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By a paradox we understand a seemingly true statement or set of
statements which lead by valid deduction to contradictory statements.
Logical paradoxes - paradoxes which involve logical concepts - are in
fact as old as the history of logic. The Liar paradox, for instance, goes
back to Epimenides (6th century B.C.?). In the late 19th century a new
impetus v/as given to the investigation of logical paradoxes by the discovery
of new logico-mathematical paradoxes such as those of Russell and Burali-
Porti. This came about in the course of attempts to give mathematics a
rigorous axiomatic foundation.
Sometimes a distinction is maintained between a paradox and an antinomy.
In a paradox, it is said, semantical notions are involved and a certain
"oddity", "strangeness", or what may be called "paradoxical situation",
resides in its construction. The resolution of a paradox is therefore
not simply a matter of removing contradiction, but also requires clarifying
and removing the "oddity". On the other hand, an antinomy is said to consist
in the derivation of a contradiction in an axiomatic system and its resolution
lies in revising the system so as to avoid the contradiction. In discussing
paradoxes and antinomies, we shall not be strictly bound by this usage of
these terms: we use "paradox" and "antinomy" interchangeably. Indeed,
from our point of view, even antinomies in an axiomatic system ultimately
need semantic clarification and thus removal of paradoxical situations.
Chapter I
BUSSELL ON PARADOXES
A. Russell's vicious circle principle
§1. Formulation of the principle
Russell agreed with Henri Poincare that logical paradoxes result
from a 'vicious circle', but dissented from Poincare's view that this
'vicious circle' is the outcome of taking infinity as actual or completed.
/
Pomncare was one of the initiators of intuitionism and was essentially
concerned with Cantorian antinomies, i.e. antinomies which arise within
the context of Cantor's set-theory. Russell was interested in other para¬
doxes as well and wanted to attack them with some uniform principle presumably
because of their structural similarity. Russell concluded from his analysis
of paradoxes that:
they all result from a certain kind of vicious circle.
The vicious circle in question arises from supposing
that a collection of objects, may contain members which
can only be defined by means of the collection as a whole.*
Russell's phraseology here is unhappy, for in employing the vocabulary of
set-theory, namely "class" and "class-membership", he gives the impression
* A. ,N. Whitehead and B. Russell, Principia Mathematica, 2nd edn. , p.37*
(Hereafter abbreviated PM).
- 2 -
that what he says has application to set-theory only. Russell's view about
'vicious circle1 may be better appreciated by his 'vicious circle principle'
in which he intended 'to avoid illegitimate totalities', namely:
Whatever involves all of a collection must not be one
of the collection
o or
If provided a certain collection had a total, it would
have members only definable in terms of that total,
then the said collection has no total.*
According to Russell if we transgress the 'vicious circle principle', we
have then an 'illegitimate totality', and thus we commit a 'vicious circle
fallacy', which leads to paradoxical consequences.
Russell's formulation of the vicious circle principle is not free from
vagueness, but by considering his illustrations we get a clear idea of what
c-
he wants to say. Russell would like to say that once we have an aggregate
or a statement or an idea, say x, then nothing, say y, defined or explained in
terms of x, can come under or be comprehended in or be a member of x. This
%
elucidation of the vicious circle principle becomes quite evident if we keep
in view Russell's examples of the violation of this principle. According to
Russell, thus, any reflexive statement or any self-inclusive one would trans¬
gress .the principle and hence involve a vicious circle fallacy, because its
application would extend to itself or come under itself. Russell himself




or reflexiveness in any statement or class. For this reason a statement
about all statements must be 'meaningless' because it is self-inclusive.
Also the law of excluded middle taken as a proposition of the form, "All
propositions are true or false", would involve a vicious circle fallacy.*
§2. Basis of the principle
It seems that Russell asserted his 'vicious circle principle' on
pragmatic and empirical grounds. He nowhere proves it by purely rational
or logical arguments. It is a merit of Poincare's vicious circle prin¬
ciple that it is based on reasoning and is not grounded simply on empirical
generalisation. As Russell seems to base his principle on inductive
generalisation, by citing various examples as evidence, it is quite suf¬
ficient to refute Russell's contention by citing counter-examples where
his principle does not hold - i.e. where reflexive statements make good
sense and may even be true.
Let us first take Russell's own example of an imaginary sceptic**
'who asserts that he knows nothing'. Russell argues, in case this assertion
be taken as self-inclusive, it commits the vicious circle fallacy and thus
leads to paradoxical consequences. This is so, according to Russell,
because the man is refuted by the implication of his own statement, namely,
that he knows that he knows nothing. This implication would then be similar
to the wise saying of Socrates, namely, "I know my ignorance". But, in fact,
knowing this much is knowing too much! A thorough-going sceptic does not mean




to assert this important implication. He would not mean to put any limitation
on the application of his assertion, 'I know nothing'. A consistent sceptic
would like to assert that he does not know whether or not he has any (unconscious)
knowledge of anything. There may be some other arguments to raise against an
all-round sceptic, .but his statements are quite consistent and sensible. Hence
Russell is mistaken in thinking that the sceptic's assertion leads to nonsen¬
sical results, because his assertion does not imply that he knows that he knows
nothing if it is taken to be self-referring.
It is not only that the sceptic's assertion is quite consistent, but there
are many statements, indeed true statements, which are reflexive, self-referring
or self-inclusive, but which according to Russell's principle must be discarded
as meaningless and absurd. For ins.tance: "All sentences are compounded of
words" is self-referring and necessarily true; "I always tell lies" with the
assumption that I make several other significant statements is a self-referring,
meaningful and necessarily false assertion; "Whatever sentence is written on
this page is in English" is self-inclusive and not only meaningful but also
empirically true; "This sentence consists of six words" is self-inclusive
and empirically true, whereas "This sentence is in French" is self-inclusive,
empirical and a false assertion. On similar lines the following sentence may
or may not be meant to be self-inclusive: "I have been told by our teacher
that I may let you know that there will not be any lecture next week." It
seems that if we accept Russell's view of vicious circle many obviously meaning¬
ful self-referring or self-inclusive statements would be rendered meaningless.
Imagine a limited company which has all limited companies as its members (share¬
holders). Now, this limited company of all limited companies is self-inclusive
because it is itself a limited company. Hence according to Russell's vicious
circle principle the notion of such a limited company shall he meaningless and
inconceivable. The principle is: "Whatever involves all of a collection must
not be one of the collection." But contrary to such a principle v.re may actually
create a limited company which includes itself such that its share-holders
are all and only those limited companies which are share-holders of themselves. ,
It seems that according to Russell's ligislation we cannot even speak signifi¬
cantly of any property (or perhaps even of a word) as being self-predicable
(or autological) because then that property (or predicate designated by the word)
can be applied to itself and that involves self-reference, which Russell would
like to exclude from any statement in accordance with his own principle. But in
fact we may reasonably say that abstract is abstract or concept is concept or
the word 'polysyllabic' is polysyllabic or 'noun' is noun, etc.
§3. Extension of Russell's principle
V/e might be accused of misinterpreting Russell's vicious circle principle
and it might be argued that Russell did not mean to extend the notion of vicious
circle to such lengths ; or that v/e can make the principle valid by minor modi¬
fications. Thus it may be remarked that the principle does not extend to the
case of saying "'polysyllabic' is polysyllabic" or "'black' is black" because
the principle extends only where the meaning of a phrase is involved and does
not refer to the written or spoken aspects of words. But we have provided ample
examples of self-reference where only meanings are involved, like an idea (or
concept) is an idea (or concept), or the example given in the previous sub¬
section about the information given by the teacher. Or take the following
assertion: "What I am saying is meaningful". It is self-referring and also
meaningful. It cannot be regarded as meaningless, for then it would contradict
itself and entail the falsity of the assertion and this falsity would, in turn,
imply the meaningfulness of the assertion. Hence this self-referring expression
must be regarded as meaningful.
Again it might be suggested that Russell's principle is in fact a combin¬
ation of several principles and it is only, e.g. in the case of definition
that this principle should be regarded as properly applicable. In other cases
where there is just self-description or self-reference, it should not be taken
seriously. Against this suggestion, however, it must be said that in the, first
place, this was not the intention of Russell as evidenced in his explanation
and samples of vicious circle. Secondly, we have given above diverse examples
to refute various sorts of formulation of the principle. And unless we have
been given a definite and unambiguous formulation, it is not illuminating to
comment at random on various possible formulations of the vicious circle prin¬
ciple. Russell himself has given us no clue as to restrictions imposed on the
use of the principle and hence we are justified in giving above an "extended"
interpretation of his principle.
In the case of Poincare's view of vicious circle we have a criterion for
deciding where to find a vicious circle, namely, when we treat infinity as
completed. But Russell has provided us with no such criterion. Moreover he
has not offered any rational justification for his principle except one based
/S> . ' <
on inductive or pragmative grounds. Hence we have to rely on his examples of
vicious circle for the interpretation of his principle.
It is amply clear, therefore, from the above illustrations that Russell is
mistaken in believing that the so-called vicious circle fallacy (as leading to
!.
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absurdity or contradiction) will always ensue if we transgress the vicious
circle principle. Even if Russell were to modify his statement and say that
ail paradoxes originate in a 'vicious circle' and not that all 'vicious circle'
statements, that is, self-inclusive, reflexive, or self-referring expressions,
lead to paradoxical consequences, he could still be easily refuted. There are
several paradoxes in which no question of 'vicious circle' arises i.e. which
do not seem to involve any self-inclusive statements. Eor instance, the
paradox of the Unpredictable Examination and the paradox of' the sophist
Protagoras and his pupil*. Nevertheless, even if Russell were to restrict
himself to well-Enown paradoxes which have been favourites of philosophers
or which he himself discusses, and so restricts the applicability or relevancy
of his principle to such paradoxes, he does not seem to be successful in his
account, as we shall now show.
§4. Russell's logic and his principle
Before examining the actual examples of paradoxes which Russell con¬
siders to confirm his principle, let us first familiarise ourselves with his
logical apparatus. As a proposition would be meaningless if it suffered from
vicious circle, his logical symbols to be well-formed must not violate the
vicious circle principle. Accordingly, Russell says that in a given function
the values of a function cannot contain terms only definable
✓ t a.
in terms of the function. Now given a function <px}the values
for the function are all propositions of the form $x. It
follows that there must be no propositions, of the form <pxf
in which x has a value which involves <px.**




Russell argues that this cannot be the case, otherwise the values of the
function would not all be determinate until the function were determinate,
but we know the function not to be determinate unless its values are
previously determinate. Hence, we can thereby clearly see that it would
be then a case of vicious circle. Therefore Russell concludes that there
must be no such thing as the value for $x with the argument <j>x or with
any other argument which involves <px. The symbol "<p(<j>x)" must not express
a proposition, as "<j>a" does if <pa is a value for The symbol "<}>{<px)"
does not express anything; it is not significant. On this point Russell
remarks:
Thus given any function <f>x3 there are arguments with which the
function has no value We will call the arguments with which
<px has a value "possible values of a?'. We will say that <j>x
is "significant with the argument x" when <j>x has a value with
the argument x.*
By such legislation Russell has been able to avoid the occurrence of
'vicious circle' in his symbolic apparatus.**
B. On the paradoxes discussed by Russell
We have just quoted Russell to see how vicious circle principle
affects his symbolism. Keeping in view the' above symbolic structure
let us consider the paradoxes enumerated by Russell as evidence for
the claim that the paradoxes are the result of a vicious circle.
* Ibid.
** In fact, in Russell's logical symbo!lism two rules corresponding to
his simple theory of types and his ramified theory of types are
required to avoid the vicious circle fallacy. More will be said





Russell says that in all these paradoxes:
there is a common characteristic which we may describe as
self-reference or reflexiveness In each contradiction
something is said about ail cases of some kind,and from what
is said a new case seems to be generated, which both is and
is not of the same kind as the cases of which all were con¬
cerned in what was said. But this is the characteristic of
illegitimate totalities, as defined them in stating the
vicious circle principle. Hence all our contradictions
are illustrations of vicious circle fallacies. It only
remains to show, therefore, that the illegitimate totalities
involved are excluded by the hierarchy of types *
That is, using the symbolic expressions as delineated and. directed by
the above sub-section we should avoid vicious circle fallacies in terms
of his theory of types, which will be discussed at a later time.
Our first objection to the above statement is that even if we
grant in all the illustrations we come across a 'vicious circle', it
is by no means certain that the 'vicious circle' alone would only be a
necessary but also sufficient basis for the contradiction (paradox)
and hence solely by the removal of 'vicious circle' shall we be able
to uproot the contradiction and thus remove the paradox in a plausible
and reasonable way. A vicious circle in the following illustrations
is not a sufficient condition, but may be one of the necessary con¬
ditions for the paradox to arise. Let us now turn to his illustrations
in sequence.
§1. The Liar paradox
Russell first takes up the following version of the Liar paradox:
"I am lying." Taken as a statement which must be either true or false,




this statement leads to contradiction. In order to avoid the contradiction,
Russell would say, we must avoid the self-inclusiveness of the statement,
that is, we must restrict its application so that it cannot be taken as
self-inclusive. . Thus, this statement is to be interpreted in accordance
with Russell's theory of types. The statement "I am lying" according to
Russell means: "There is a proposition which I am affirming and which is
false". That is: "I assert p and p is false". If this proposition is
supposed to apply to itself, it involves then self-reference and hence
commits the vicious circle fallacy. In order to avoid this unpleasant
situation Russell asserts that the word "false" is ambiguous and that in
order to make it unambiguous, precise and univocal we must pinpoint the
order of falsehood. This order of falsehood is determined by specifying
the order of the proposition to which falsehood is ascribed. There are
propositions about individual existent things; again there may be propo¬
sitions about such previous propositions in turn and so on and so forth.
To quote Russell:
We saw also that, if p is a proposition of the nth order, a
. proposition in which p occurs as an apparent variable is not of
the nth order, but of a higher order. Hence the kind of truth
or falsehood which can belong to the statement "there is a
proposition p which I am affirming and which has falsehood
. of the nth order" is truth or falsehood of a higher order
than the nth. Hence the statement of Epimenides does not
fall within its scope and therefore no contradiction emerges.*
Thus, according to Russell the statement "I am lying" taken meaning¬
fully consists of a combination of an infinite number of statements in the
form: "I am asserting a false proposition of the first order", "I am
asserting a false proposition of the second order" and so on. Now,
* Ibid, p.62.
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according to Russell's analysis, as no proposition of the first order is
asserted, the statement "I am asserting a false proposition of the first
order", is to be regarded false: as according to Russell this statement
consists of two statements (i) I assert p (2) P is false, of which (l)
is false and so the conjunction is false. Hence we get a true state¬
ment of the second order: "I am asserting a false proposition of the
first order" is false. Hence the statement "I am making a false state¬
ment of the second order" is true. Again this is the only•statement of
the third order. Hence the statement "I am making a false statement of
the third order" is false. Thus Russell concludes:
Thus we see that the statement "I am making a false statement
of order 2n+1" is false, while the statement "I am making a
false statement of order 2n" is true. But in this state of
things there is no contradiction.
Both Russell's analysis and his solution of the Liar paradox
are objectionable. If the contradiction in the Liar paradox arises
solely from a vicious circle, then why does it not arise in the following
parallel statement "I am speaking the truth"? This shows that the cause
of contradiction (paradox) is not solely due to the vicious circle, hence
that Russell has failed to specify the sufficient cause of the contradic¬
tion. Nor does Russell's solution in terms of a hierarchy of "true" and
"false" seem convincing. His claim that the words "true" and "false"
are ambiguous and have different meanings (in fact an infinite number of
meanings according to the order of the proposition) does not reflect the
real meanings or the logical behaviour of the words "true" and "false".
When I say "All statements on this page are true", this statement applies
to itself, i.e., it is self-inclusive, and it may well be a true state¬
ment. The truth of this statement no doubt banks upon the truthfulness
I
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of the rest of the statements on this page. That is, in order to verify
this statement, we must verify the rest of the statements on this page.
Also the question of truthfulness in this arises only if there are other
statements on the page so that the question of the truthfulness of these
statements could be settled without further reference to the question of
truthfulness of some other statements. This shows that the method of verifi¬
cation of a statement which concerns all other statements on this page is
different from that of other statements on the page. But it does not
follow from this that every value has "first truth" i.e. , the truth
of the first order, and the sort of truth appropriate to (x) .<j>x is
"second truth" i.e., the truth of the second order different from that
of the first order, as Russell wants us to believe. Because of the con¬
fusion between the method of verification and the question of truth (i.e.
whether we can sensibly raise the question of whether the statement is true
or false) with the notion of truth, Russell seems to have been misled into
thinking that "I am lying" paraphrased as "I am asserting a false proposition
of the first order" is false. In fact, according to his analysis, we are
led to the unhappy consequence that the statements "I am lying" and
"I am speaking the truth" should have the same truth-value, namely false¬
hood, because in both cases no proposition of the first order is being
asserted. Ke should have argued rather that since there is no proposition
(i.e. a statement which is true or false) of the first order, the question
of truth and thus the question of the verification of the statement "I am
asserting a false proposition of the first order" - i.e. the statement
"I am lying"-does not arise: insofar as such a question is necessarily
linked with the truth of the statement, we cannot talk of this sentence
being true or false. It nowhere follows from Russell's argument that the
notion of truth is ambiguous and that there is an hierarchy of different
meanings of the word "true" or the word "false".
§2. Russell's paradox
In the case of the paradox of the class of all classes which are not
members of themselves, now called Russell's paradox, the contradiction results
from posing the question whether this class is a member of itself or not.
According to Russell:
a proposition about a class is always to be reduced to a state¬
ment about a function which defines the class, i.e. about a
function which is satisfied by the members of the class and
by no other arguments. Thus a class is an object derived from
a function and presupposing a function, just as, for example,
(x) ,<px presupposes the function <px. Hence a class cannot, by
the vicious circle principle, significantly be the argument
to its defining function, that is to say, if we denote by
"z(tpz)" the class defined by (j>z, the symbol "<f>\z(<j>z)[n must
be meaningless *
Hence, according to Russell, no class can be a member of itself: class-
self-membership is rather meaningless, and so to say that such-and-such
class is a member of or is not a member of itself is meaningless. Russell's
argument seems to be highly implausible. He tries to show by inductive
generalisation that all paradoxes are the result of a vicious circle; he
makes the generalisation that where there is a vicious circle, it leads to
paradoxes, meaninglessness, and absurdity. Russell gives no other reason
for rejecting the notion of self-membership of any set except that it involves
a vicious circle. This is a very unconvincing analysis of the situation. In
fact, he could have reasonably argued that the rejection of self-membership
of the set follows directly from the very concept of set. and set-membership -
a point to which we shall return at a later stage. However the meaninglessness
of the concept of self-membership for sets does not follow. That is, "~(a£a?)"




of "a£m". Russell fails to provide any rational ground for the belief
that a vicious circle necessarily leads either to contradiction or to
meaninglessness.
§3. Class and Relation paradoxes
Russell was ahle to derive the contradiction by using both the notions:
"x is a member of and "x is not a member of x". His layout of the
paradox is similar to that of the Barber paradox and the Relation paradox
(discussed below). But it does not follow from the fact that if these
paradoxes have some structural similarity, then they are structurally'
identical.* Our objection to Russell's analysis of the Class, i.e.,
Russell paradox, is that he does' not bring out the essential structure
involved in the paradox. Apart from the structural features which it shares
with the Barber paradox and the Relation paradox, the more important and
essential structure involved in the Class paradox is similar to that of,
say, the Class of all classes (discussed in Chapter V). Again, if we
follow Russell's description of the Class paradox, that it results from a
'vicious circle' then there should occur a contradiction even if we remould
the paradox so as to concern the class of all classes which are members of
themselves. But, in fact, no contradiction emerges according to his analysis.
That is, Russell cannot show us any contradiction if in our argument we bring
in " |:c:cc£a?i", although "x£cc" is clearly a case of a vicious circle. Hence
Russell cannot show the meaninglessness of "x£x" in that it results from
contradiction solely derived from his analysis of the paradox in question.
Russell's presentation of the Class paradox is similar to the paradox
The notion of structure of paradox is discussed in the next chapter.
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of 'the relation (T) which holds between the relations R and S whenever R
does not have the relation R to S'*. Let the relation T be R, then "R has
the relation R to S" is equivalent to "R does not have the relation R to S",
leading thus to contradiction. As it was in the case of classes, a class
cannot by the vicious circle principle significantly be the argument to
its defining function, that is to say, if we denote by the class
defined by <pz} the symbol must be meaningless. Similarly, if
we let the relation R be defined, say by the function <f>(cc,y), (i.e. R
holds between x and y whenever is true, but not otherwise). Then to
interpret "R has the relation R to Sn" we shall have to suppose that R and
S can significantly be the arguments to 0. But this would require that <P
should be able to take as an argument an object which is defined in terms
of 9, and this no function can do because of the vicious circle principle.
Hence "R has the relation R to S" is meaningless, and thus Russell says, the
contradiction vanishes. Our objection is the same as mentioned above, that
if we confine ourselves in our argument only to the notion "R has the relation
R to S" and do not bring in the notion of "R does not have the relation R to S"
no contradiction arises, although in the notion of "R has the relation R to S"
the vicious circle principle is exemplified. Hence, violation of the vicious
circle principle alone cannot be deemed responsible for the emergence of
contradiction. Russell, in fact, would agree that in most cases the
conclusions of the arguments which involve vicious circle fallacies will
not be self-contradictory, but he states:
* Cf. Ibid, pp.60, 63.
- 16 -
wherever we have an illegitimate totality, a little ingenuity
will enable us to construct a vicious circle fallacy leading
to a contradiction, which disappears as soon as the typically
ambiguous words are rendered typically definite, i.e. are
determined as belonging to this or that type.*
This is a very elusive reply and Russell provides no example of his
ingenuity in cases where we use only the notion of self-membership of
classes, or the notion of relation R having the relation R to S such
that they would lead to contradictions. Possibly what Russell calls a
'little ingenuity' would discover some factor other than 'vicious
circle' which becomes mainly responsible for contradictions. In the
paradox under discussion the notion of "R does not have the relation
R to S" enters in just as in the case of the class paradox the notion
of "not a member of itself" creeps in to bring about the contradiction.
We may interpret Russell's concealed argument as follows: As the notion
"R has the relation R to S" commits the vicious circle fallacy, it is
meaningless. Hence the opposite notion "R does not have the relation
R to S" is also meaningless (or ill-formed). As the argument involving
the notion "R has the relation R to S" and its opposite leads to contra¬
diction as shown in the above paradox, we need to expose and eliminate
the root-cause of the evil, namely, vicious circle. That is, in order
to remove the paradox, we should make the notions significant and this
is only possible if we avoid the vicious circle. Russell ignores to discuss
the structure or skeleton of the argument which occurs while creating a
paradoxical argument with the help of notions like "R has and does not have
the relation R to S". But this structure is of great importance, and hence
by ignoring this, Russell has failed to present an adequate analysis of the
* Ibid. p.6if. Russell uses many expressions like 'illegitimate totality',
'systematic ambiguity', 'vicious circle fallacy', 'insignificant', mean¬
ingless' etc. etc. without specifying their discriminating characteris¬
tics. As it stands, the expression 'illegitimate totality' may be taken
as equivalent to 'systematic ambiguity' or even to 'vicious circle
fallacy', although these expressions seem to denote different concepts
which are nevertheless connected with one another.
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paradox. Russell vaguely saw some similarity in structure between the class
paradox and the relation paradox, although he proffered an inaccurate account
of it.
As already mentioned, Russell rejected Poincare's contention that the
contradictions arise because of introducing the notion of actual or completed
infinity.* Russell saw that we encounter contradictions even if there is
a finite number of things and no question of infinity could arise. But
he mistakenly assumed that there could only be one common root-cause behind
all the paradoxes. It might, be that in certain cases the trouble-spot may
be treating infinity as completed, although in some such cases there might
be an additional factor in common with other paradoxes which concern only a
finite number of objects. It seems Russell was blinded by his eagerness to dig
out a uniform formula to mend all the paradoxes. But there may be several
ailments needing diverse treatments, each treatment or medicine best-
suited to cure some particular sort of ailment, and no panacea to cure all
the paradoxes. The urge to attain uniformity, harmony and oneness is deeply-
seated; it is as old as man. The search for elixir and philosopher's stone,
in order to cure all diseases and to convert baser metals into gold, and
Russell's vicious circle principle are examples of this natural urge.
§4. Berry's paradox
Next, we come to Berry's paradox of 'the least integer not nameable
in fewer than nineteen syllables', the paradox of 'the least indefinable
ordinal', and the Richard paradox. It is difficult to see how the vicious
* See H. Poincare, The Logic of Infinity' and 'Mathematics and Logic' transl.
in Mathematics and Science: Last Essays; Science and Method, Part II.
- 18 -
circle fallacy is responsible for the rise of such paradoxes. Russell tries
to show how these paradoxes embody the vicious circle fallacy. He points out
that the Berry paradox results from thinking that 'the least integer* not
nameable in fewer than nineteen syllables' is itself a name. First we come
to know that there is in fact a least integer which is not nameable in fewer
than nineteen syllables. This we know because the number of syllables in English
names of finite integers grow larger, ana must generally increase indefinitely.
Hence the names of some integers must consist of at least nineteen syllables
and among them there must be a least. Hence this particular number is both
nameable and not nameable in less than nineteen syllables. It is nameable
in fewer than nineteen syllables, because we regard 'the least integer not
nameable in fewer than nineteen syllables' as itself a name, which consists
of less than nineteen syllables. Here we are confronted with a contradic¬
tion. But this contradiction arises only in confusing two different methods
of naming integers. According to one method of naming, which is our
ordinary way of counting numbers, the order and number of definite syllables
is essential and all-important. According to this procedure, the discussed
number would be that number chosen by selecting the naming expression which
would just occur when the counting expression just exceeds eighteen syllables
i.e. nineteen or more than nineteen syllables. This method actually deter¬
mines both the name (numeral) as well as the number because by convention
we usually understand such names as numbers. Once we have the number by
the above method we may designate this number by the expression "the least
integer not nameable in fewer than nineteen syllables". Obviously this
expression would be really equivalent to "the least integer not nameable in
fewer than nineteen syllables in the English language as used in ordinary
counting". In case the above equivalence does not hold and the "nineteen
syllables" in the expression "the least integer not nameable in fewer than
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nineteen syllables" should mean "nineteen syllables in the expression formed
by any meaningful English expression", then we do not have any clue as to what
number we are talking about. The simple designation "the least integer not
nameable in fewer than nineteen syllables" does not apply to any particular
number unless v/e already know some particular method by which the significant
English expressions are to be arranged. The manner of classification of
expressions is very important. It may be that according to one classification
one number is named or described in more than nineteen syllables and according
to some other classification the same number is named or described in fewer
than nineteen syllables. Russell himself remarks that the number mentioned
in the expression 'the least integer not nameable in fewer than nineteen
syllables' in fact is 111777- Russell obviously arrived at the number 111777
by considering expressions which are arranged in accordance with the normal
v/ay of counting numbers in English. Thus the number 111777 would be expressed
by "One hun/dred and e/le/ven thou/sand se/ven hun/dred ana se/ven/ty se/ven",
which of course is constituted of just nineteen syllables. But the same number
(111777) can be expressed by some other English expression having less than
nineteen syllables e.g., we may simply omit two "ands" in the above 19-syllabic
expression, or we may express the same number by the expression "Three thou/
sand and twen/ty one mul/ti/plied by thir/ty se/ven". But if there is some
precise, clear-cut, unambiguous and we11-determined rule for writing series
of numbers, there will not appear any contradiction as we have above. Erom
the foregoing discussion it is clear that the expression "the least integer
not nameable in fewer than nineteen syllables" cannot be said to have full
significance unless we have already some unambiguous rule for framing names
for numbers by combining definite syllables. According to Russell the word
"nameable" in the Berry expression refers to the totality of names and hence
=T7-_
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the expression cannot stand by itself without infringing the 'vicious circle
principle'.* In accordance with the theory of types we have thus a hierarchy
of functions. We, therefore, have to distinguish names of different orders.
Elementary names will be true 'proper names' without involving any description.
First-order names involve description by means of first-order function - that is, if
tp\x is a first-order function, then the term satisfying this function will be a
first-order name, although according to Russell, there may not be any corres-
poinding object to be named. Second-order names involve similarly the second
order function. Also such names may involve reference to the totality of first-
order names. So the phrase "nameable" remains systematically ambiguous unless
we mention the corresponding order, and the name in which the unambiguous phrase
"nameable by names of order n" occurs is necessarily of higher order than the
nth. Hence no paradox arises. Accordingly Russell would like the 19-syllable '
expression to be paraphrased as "the least integer not nameable in fewer than
j .
nineteen syllables of order n", and since this expression (considered as a name)
would belong to order n+1, there is no contradiction if it has less than nine¬
teen syllables. So two or more names of different orders may denote the same
number without involving any contradiction. The question arises how to make a
hierarchy of names. Take the following expressions: (a) "ten multiplied by
two" (b) "four multiplied by five" (c) "ten added to ten" (d) "twenty" etc.
These expressions represent the same number but have a different number of
syllables. Do these expressions as names belong to the same order or not?
If they do not belong to the same order, then we should not treat them on the
same level as we actually do in arithmetic. Again, according to Russell's
ramified theory of types, irrational numbers should be regarded of higher
order than rational numbers; for the former are to be defined as classes of
* Cf. PM, p.63-4.
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rational numbers. Hence it follows that the name of a number in terms
of irrational numbers would be of different order from that of in terms
of rational numbers. But we do not maintain this distinction in
arithmetic*. The fact is that in the Berry paradox we are not con¬
cerned with the systematic ambiguity of the concept "name", and hence
there is no need of a hierarchy of names. The real problem is simply
to remove the ambiguity. Once it is clarified, the paradoxical tangle
is resolved. There is no question of systematic ambiguity corresponding
to different types of naming. Again the contradiction does not arise
because of any vicious circle involved in Berry's puzzle; it arises
because of ambiguity and vagueness. Russell would himself agree that
if we write the expression "the least integer which is not nameable in
less than nineteen syllables", then the contradiction would cease, for
the new expression makes up nineteen syllables.
Whether the expression is self-inclusive or not is another matter.
Once we formulate an unambiguous1 method for the generation of names,
it is then an empirical question whether or not the said formula involves
the expression used for the formation of the formula. That is, self-
inclusiveness of the formula is incidental. Consider e.g. the expression
"The least integer which is nameable (using expressions based on our
ordinary counting system) only by syllables of the words used on this
page such that each definite and distinguished syllable is used only once
* To avert the unpleasant situation which results from the ramified
theory of types, Russell introduces the axiom of reducibility, which
asserts that functions of different order may be equivalent. This




Not; this expression is meant to include itself. Our objective is to
avoid ambiguity and it is not always or necessarily the case that this
objective is achieved by applying the vicious circle principle. Again
Russell's account presents an unfair account of the Berry expression
"the least integer not nameable in fewer than nineteen syllables" by
calling it a name, because this expression is indeterminate and cannot
attain the status of name unless we already know a specific method of
arranging names. Hence, to say of it that it is a second-order name
seems unfortunate.
|5. Other paradoxes treated by Russell
Similar remarks can be applied to the paradox of 'the least trans-
finite ordinal' and Richard's paradox discussed in Chapter IV. Russell
states the Burali-Forti paradox in the following words:
It can be shown that every well-ordered series has an ordinal
number, that the series of ordinals up to and including any
given ordinal exceeds the given ordinal by one, and (on
certain very natural assumptions) that the series of all
ordinals (in order of magnitude) is well-ordered. It follows
that the series of all ordinals has an ordinal number,-n_say.
But in that case the series of all ordinals including_/v_ has
an ordinal number-^+l, which must be greater than-n-. Hence
-a_is not the ordinal number of all ordinals.*
To put the matter crudely, the paradox arises from two premisses:
(a) the series of all ordinals up to and including any given ordinal
exceeds the given ordinal; and
(b) the series of all ordinals has an ordinal number.
The first assertion implies that given any ordinal there is a greater
* Ibid, p. 60 ,-1.
- 23 -
ordinal. The second assertion implies that there is the greatest ordinal
which contradicts the first implication. To avoid the paradoxical situation,
Russell employs his hierarchy of types that is in this case hierarchy of
ordinals. He says:
....... a series is a relation, and an ordinal number is a
class of series .... Hence a series of ordinal numbers is a
relation between classes of relations, and is of higher type
than any of the series which are members of the-ordinal
numbers in question. Burali-Forti's "ordinal number of all
ordinals" must be the ordinal number of all ordinals of a
given type, and must therefore be of higher type than any
of these ordinals. Hence it is not one of these ordinals,
and there is no contradiction in its being greater than
any of them.*
Our objections to this resolution are the same as we levied against his
theory of types in general. We return to this paradox in Chapter V.
C. Meaninglessness and type-theory
gl. Vicious circle and meaninglessness
Russell's basis for asserting that vicious circle leads to meaning-
lessness may be: (a) that the vicious circle leads to contradiction; or
(b) that common-sense suggests so. It seems clear that the fact that
certain statements involving a vicious circle lead to contradiction, in
no way implies that they are meaningless. Even the notion of "square-
circle" is meaningful, though it is self-contradictory. Even in an axio¬
matic system the combination of symbols p.~-p is regarded as a well-formed
though self-contradictory formula. As far as the other Consideration is
concerned, of course, common-sense does perceive many instances where self-
inclusive sentences lead to meaninglessness. Taking Russell's own example,
if the prepositional function '$&•' means '£ is a man' , then (also in
accordance with the vicious circle principle) becomes meaningless,
and this can be directly seen when we consider 'jis is a man'.** As Russell
"Ibid, p.63.
'Cf. Ibid. p.41.
remarks: 'we cannot legitimately deny "the function 'a is a man' is a man",
because this is nonsense'. From direct inspection and reflection, Bussell
is led to think that the things which we say about individuals, we cannot
significantly say about the properties (functions) of individuals; and
again the things which we sensibly say about the properties (functions)
of individuals, we cannot say about the properties (functions) of the
properties (functions) of individuals, etc. We significantly say of per¬
sons that' they are honest or dishonest,' but to say that certain characteris¬
tics of man are honest or dishonest would be non-sensical, because it is
only about persons that we can sensibly say that they are honest or
dishonest.
Bussell is quite aware of the distinction between a false statement
and a meaningless sentence (although he does not make any distinction
between a meaningful sentence which is neither true nor false and one which
can be said to be true or false). Now, Bussell appeals solely to common-
sense to support the claim that self-inclusive functions are meaningless.
It is easy to refute him, as we have already done earlier, by actually
citing instances where we can not only make significant statements by
means of self-inclusive sentences, but also we can reasonably say whether
they could be true or false. In the above example we can reasonably say:
"All G-reek men's opinions are honest" and hence the word "honest" is not
only used to apply for men but also for their opinions. In fact, common-
sense would rather suggest that it is quite meaningful to ask whether a
set can or cannot be a member of itself; in fact it is necessarily false
(contradictory) that a set is a member of itself and it is necessarily true
that it is not a member of itself, as will be explained in Chapter V.
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1
rding to Russell, the sentence "this proposition is false" when considered
sxively will be meaningless. A little reflection will show that it cannot
lything but meaningful. For suppose a proposition P be meaningless,
the statement saying that p is true or p is false is false and hence
Lngful. But in this special case "This proposition is false", "p is
j" is nothing else than p itself and hence p is meaningful contradicting
iriginal hypothesis. There seems to be no reason why meaninglessness
.a follow from the vicious circle. Our judgement that such-and-such a
>e or sentence is meaningless or meaningful depends upon the context of
.ituation*. In certain contexts the vicious circle leads to meaningless-
in others it does not. In certain other contexts where there is no
ion of vicious circle the sentences may still be regarded as meaningless,
nstance the assertion "My watch is sweet and delicious", or "An elephant
square root of two" are meaningless and the reason is that the watch
lephant are not the sort of things which could be sweet and a square
of two, respectively. No fixed and definite criterion can be given to
nguish meaningless phrases or sentences. Again it is not certain that
e assertion that certain relation or property is meaningless, its con-
ctory must also be meaningless. If "a£n" is meaningless, it does not
,v that "otfZa?1 is also meaningless. As Russell bases his theory of meaning-
sss on the vicious circle principle, he should have shown independently
in the case of "£$&c" i.e. "sa is not a member of a?', the vicious circle
Lple is violated in order to show that is meaningless. It seems
ae assumes another principle, namely that if any sentence is meaningless,
Ls point is discussed in Chapter III, pp.94-8.
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then its negation is also meaningless; although he does not state it
explicitly. In certain cases this principle may hold but it all depends
on the contextual situation*.
§2. Systematic ambiguity: type theory and meaninglessness
In certain cases certain propositions appear to be meaningfully
self-inclusive. Such a proposition according to Russell is in fact ambi¬
guous, that is, it combines many statements having different types -
for example the proposition "(p).pis false" the proposition asserting
that all propositions are false. Such a proposition is infected with
systematic ambiguity. The above proposition in fact says that proposi¬
tions of a certain type are false but the proposition making such an
assertion would be of a higher type. So there is an ambiguity in the
terms "true" and "false" and they can be applied unambiguously only to
propositions of a certain order (type) and not to all propositions of
whatever order. Kence, in fact these terms have an infinite number of
meanings corresponding to an infinite number of orders of propositions.
We must not confuse the various types of meanings; otherwise we shall
get into systematic ambiguity, and hence contradiction and meaninglessness.
I
Therefore, according to Russell's type theory, it would seem that the
phrases "ccis a member of y" (a£y) or " x Is not a member of y" (cjZy)
would be meaningless unless x is of type n and y of type Ji+1.
Discussing this point, L. G-oddard** considers the problem whether
* This point is discussed in Chapter III, pp. 54 3.
** See L. G-oddard, 'Sense and Nonsense' , Mind 19&4, pp»309-31«
we can reasonably say that the class-membership is transitive, intransitive,
reflexive, irreflexive or not. Class-membership (£) cannot be transitive,
for it is then ((xn^yn+j • y-n+l^3n+2^ ^ xr$~2n.s^J ~ (subscripts denoting the
types) should hold, but then the deduction of nonsense would follow from
sense, for in the conclusion x£s} the class 2 is not of immediate higher type
than that of its member and hence the ambiguity of types occurs, for the same
reason it cannot be intransitive (i.e., ((o£y. y£a) D u£s))), nor can it be
non-transitive. The same comments hold for the relation of symmetry and
reflexivity. The relation "next to" is symmetric as it satisfies "xRy D yft-x
the relation "father of" is assymmetric: it satisfies always "oSyD y^x". The
relation non-symmetric is neither symmetric nor assymmetric. But in case the
relation R is £, & and y cannot be of ascending consecutive types. Again £
;annot be reflexive, since "x£x" is meaningless fox- all x} nor irreflexive for
'ajtat' too is meaningless, nor non-reflexive since "~(rc) (a£rc) . ~(£c)(a^cc)" is
Likewise meaningless. Thus Goddard comments:
Thus whereas every two-termed relation has (at least) three
properties: one drawn from the transitivit}^-trio, one from
the symmetry-trio, and one from the reflexivity-trio, £ has
none of these. And this faces us with a choice between the
theory of types and otherwise reputable laws of logic, for it
is easy to establish as laws theorems which express the fact
that every relation has one property in each trichotomy. Thus,
for example,that every two-termed relation is either reflexive,
irreflexive or non-reflexive is expressed by,
(a) (x)(aRos) v (aiKccSmr) v (*~(x)(x8x) , ~'(x){cq(x))
which is an immediate consequence of the sentential law "p v~p".-;
Goddard gives another example to show that the acceptance of type-
heory does lead to far more serious consequences, namely, rejection of the




If ® is a member of the Pan-Hellenic League then sis a state.
If a; is a state then a: is not an individual.
Hence, if sis a member of the Pan-Hellenic League then x is not an
individual.
That is, if s is an individual then x is not a member of the Pan-Hellenic
League.
Hence, if Pericles is an individual then Pericles is not a member of the
Pan-Hellenic League.
But, Pericles is an individual; therefore,
Pericles is not a member of the Pan-Hellenic League.
The conclusion when expressed in accordance with Russell's theory of
types is meaningless. But the argument is validly drawn from true premisses.
So either we must reject the theory or the validity. G-oddard shows that the
premisses can be meaningfully stated according to the theory of types and
thus he concludes:
The argument thus faces us withiJa dilemma: a choice between
the theory of types and the rest of logic. Por if we accept
the truth of the conclusion or deny the truth of the premises,
we have to reject the theory of types; but if we try to save
the theory by denying the validity of the argument, we have to
reject otherwise cherished laws such as, ' (p D q . q D rj D p D r'
and 1 (p 3 q) s (~gr D~p)'; or the rule of substitution ('Pericles'
for ' x*); or the rule of detachment. And of course we cannot
reject any one of these in isolation. The rejection of any one
would entail a major logical breakdown.
The dilemma, then, is not simply a choice between the theory
of types and (a)-laws, it is a choice between the theory of
types and the rest of logic.*
It is clear from Goddard's criticism that Russell's theory of meaning-
lessness as it emerges from Russell's theory of types cannot be accepted
without first limiting the range of application of his theory of types.
We shall soon take up this point again.
* Ibid.. p.315.
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Apart from the above criticism, the very idea of systematic
ambiguity suggests that there should be a common notion of which we
could talk of its systematic ambiguity. The systematic ambiguity of the
word "false" is quite different from the ambiguity of the word "bat".
Russell nowhere explains why in certain cases there is a question of
systematic ambiguity and why for instance we use the same word "false"
in all the types of falsehood, but in certain other cases the vicious
circle leads to meaninglessness.
Again, there is a problem linked with the above point as to how .
to formulate the type-theory in a Russellian type-theoretical language.
Pap discusses this point*. He asserts the impossibility of formulating
statements about types within a type-theoretical language; to express,
for instance, the theorem that distinct types do not overlap. Pap ex¬
presses this in the language of quantification:
for any class A and Bt if A is a type and B is a type and
A is distinct from B, then there is no x such that a: is a
member of both A and P.*
%
Clearly there is a reference to all classes, which is meaningless according
to Pussellian type-theory. Again if we express semantically by saying
that if "P" and "Q" are different type-predicates, then it is meaningless
to say "Fx. Qxs'. But how to express that the same entity, say a, cannot
occur as "Pa . Qa" without using an unrestricted variable ("entity").
Hence Pap concludes:
* A. Pap, 'Types and Meaninglessness', Mind 19^0 5 p.44»
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it cannot be expressed in a logically perfect language of the
Russellian kind. The old difficulty of how to formulate
Rus Llian type theoiy without violating it in the very
act of formulation has reappeared.*
Also there is a problem of how to arrange entities in a hierarchy of
types and also what is meant by saying that such-and-such things are of the
same logical type. Colours and shapes are taken by logicians as entities
jf the same type, being attributes of the first -level (i.e., of individuals),
ret colours can be said to be bright while it would be regarded as non-sensic
:o say that a triangle is bright.
It is clear from the above discussion that Russell's whole machinery
;o eliminate unwanted and meaningless expressions, namely, that of vicious
:ircle, systematic ambiguity and type-theory, abounds with difficulties and
>bscurities. Perhaps Russell's aim could be interpreted as a search for
in ideal language which would satisfy the requirements of type-theory,
nd then the requirements of type-theory would amount to the requirements
'or well-formed formula in this system or language. But in that case type-
heory and the vicious circle principle should not be taken seriously out-
ide the limited range of the system in question. In particular, also, the
.anguage in which type-theory is described should not be 'subject to such
■estrictions. Just as vie regard symbols or expressions such as pDVq as
leaningless and ill-formed in the propositional calculus, likewise the ex¬
pressions involving vicious circle and systematic ambiguity would be deemed
eaningless and ill-formed in the system under scrutiny. In that case,
Ibid. '
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Russell should show the need and utility for such a system and why such
requirements to prevent meaninglessness are necessary and relevant for
its construction and what are the limitations for the application of
this system. But Russell nowhere suggests that his vicious circle
principle of his type-theory should have restricted application.
Moreover he did not even lay down strict rules for the formation (or
prohibition) of such well-formed (or respectively ill-formed) formulae.
That is, he did not provide us with clear-cut, strict and unambiguous
criteria for meaningless phrases. G-Odel criticizes Russell for his
lack of precision, though perhaps for different reasons. He says:
It is to be regretted that Ms first comprehensive and
thorough going presentation of a mathematical logic and
the derivation of mathematics from it is so greatly lacking
■in formal precision in the foundations (contained in *I-*2I
of Principia) that it presents in this respect a considerable
step backwards as compared with Rrege. What is missing,
above all, is a precise statement of the syntax of the for¬
malism. Syntactical considerations are omitted even in
cases where they are necessary for the cogency of the proofs,
in particular in connection with "incomplete symbols" *
D. Russell's philosophy of mathematics
SI. Russell and Poincare
Russell seems to be chiefly interested in obviating the paradoxes
rather 'chan of proper analysing and studying of the concepts involved
in them. He thinks that a vicious circle is responsible for all the
above paradoxes ana hence if it is avoided, his purpose of averting
the paradoxes is achieved. With this aim in view he was led to create
his theory of types. His main argument by empirical justification, that
* K. Gbdel, 'Russell's Mathematical Logic', in The Philosophy of
Bertrand Russell, p.126.
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vicious circle is the only source or cause of paradox, we have already
jf
criticised. His expose remains unconvincing and undemonstrated
because he provides no rationale, no logical or purely rational argu¬
ment to support his general thesis that the vicious circle leads to
paradoxical results (and to meaningless or systematic ambiguity). On
the other hand Poincare provides a reason why the vicious circle leads
to paradoxical consequences. Confining himself essentially to the
Cantorian antinomies where the notion of completed infinity is involved,
he points out that the vicious circle results whenever we use in our
argument the notion of completed infinity.* While discussing the Richard
paradox he says:
Now we have defined N by a finite number of words, it is
true, but only with the help of the notion of the aggregate
E, and that is the reason why N does not form a part of E.
In the above example chosen by M. Richard, the conclusion
is presented with completed evidence, and the evidence becomes
more apparent on a reference to the actual text of the
letter. But the same explanation serves for the other anti¬
nomies, as may be easily verified.
Thus the definitions that must' be regarded as non-predicative '
are those which contain a vicious circle.**
* In the notion of "potential infinity", say of integers, we are
not given all the integers at once and we can thus always add
a further unit (i.e., one), and so here we have the possibility
of going on ad infinitum. But in the notion of "completed
infinity", we may entertain all the integers given altogether
all at once. Hence we have infinity as completed totality.
Some philosophers (e.g., Aristotle) not only simply reject
the notion of completed infinity but regard it as absurd or
even self-contradictory.
** H. Poincare, Science and Method, pAL90.
- 33 -
y»
Poincare now explains the genesis of non-predicative definitions;
that is, the definitions involving vicious circle, in these words:
It is the belief in the existence of actual infinity that
has given birth to these non-predicative definitions. I
must explain myself. In these definitions we find the
word all, as we saw in the examples quoted above. The
word all, has a very precise meaning when it is a ques¬
tion of a finite number of objects; but for it still to
have a precise meaning when the number of objects is in¬
finite, it is necessary that there should exist an actual
infinity. Otherwise all these objects cannot be conceived
as existing prior to their definitions, and then, if the
definition of a notion N depends on all the objects A,
it may be tainted with the vicious circle, if among the
objects A there is one that cannot be defined without
bringing in the notion N itself.*
Poincare explains why vicious circle or non-predicative definitions
lead to contradictions. He drav/s a distinction** between predicative
and non-predicative classification. The former classification remains
unchanged by the introduction of new elements. But, in the latter classi¬
fication, the introduction of new elements necessitates constant rnodifi-
cation. Poincare elucidates his idea of classification by an example of
arranging integers or points in space. Suppose we legislate to arrange
them in alphabetical order, etc. , and to choose the first of them.
Poincare remarks that such a classification would not be predicative,
since by the introduction of new integers the sentences which were
unmeaning previously, would acquire new meaning and some of these sen¬
tences should come first according to our alphabetical arrangement. Hence
a.new classification emerges, and so on and so forth. Non-predicative
*Ibid., p.194-5•
"* Cf. H. Poincare', 'The Logic of Infinity' , op. cit., pp.47-8.
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classifications or definitions may occur both in finite and infinite domains,
e.g., the Berry paradox and the Richard paradox,, respectively. But in the
latter case the fallacy is not so easily detectable. Poincare'says:
The antinomies to which certain logicians have been led
arise from the fact that they have been unable to avoid certain
vicious circles. This happened when they considered finite
collections, but this happened much more often when they laid
claim to treating of infinite collections. In the first case,
they could have easily avoided the trap ............ Very
different are those generated by the notion of infinity; it
often happens that the logicians fall into it without .doing
it on purpose *
So Poincare provides a sound rationale as to why a vicious circle
in certain cases, such as where we bring in the notion of completed
infinity, results in antinomies. This is so because it leads us to
a impredicative classification. He rejects the notion of completed
infinity and affirms:
There is no actual infinity. The Cantorian forgot this>
and so fell into contradiction.**
He passes a sarcastic remark against logistics by pointing out:
Logistics is not barren, it engenders antinomies.***
In short, Russell has failed to give any rational ground for holding
/
the vicious circle principle but Poincare gives a sound reason why a
vicious circle in definition leads to antinomies.
§2. Russell's logicism
Russell was eager to show that mathematics is just a part of logic,
* Ibid, p.63.
:<* H. Poincare, Science and Method, p. 195.
** Ibid, p. 194.
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and hence that paradoxes in mathematics are just paradoxes in logic.
Accordingly, as he maintained the Cantorian view of mathematics, he thought
that it was wrong to suppose that the source of contradiction in the Can¬
torian paradoxes was a mistaken view of infinity, i.e. , the notion of
actual infinity. Further he observed some structural similarities between
Cantorian paradoxes and other paradoxes, like that of the Liar, where no ques¬
tion of infinity was involved. Therefox-e, Russell concluded that the Can¬
torian paradoxes.have nothing to do with infinity and all paradoxes are
the result of some defect in our formulation of logic. Russell thus
points out:
The paradoxes of symbolic logic concern various sorts of
objects: propositions, classes, cardinal and ordinal numbers,
etc. All various sorts of objects, as we shall show, represent
illegitimate totalities, and are therefore capable of giving
rise to vicious circle fallacies ...... *
I7hy do all these objects concern logic? Russell's reason for saying so
stems from his theory, according to which the statements concerning
classes and relations can be reduced to statements concerning proposi-
bional functions. Russell points out that the paradoxes which involve
propositions are indirectly relevant to mathematics, while those that more
learly concern the mathematicians are all concerned with propositional
functions. Because of his own belief that mathematics is ultimately
reducible to logic, also observing that Cantorian paradoxes suffer from
self-inclusiveness and thus from 'vicious circle', Russell came to the
ionclusion that logic in general must be purged of the 'vicious circle
'allacy'. Any class, any relation, any propositional function, any
Ph, p.38-
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proposition must not be self-inclusive or reflexive. Hence, Russell's
theory of types was the result of his general effort to reduce mathematics
to logic. But in his effort to do so, he was led to present a distorted
account of paradoxes, including the Cantorian paradoxes. If we apply the
'vicious circle principle' only to the Cantorian paradoxes, which pertain
to the notion of completed infinity, our approach would be based on
rational grounds (as Poincare tried to show), and thus our account
for such paradoxes might be well justified. But in doing so, we would
distinguish paradoxes into: (a) those to which 'vicious circle principle'
necessarily applies i.e., where the notion of 'completed infinity' is
involved, or, as we shall argue later, where the notion of set is involved;
and (b) those paradoxes to which the vicious circle principle does not
necessarily apply, that is, for instance where simply the general concept
of proposition or propositional function is involved. By doing so we shall
weaken the claim of Russell that mathematics is a part of logic.
Now, if the 'vicious circle principle8 is to be regarded as a metalogical
principle, it must be applicable to all cases and not only to the Cantorian
or set paradoxes. In logic we would like to have minimum axioms and rules.
Prom these axioms we derive theorems by applying rules of transformation.
Thus, we create a logical system. Now if the 'vicious circle principle'
is a metalogical principle and is supposed to be applicable to every propo¬
sition (or propositionai variable) and every propositional function, it
must be applicable in all cases and not merely to some propositional
functions and not to others. As this principle is to be extended to the
whole of logic and not merely confined to some specific, somehow limited
system, it should be deemed to have universal validity. As it fails to
- 37 -
apply in all cases, it cannot be a metalogical rale as Russell enunciated
and extended to every particular instance of propositional function. But
as this principle is essentially applied to mathematical paradoxes, it is
specially relevant in the theory of sets which is supposed to serve as a
framework for the mathematical system. This would illustrate the fact,
granted Russell's suppositions, that*the theory of sets falls outside the
ambit of logic. Another way Russell's program may be stated is that logic
should deal with propositions and propositional functions; but insofar as
other entities like class, relation, number, ordinal, cardinal ana so forth
are reducible to propositional functions, these entities also come into
our logical system. It becomes sometimes quite essential to speak of all
such entities together, e.g. all the cardinal numbers or even the set of
all x such that x=x. But to refer to all of such entities would transgress
the vicious circle principle in general. To circumvent this difficulty,
Russell introduces the axiom of redu.cibility. Ke states:
Hence many kinds of general statements become possible which
would otherwise involve vicious-circle paradoxes. These general
statements are none of them such as lead to contradictions, and
many of them such as it is very hard to suppose illegitimate.
The fact that they are rendered possible by the axiom of
reducibility, and that they would otherwise be excluded by
the vicious-circle principle, is to be regarded as an argument
in favour of the axiom of reducibility.*
Hence, Russell himself demolishes the generality of his vicious circle
principle. But he does not tell us explicitly what would then be the
remaining principle when some types of vicious circle no longer come
dnder the vicious circle principle. It seems that Russell is only making
ad hoc arrangements to suit mathematical needs and ends, and there appears
to be no question of intuitive or logical rules being involved in it. We may
on similar lines agree to bring in some other ad hoc rule to cover those
: Ibid, p.76.
cases where neither the general principle of vicious circle nor the axiom
of reducibility would apply. But it would further lead to a loosening of
the generality of rules in our logical system and symbolism. To con¬
struct a logical system we are supposed, or rather obliged, to employ
intuitive or logical rules and should not rest content with ad hoc arrange¬
ments. Hence, Russell has failed to supply a logical or intuitive prin¬
ciple or a criterion as a general remedy for the removal of paradoxical
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A. Distihction between syntactic and semantic paradoxes
S1' Three such distinctions
Are there common features in all or in some of the paradoxes? According
to Russell, all paradoxes suffer from the 'vicious circle' fallacy. But as we
tried to show in the first chapter, this view is mistaken. Indeed there seems
to be no characteristic which may be deemed common to all the paradoxes except
that we regard them as leading to contradiction. Attempts have been made to
classify paradoxes. Sometimes a distinction is maintained between "syntactic"
and "semantic" paradoxes. Logicians appear to have offered various accounts
of this distinction.* We make the following three specifications of this
distinction to clarify the matter:
■ | V .
(a) In one sense, as the very meanings of the terms "syntactic" and
"semantic" suggest, the contradiction in a syntactic paradox results from
* For example see:
(1) Hao Wang, A Survey of Mathematical Logic, p.387*
(2) A.A. Fraenkel and Y. Bar-Hillel, Foundations of Set Theory. pp.5» 12.
(3) S.C. Kleene, Introduction to Metamathematics. p.4-5
(4) D. Hilbert & W. Ackermann, Principles of Mathematical Logic, p.151.
(5) F.P. Ramsey, The Foundation of Mathematics, pp. 20, 24-5•
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the manipulation of symbols of certain symbolic systems only; that is, the
symbols occurring in syntactic paradoxes are completely uninterpreted and have
been assigned no meanings except through syntactical "grammatical" rules which
govern their usage; while in semantic paradoxes we assign meanings to the
symbols used in expressing the paradoxical statements.
(b) In another sense, this distinction between syntactic and semantic
paradoxes may be identified with Ramsey's distinction between logical and
epistemological paradoxes; namely, that in logical paradoxes only logical or
mathematical concepts are involved but epistemological paradoxes essentially
involve epistemological concepts, like meaning, truth, etc.
(c) Again in another sense, the syntactic paradoxes may be regarded as
those which occur in an axiomatic system and the semantic paradoxes as those
which do not arise within any axiomatic system.
The above distinctions are our own. Usually the above three senses of
the distinction between semantic and syntactic paradoxes sire not clearly
distinguished but are confused with one another. Let us now consider in turn
■y
these preliminary three ways of drawing the distinction of p&radoxes into
semantic and syntactic.
V- • \ °
§2. Are any paradoxes purely "syntactic"?
In the first sense the division of paradoxes is trivisil. We sure not
interested in just creating a syntactic system and showing its consistency.
The distinction between a wholly syntactic system - in which we are supposed
to deal only with uninterpreted symbols, arbitrary definitions and rule3 - and
.
the meta-language - which concerns the interpretation of the system - does not
mean that we first create an uninterpreted symbolic system and then try to
w
interpret it. Both processes go together, and the distinction may be drawn
to appreciate and facilitate the solving of some other problems connected
with the system e.g. the phenomenon of isomorphism. But some writers seem
to express the extreme position of making a distinction in an uninterpreted,
i.e. completely syntactic system. R.M. Martin, for example, says:
Strictly speaking we should distinguish between a formalised
logistic system (or calculus) and a formalised language-
system (or interpreted language) as follows: The former is
determined by grammatical i*ules or definitions which refer
exclusively to sytabols and expressions, regarded in abstrac¬
tion from any specific interpretation. A language-system,
on the other hand, is a logistic system with a fixed,
determinate interpretation given to certain of its expres¬
sions. ♦
From our standpoint such an extreme position is untenable. Firstly it is
extremely difficult to construct a system of any worth without keeping in
view some interpretation of it. In general, we have to define what is
inconsistency or contradiction in the system. We may approach the problem
of consistency in a purely syntactic way and say that a system is consistent
when we have certain well-formed formulae of the system which are not deriv¬
able in the system, or that the system is consistent if we cannot derive both
p and ~p in the system. But the above notion of Post-consistency is not
enough for a complicated system. As we know, for predicate calculus, we need
a semantic notion of consistency as well. It shows that we need semantic
clarification and explanation of the concept "consistency". Secondly, we
are here concerned with logico-mathematical systems and not With any other
axiomatic system. In the logical system we already have some semantic under¬
standing about the symbols used in the system. Hence, the distinction between
• >av a i. a-il
paradoxes in the first sense has to be rejected. \ S
■ y
* R.M. Martin, Truth and Denotation, p.2.
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A weaker form of distinction may be proposed by starting to build a
mathematico-logical system with some intuitively clear axioms, rules and
definitions. We express these basic rules and axioms in symbolic form. By
manipulation of these symbols in accordance with transformation rules we may
arrive at contradictory symbolic formulae. In order to rectify the contra¬
dictory situation in the system we may no longer bother about the inter¬
pretations or meanings of the terms involved in the system and so may just
try to change the axioms or rules by only observing how to aVoid the deduc¬
tion of contradictory formulae. One may go so far as to assert that this is
the only reasonable or correct approach to constructing an axiomatic system.
In that case it may be said that any contradiction occurring in such a
system may be referred to as a syntactic paradox (as a reminder that we have
)
only to look to the symbols, i.e. the syntactic aspect of the system, for
reconsideration and solution), and the other sorts of paradoxes, like the
Liar paradox, where we have to look to the meanings of the terms involved,
may be called semantic paradoxes.
Even this revised formulation of the first distinction between paradoxes
i3 misleading. Firstly, the so-called syntactic paradoxes are not purely
syntactic because even they can be traced back to the interpreted original
' ft
axioms, rules and concepts such as set and set-membership. Secondly, the
syntactic procedure to avoid contradiction in the system is not plausible.
We need semantic clarification of concepts for rational understanding of the
situation. It should be specially necessary in the case of a logico-
mathematical system, i.e., the system incapsulating mathematical and logical
- ' 5 '
theorems; namely, the propositional, predicate calculus, and set theory.
Because we usually hold that the logical and mathematical theorems (i.e. of
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mathematics which may properly be regarded true) have special truth and they
are not just deductions which follow from our arbitrary definitions and
axioms - the definitions, axioms and rules being chosen by our determination
without reference to the notion of truth. Again, just as in other fields of
enquiry we should like to be clear about the conceptual scheme involved, so
we would like to be clear about the conceptual scheme embodied in our
axiomatic system of logico-mathematics. Just as in our common notions of
free-will and determinism or in our concept of tod as all-powerful, all-
just, all-merciful, etc. we may find contradictions and try to remove them
and thus clarify our notions about them, so it is no less necessaiy that we
should clarify the conceptual foundations of logic and mathematics. Hence
i , , /
in order to remove the contradiction in the system we should look to the
nature of the contradiction arrived at, that is to say, we should approach
the contradiction semantically, determining the meaning behind the symbolic
expressions which lead to contradiction. In this way we come to know the
real nature of paradox. As the contradictory formulae encasing the paradox
are traced back to axioms and rules of the system, ultimately we rectify the
basic axioms and rules of the system. That is to say, we in fact amend and
clarify our concepts about the main principles of the system. We may thus
come to know some general principle for avoiding the paradoxes because we now
come to know some real paradoxical malady. We may thus profitably apply this
principle to rectify our basic axioms or rules and thereby create a sound and
flawless system.
It may be interesting to note that Russell's 'vicious circle principle'
for avoiding self-inclusiveness is a semantic principle. As Russell himself
pointed out, he arrived at this principle by studying the nature of paradoxes.
.. I • .•
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Hence, in order to avoid the paradoxes, he said to avoid a 'vicious circle'
in symbolic expressions in the system. Hence, Russell's approach to resolve





From above, it follows that all paradoxes are properly called "semantic"
according to our first interpretation of the distinction between semantic and
syntactic paradoxes, because even in considering formal systems semantic
elements are involved. Ramsey, in his article "The Foundations of Mathematics"
(1925), makes a distinction between paradoxes concerned with logical or
mathematical systems and other sorts of paradoxes which involve linguistic or
epi3temologicai concepts.* This distinction corresponds to our second inter¬
pretation of the distinction between syntactic and semantic paradoxes. Hao
Wang says:
In 1926, Ramsey introduced a distinction between logical
(mathematical) and semantic (epistemological) paradoxes.
...., while the semantic ones involve notions of truth
designation, expressibility, and the like. The distinc¬
tion is not entirely sharp.**
Paradoxes of group A, on Ramsey's account, involve only logical or mathematical
terms such as class and number, and thus show that there must be something
wrong with our logic or mathematics. Paradoxes of group B, on the other hand,
admit some reference to thought, language or symbolism, which according to
Ramsey are not formal but empirical terms. They betray faults embodied in
* F. P. Ramsey, The Foundations of Mathematics, pp.20-21
** Hao Wang, A Survey of Mathematical Logic, p.337*
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our ideas about thought and language. To group A belong paradoxes like Russell's
class paradox and the relation paradox and the Burali-Forti paradox; and to
group B belong paradoxes like the Liar paradox, Richard's paradox, Berry's
paradox, Grelling's paradox, etc. The paradoxes of group B 'are not purely
logical and cannot be stated in logical terms,alone' and thu3 Ramsey concludes
that these paradoxes are not relevant to mathematics or logic.
Ramsey says that Russell confused the two groups of contradictions,
although the distinction is implied in his distinction between the theory of
types and the theory of orders (i.e. ramified theory of types), respectively.
Thus Ramsey has it:
The contradictions of group A are removed by pointing out
that a propositional function cannot significantly take
itself as «n. argument, and by dividing functions and classes
into a hierarchy of types according to their possible
arguments ...
The first part of the theory, then, distinguishes types
of propositional functions by .their arguments; thus there
are functions of individuals, functions of functions of
individuals, and so on. The second part designed to meet
the second group of contradictions requires further
distinctions between the different functions which take
the same arguments, for instance between the different
functions of individuals.*
Let us examine still more closely the differentiating marks between the
simple theory of types and the ramified theory of types. In the simple theory
of types the type of a function is determined by its arguments. If the argu- p
ment3 comprise individuals of type n, then the type of the function would be
n+ 1; if the arguments have the type n then their functions would have the
type n + 1. So according to the simple theory of types, the type of a
* F. P. Ramsey, The Foundations of Mathematics, pp.24*-25.
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function is determined by its arguments. According to the ramified theory of •
types we further subdivide each type (above the level of individuals), though
having the same type of arguments, into different oMers. The propositional
functions of type I (i.e., functions of individuals), in which there is either
no quantification or quantification only on individual variables, are called
r
first order functions. For instance, F(«) or (®)F(ay where x is an individual
and F a certain property of the individuals. In case we have quantification
over the functions of type I we have the second-order functions of individuals.
We give Russell's own examples:
' ((P) •«/*• Ki1 ', 1 (30) »f(<p2tx) 1, ' ,z,ip'.s,x)' *
We can create higher order functions of type I by quantifying the second-
order function of individuals. An nth-order function of type I thus has
quantifiers on functions of order n-1. The conception of Russell's theory of
orders will be further clarified by considering the heterological paradox of
GTelling below in Section C.
§2. Our assessment
It is difficult to understand Ramsey's equating the two distinctions
of paradoxes; the one based on the contrast between logical and epistemological
paradoxes, the other based on the contrast between the solutions offered (or
simply the expressibility of the paradoxes) by two theories of types. Let us
consider an example which appears to go counter to Ramsey's thesis that the
epistemological paradoxes are only expressible and resoluble in terms of
Russell's ramified theory of types.
* P.M.. p.53.
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Consider the following version of the Liar paradox:*
'Every proposition asserted by A during the interval o is false'
j
Let us call this proposition (or sentence) P. We are further given:
'"P" is the only proposition asserted by A during the interval o'
We now construct the paradox symbolically as follows: i
(1) P = (p)[<p(p) 3~jp] ..... (i.e., Every proposition (p) asserted by A
during the interval o ($) is false)
(2) <f>{P) . |(p)[<j6(p) D (p = P)]\ (i.e., "P" is asserted by A during the
interval c and "P" is the only proposition he
asserted during the interval c)
In order to obtain the contradiction we proceed as follows:
(3) P = P Theorem of propositional calculus
4) PD (p)[#(p) 3 ~p] .... Substitution: P / (p)[$(p) D ~p]
5) P D l<j>(p) D ~P] Instantiation: A D (x)b(x)
A 3 J3( t)
(6) <t>(P) D (P D ~P) Theorem of propositional calculus
(7) P D ~P 4>{P) being given
Therefore if P is true then P is false. Let us now prove "~P D P\
(8) ~p D ~P Theorem of propositional calculus
(9) ~P D~[(pj[$(p) 3~p)J Substitution: P/ (p)[^(p) 15 ~p]
(10) d (3p)[^(p) . p] .... from (9)
(n) (pMIXp) • PJ =>I(P = P) • p] From (2) and the theorem:
(x)[a(;c) D£(a:)] D (a:)[(Ac . Q) D (Bx . §)]
(12) (3p)[^(p) . p] D (3p)[(p = P) . p] From (11)
(13) ~p d (3p)[(p = P) . p] From (12) & (10)
U4) [(p = P) , p] D P
(15) (3p)[(p = P) . p] DP 'From (14)
(16) ~P D P From (13) & (15)
Hence, we derive both "P D ->P" and "~P DP' (i.e., P a ~P) and that is
a contradiction. In order to obvert the contradiction we may, following the
Russell simple theory of types, say that proposition P belongs to a higher
type than the variable p because the function <p is involved in P, and thus
* Cf. D. Hilbert & W. Ackermann, Principles of Mathematical Logic, p.145*
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the notion of falsity which attaches to propositions of the type of p cannot
be unambiguouply attached to P. (Other solutions would be, to deny that P is
a proposition and hence the question of truthfulness does not arise; or to
claim that P is a sort of proposition to which law of excluded middle does
not apply, so that we cannot regard P as an instance for the variable p.)
From the above formulation of the Liar paradox, it is quite obvious
that there is no need to quantify over any function, that is to say we do not
have to refer to the orders of the function or bring in the ramified theory
of types. A similar symbolisation after the manner of the simple theory of
types is sufficient in the case of the Barber paradox, where a barber asserts
that he shaves all and only those who do not shave themselves. This may be
symbolised as:
(1) (®)[s(.B,a?) "~S(a:,a;)] i.e., the barber B shaves every man x (or has
the relation of shaving S to every man a;) who does not shave himself. A
contradiction arises by applying universal instantiation: S(B, B) =~S (B, B).
There i3 an assumption in the premiss (1) that (la) (3a;)(ac = B). In this
case, as in the version of the Liar paradox given above, there is no need to
quantify over the relational function S, hence there is no need for the
ramified theory of types. It follows from the above illustration that Ramsey's
interpretation of Russell's simple theory of types and ramified theory of
types as correlated with the logical and epistemological paradoxes is not
well-founded.
Let us now examine Ramsey's distinction between logical or mathematical
paradoxes and epistemological paradoxes as such; i.e., the class of paradoxes
which involve logical or mathematical terms only, as opposed to the class of
l
paradoxes which involve other terms as well. We may notice that the Barber
paradox, when symbolised, involves only logical concepts, e.g. relation (S),
negation (~), individual variable (»), etc. The structure of the paradox as
expressed in symbolism has nothing to do specifically with any semantic or
epistemological concepts. In the case of the Liar paradox we symbolise it
with logical concepts like property <f>, negation ~, propositional variable p.
Now if we place any particular semantic property or relation in "0" or "S",
the paradoxical structures remain. It follows from Ramsey'3 description of
logico-mathematical paradoxes, as those which embody only logical or mathe¬
matical terms, that these "structural paradoxes" should be counted as logico-
mathematical paradoxes; but as soon as we make a particular interpretation of
"<p", "S", "x" we get epistemological paradoxes. If this is the distinction
between paradoxes, it is obviously a trivial one. Moreover, it is hard to
maintain a distinction between logico-mathematical and epistemological con¬
cepts. Ramsey has given us no clue how to maintain this distinction. The
essential feature of logico-mathematical concepts appears to lie in their
generality. If we regard "modal logic" as part of logic, we would include
concepts like possibility, impossibility, etc., as part of logical vocabulary.
Again, the general concepts involved in conditionals, counter-factuals,
.
|
causal statements, etc., may come in purview of logic. As much as we map
our field of reasoning, we are widening the horizon of logic and hence there¬
with the terms involved in the widened scope of logic.
Although Ramsey does not elaborate his position, it seems that he did
not intend to make the distinction described above. Ramsey seems to have
combined our second and third interpretation of the distinction of semantic
and syntactic paradoxes. He would claim that logico-mathematical paradoxes
are those which occur in the construction of logico-mathematical systems,
i.e., they sire syntactic paradoxes in our third sense. These contradictions
occur in logico-mathematical systems and not in any axiomatic system like
Euclidian or non-Euclidian system. By logico-mathematical system we should
understand the propositional and predicate logic and set-theoretical system
for the foundation of pure mathematics. In this sense the Liar paradox is
not logical, because we may affirm that we do not get the premiss, for
instance l(p)[^(f) ^ (p = -P)]!, of the Liar paradox in a logical system.
Hilbert and Ackermann seem to hold this distinction.* Their contention is
that, since the premisses of paradoxes like that of Liar cannot occur in our
axiomatic system, they do not form universally valid formulae; they are to be
regarded as semantical paradoxes as distinguished from logical paradoxes.
C. Heterological paradox
Ramsey discusses his point of view at some length in the case of the
heterological paradox. This paradox was not discussed by Russell and it seems
an unhappy selection on the part of Ramsey for discu33ing Russell's theory of
types. We will discuss the heterological paradox in some detail, in order to
assess both Russell's and Ramsey's solutions. This is a paradox about words.
There are some words which designate properties which are exemplified by the
words themselves. These words may be called autological. The character¬
istics for which these words stand can truly be applied to the words them¬
selves. There are other words which specify properties which are not
exemplified by the words themselves. These words therefore cannot be validly
* D. Hilbert & W. Ackermann, Principles of Mathematical Logic, p.151.
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applied to themselves. They may be called heterological. For instance,
"English" is English, but "German" is not German; "noun" is a noun, but
"adjective" is not an adjective; "polysyllabic" is polysyllabic, but "mono¬
syllabic" is not monosyllabic; "short" is short, but "long" is not long. As
"English", "noun", "short", "polysyllabic" are self-applicable or self-
predicable, in the sense that they instantiate their designated character¬
istics, they may be called autological. But "German", "adjective", "mono¬
syllabic", "long" are not self-applicable in the sense that the specified
properties are not attributable to themselves, hence they may be regarded as
heterological. Now, the question may be raised whether "heterological" is
heterological or not. The word "heterological" indicates that common property
of heterologicality shared by all and only those words which name properties
which the words themselves do not possess or exemplify. Now, suppose the word
"heterological" is heterological, that is, it has the property of being heter¬
ological; thus this word "heterological" does not have the property which it
designates. But this is a contradiction because'by supposition it possesses
the property of being heterological to that which it designates. Now, suppose
"heterological" is autological, then the word "heterological" does not have
the property which it designates. If so, then it must be heterological.
Hence, a contradiction follows from the fact that we must assume that "heter¬
ological" is either heterological or autological.
Let us express the paradox after the manner of Ramsey1". When we say the
word "noun" means noun, we mean that the word "noun" designates the property
of being a noun. In Russell's terminology, to assert that a word designates
* Ramsey did not give a full symbolic formulation of the heterological
paradox. I.M. Copi in his book Symbolic Logic, pp.33-34> has given a
symbolic formulation of the heterological paradox patterned after Ramsey's.
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a certain property is to say that the word, designates or means a certain
propositional function. So we symbolise *"cc" designates propositional
function by '"x"R(<pa)\ To express the heterological paradox, we have
to suppose that there is in fact a single property designated by the word
(i.e., the word is univocal). Furthermore that word does or does not have
the designated property (i.e., the law of excluded middle holds good here).
We thus symbolise '"as" is heterologic^.1' as: (3$)["ac"R(^a) .~0"as"J. Granted
the supposition of univocality of the word, it can easily be seen that this
expression is equivalent to (0)["ac"R(0£) . or simply to ["as" "as" ]
We now symbolise '"heterological" is heterological' as: ^
hetChet") = (30)["het"R(0$) . ^<*("het" )1
D "het"R(^g) . ~^>("het") because "het"R($a) is equal
to "het"R(het £) and is given as univocal, hence the expression
above is equivalent to (0)["het"R(0£) . ~0("het")]
D ~.het("hat" )
Hence the assumption that "heterological" is heterological leads to
contradictory results. Let us now assume "heterological" is not heterological,
then expressing it in symbols we have:
<vhet("het") ■ (3^)f "het"R(<*z) . ~d("het")H
D (d>)["het"R(<t,z) D <ft("het") ]
D ["het"R(het j§) D <a("het") ]
het("het") because "het"R(het st) already known
to be true. (Modus Ponens)
Hence whether we assume "heterological" is heterological or is not
heterological we are led to contradictory consequences that "heterological"
is not heterological and is heterological, respectively.
Ramsey rightly points out that according to Russell the contradiction
is removed by saying that the function het (£) is of higher order than any of
I
the functions (^3), and. hence it cannot be an instance of (<pz). If we dis-
tinguish the hierarchy of orders by applying subscripts, that is to say, if we
avoid systematic ambiguity in this way, then we derive no contradiction. For
example, in saying '"adjective" is heterological^' and '"heterological" is
heterologicalg' the functions het^(&) and het^(a) are different and do not
mean the same thing. What the difference of meanings between het^ and het^
may be, however, it is hard to imagine; this is the sort of general criticism
we have already levied against the notion of systematic ambiguity. Anyhow,
Russell's theory of orders avoids the present contradiction. It can be easily
seen that a 'vicious circle' as defined by Russell is involved in the Grelling
paradox. To simplify, let us define any word being not heterological (i.e.
autological) as:
aut ("a:") « (0)["£c"R(0j&) D <p(ux" )] That is, a word "a:" is autological
if and only if "x" possesses whatever property it designates. The symbolism
above clearly shows that the function of autologicality aut(g) involves all
the functions And in the case of '"autological" is autological' the
function aut(3) itself becomes one of such functions (i.e., an instance of
(<££)). Hence the vicious circle fallacy is committed. As the definition of
this function requires that we quantify over functions (or properties) it
involves the ramified theory of types. This example shows how a vicious circle
is involved even in the ramified theory of types. And because of the vicious
circle the function "aut(a)" becomes meaningless as an instance of the func¬
tional variable so its negation "het(g)" (i.e., ~aut(&)) becomes meaning¬
less as we discussed in the last chapter section C. Hence, according to
Russell's ramified theory of types we cannot put "het £" as an instance of
"^>S" and thus the contradiction is avoided.
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Ramsey's solution also involves a hierarchy of types. He eliminates
the ramified theory of types and therewith the principle of reducibility.
Ramsey would interpret a formula like ' (0)0a' as the logical product of the
propositions 0a, of which it is itself one. He says:
To take a particularly simple case, (<p)$a' is the logical
product of the propositions 0a, of which it is itself one;
but this is no more remarkable and no more vicious than
the fact that 'p . q' is the logical product of the set
P > 2'> P • l) of which it is itself a member. The
only difference is that,owing to our inability to write
propositions of infinite length, which is logically a
\ mere accident, ■ <p . <pa cannot, like fp . q^ be element¬
arily expressed;but must be expressed, as the logical
product of a set of which it is also a member.*
Hence, according to Ramsey, quantification over functions does not necessitate
the hierarchy of orders and therewith the principle of reducibility. But
Ramsey's solution is similar to that of Russell's. According to Ramsey, the
sense of the verb "means" in "'heterological" means heterological' is differ¬
ent from its sense in '"adjective" means adjective'. Therefore '"het"R(het £)
cannot be an instance of ' "x"R(<pS)'. He says:
the contradiction is simply due to an ambiguity in the word
'meaning' and has no relevance to mathematics whatsoever.**
It is because of the epistemological or semantic nature of the paradox that
such a situation arises. He says that in the case of "'het"R(het a)' the R
is complicated. To illustrate this point he gives the following illustration.
Consider the case of 'a 8 b' where 'a', 'b', 's' mean in the. simplest way the
separate objects a, b and 8. If we define now '0a:' as * a 8 x', then '0' is
substituted for 'a e' and does not mean a single object; it has meaning in a
r
* F. P. Ramsey, The Foundations of Mathematics, p.41-
more complicated way by virtue of the 3-termed relation to both 'a* and '8'.
In the same way, R in "*het"R(het z)1 is complicated and has a different
meaning from its meaning in "'ic"R(0£)'. According to Ramsey's interpretation,
therefore, we can substitute 'het £' for '; but due to the epistemological
nature (of this property), the meaning of 'R' alters. Hence, Ramsey was led
to create a hierarchy of different meanings of 'R', i.e., of semantic expres¬
sions like 'means' or 'designates'.
Ramsey's solution does not appear to be satisfactory. We rather think
that the meaning of 'means' in "'heterological" means heterological' is the
same as it is in the expressions '"adjective" means adjective' or '"noun"
means noun'. If the meaning of 'means' differs from one expression to another,
we can legitimately raise the question why the same word 'means' has been used
in various expressions, or in other words, to ask what is the meaning of
'means' in general. The fact is that in order for a word to be heterological
(or autological) - i.e., in order for a word to have the characteristic of
heterologicality (or autologicality) - it must designate some property other
than that of heterologicality (or autologicality. In order to judge whether
a certain word is autological, we have to determine whether this word desig¬
nates some property (other than heterologicality or autologicality) and
further whether or not it has the designated property- And this is quite
different from saying that there is a systematic ambiguity of the word
'means'. The property of heterologicality (or autologicality) is a dependent
property; i.e., its existence is logically dependent on that of some other
property. The truth-value of an assertion of heterologicality of some word
depends on there being some other property just as the truth-value of the
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sentence,"I am lying", depends on there being some other proposition. The
property of being admirable is a dependent property; it may depend on the
property of being honest or of being beautiful, etc. So, whether something
is admirable depends on its having or lacking a property such as honesty or
beauty. Similarly, the property of autologicality depends on there being
some other property designated and owned by some word. The property of
heterologicality depends on some other property designated but not owned by
certain words. If there is no designated property already present, we cannot
sensibly ask whether or not the words are heterological. There is no need to
make a hierarchy of meanings of "autological" or "heterological" or "means".
We have only to learn the logical behaviour of the properties of hetero¬
logicality or autologicality, that is to say, the requirement for asserting
that certain words are or are not heterological; these words must have some
other designated property about which we could sensibly raise the question
of their being or not being heterological.
Co
D. The structure and solution of paradoxes
§1. Structure
We may note that no contradiction ensues if we ask whether "autological"
is autological or is not. As we remarked earlier, it is the structure or
pattern which is responsible for the emergence of contradiction in a paradox.
There is some pattern or structure of the argument involved in a paradox. We
try to clarify the notion of structure which leads to contradiction in three
stages: first, by considering some paradoxes in symbolic formulae; secondly,




The pattern in the heterological paradox may be symbolised in the
simplest form as:
(0)i£"cc"R(0) 33 het .... i.e., to say that any word ("x")
designates (R) a particular property ($) and that that word does not possess
the designated property (^("ac")) is equivalent to saying that that word
possesses the property of heterologicality (het("ac")). (Instead of using
Russellian cumbersome notation of propositional function ($(£)) we shall
simply write the property (<p).) In order to get the contradiction, we take
the word "heterological" for "ac", and then obviously follows the designated
property "heterological" as an instance for "0". Thus, by universal instan¬
tiation we get the following:
["het"R(het) D -^het("het") ] » het("het"). With the justifiable assumption
of '"het"R(het)' the above formula is self-contradictory, being equivalent
to: ->-het("het") = het("het") . If we have the formula "P » Q', we may conjoin
any true or valid formula to P or Q without any change in the truth-value of
"P = Q".
In this particular paradox, the structure of the paradoxical argument
has become a bit more complicated and involved because of the additional
factor of words designating their meanings. In order to appreciate the basic
or primitive structure behind it, let us consider the paradox of Impredicability.
which has apparent similarity to the Grelling paradox.* The Impredicability
paradox deals with properties only and does not concern words. Individuals
have properties and properties themselves may have further properties. For
example, the property of being beautiful has the property of being admirable.




Now, there are some properties which may be predicated of themselves. For
instance, we may say that the property of being abstract possesses the property
of being abstract (i.e., abstract is abstract); but the property of being
concrete does not seem to have the property of being concrete. A self-
predicable property may be called Predicable. A property which is not self-
predicable may be called Impredicable. Now, the property of being impredicable
is a property of all and only those properties which are not self-predicable.
Let us raise the question whether the property of being impredicable is
predicable or not. If it is predicable, then it must be impredicable; and
if it is impredicable, then being self-predicable it is predicable. The
paradoxical structure may be symbolised as: (x)(l R x = ~(x R x)); by
universal instantiation we get: (I R I = ~(l R i)), which i3 a self-contra¬
dictory formula.
The structure or the symbolic formula exhibited by the above paradox
is self-contradictory and under our usual interpretation of I, R and x, it
would lead to contradiction by valid deductions. Let us interpret x as
individual variable for persons, I as Barber, and R being the relation of
shaving; then the symbolic formula "(x)(l R x s ~(x R x))" would mean that
the Barber snave3 all but only those persons wno do not shave themselves.
By this interpretation we get the Barber paradox; the paradox of a barber who
claimed that he shaves only and all those persons who do not shave themselves.
Now, if the barber does shave himself, he must not shave himself in case his
assertion is taken to be true. If the barber does not shave himself, he must
>aJ
3have himself. This sufficiently illustrates that the contradiction occurs
because of the peculiar paradoxical structure. If we negate the whole
expression of the structure, it will yield a universally valid formula as
expected, and hence a theorem of logic; the formula being then,
~(m)(l R £c » ~(r R x)), i.e., (3r)[(l r x . x r x) v [~(l R x) . ~-(a; R a:) ,
which is valid even in the domain of one object. In this basic self-contra¬
dictory formula of paradoxical structure we may insert some additional
symbolic expressions which may not affect the truth-value of this formula, and
these added formulae would also yield contradiction as we noticed in the case
of the Grelling paradox.
J. F. Thomson brings out the structure common to the paradoxes like that
of heterological, Russell, and of the Barber. This common structure we label
the "Barber structure", as it is exhibited in the Barber paradox in a most
simplified form. By considering the relations in sets he states the following
theorem:
Let _S be any set and R ioc any relation defined at least
on _S. Then no element of S has R to all and only those
_S-elements which do not R to themselves.*
It follows from this theorem that there cannot be a man (barber) who can
shave all and only those men who do not shave themselves. But the Barber
paradox asserts this, thus showing that the structure of the Barber paradox
is self-contradictory. Similarly there cannot be a word (e.g., "heterological")
which applies to all and only those words which do not apply to themselves.
That is, the structure of the heterological paradox is likewise against the
theorem and hence lead3 to contradiction. Similarly, there cannot be a class
whose members are all and only those classes which are not members of themselves.
ry ^
• .' .
* J. F. Thomson, 'On some paradoxes', in Analytical Philosophy I, ed.
R. J. Butler^ p.104.
In Russell's paradox such a class is defined, so we are bound to meet a contra¬
diction. The application of the theorem can be extended to more complicated
cases like that of Richardian and the Cantor general argument (to be discussed
later) where the relation involved is not so simple. In the Richardian paradox
we have the set of serial numbers correlated with properties and the relation
on the set being the possession of the correlated property by the serial
numbers. According to the theorem above, there cannot be a serial number n
correlated with the property (e.g., of being Richardian) which is owned by
all and only those serial numbers which do not have the correlated properties.
, ♦
In the Richardian paradox we suppose such a serial number n and hence there
follows the contradiction. In the Cantor general argument, we have a class
of positive integers correlated with sets and the relation on the class being
the membership of positive integers with their correlated sets. Now, there
cannot be a positive integer m correlated with the set M whose members are
all and only those positive integers which Eire not members of their correlated
sets. Supposition of such a positive integer m in the Cantor general argument
leads to contradiction. We can make our relation in a certain paradox still
more complicated and involved, and it may even then be difficult to trace its
connection with the theorem above.
§2. Diagrammatic representation of the Barber structure
We draw the diagram to illustrate the Barber structure involved in the
main paradoxes discussed in the present thesis. The numbers 1-7 correspond
to different paradoxes: the Barber, Impredicable, heterological, .God who helps
all and only those who do not help themselves and then raising the question
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is mentioned to illustrate that we can construct as many paradoxes as we like
by maintaining the Barber structure in the argument), Liar, Richardian and
the Cantor general diagonal argument to prove the higher cardinality of the
power-set (here: set of all sub-sets of positive integers) of any set (here:
set of positive integers), respectively. The Liar paradox is fully discussed
in the next chapter, the Richardian paradox and the Cantor general diagonal
argument are dealt with in Chapter IV.
An entry in a horizontal axis, Xk, stands in a certain relation to the
corresponding entry in the vertical axis xk, or it does not stand in this
relation. E.g. John (= Al) does or does not stand in the relation of shaving
to John (= al); "Snow is green" (= C5) does or does not stand in the relation
of truly asserting to the fact that snow is green (= c5)J and the positive
integer (p.i.) 17 (= D7) does or does not stand in the relation of being a
member of the set to which the p.i.17 is correlated in an enumeration of all
subsets of the set of positive integers (= d7). Entities Ek in the horizontal
axis E, like Barber, Impredicable, serial number (s.n.) n etc., bear certain
simple or complex relations to the corresponding entities Xk. It is to be
observed that if any entity Xk bears a positive relation to the corresponding
entity xk, then Ek would bear negative relation to Xk and conversely. Accord¬
ingly, if a certain entity, say Al, bears a positive relation to al, we write
+ in the corresponding block Aa; otherwise we write Again, if the entity,
say El, bears a positive relation to the corresponding entity Al, we write +
in the corresponding block Ea; otherwise we write For example, if John
shaves himself and so we write + in the diagonal block Aa, then the Barber
does not shave John and so we write ~ in block Ea of vertical column E. Hence
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if we write + in the diagonal block, then we have to write ~ in the correspond¬
ing block of vertical column E. The paradoxical situation arises when we
raise the question as to what should be written in the block Ee, + or ~.
To show how the diagram works, we pick out one instance from each
paradox. Suppose Gill does not shave himself and hence the Barber shaves
Gill; accordingly we write ~ in the diagonal block Cc and + in the block Ec.
Again, the property of being concrete does not have the property of being
r
concrete and hence it has the property of being impredicable; accordingly we
write — in the block Bb and + in Eb. Again, "noun" is a noun and hence it is
not heterological. Therefore the word "heterological" cannot be applied to it';
accordingly we write + in the diagnoal block Dd, but ~ in the block Ed. Again,
the lame Gill cannot help himself; therefore God helps him. Hence we write ~
in the diagonal block Cc, but + in the block Ec. Again, the proposition, "The
sun is black", falsely asserts the state of affairs that the sun is black;
but the proposition, "This sentence is false that the sun is black", does
truly assert the state of affairs that this sentence i3 false that the sun is
black. Hence we write ~ in the diagonal block Bb, but + in the block Eb.
Again, in the Richardian paradox, suppose the s.n. 12 is correlated with the
property of being odd, then as the serial number 12 does not possess the
property of being odd, we write ~ in the diagonal block Cc; but a3 this s.n.
does not possess the correlated property, it owns the Richardian property
supposedly correlated with the s.n. n and hence we write + in the block Ec.
Again, in the Cantor general diagonal argument, suppose the set of prime
numbers of the power set of positive integers is correlated with the integer
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17 as it is shown to be the case in 7 in the diagram, then it means that the
p.i. 17 being a prime is a member of the 3et of prime numbers, and hence we
write + in the diagonal block Dd. But the p.i. 17 being the member of the
correlated set, it cannot be a member of the diagonal set M supposedly
correlated with the p.i. Jh, hence we write ~ in the block Ed. The contra¬
diction becomes apparent when we think of putting the mark + or ~ in the block
Ee. The marks on the diagonal blocks run opposite to the marks on the blocks
of column E, but the block Ee is common both to the diagonal and the vertical
column E. Hence we write both + and ~ in the block Ee, and thiskJla a contra¬
diction.
Thomson also draws diagrams to explain the paradoxical nature of the
heterological paradox. But our diagram has the advantage of being comprehen¬
sive so as to include other paradoxes of the Barber type and also it shows
clearly how the contradiction is bound to occur in the block Ee. Our graphic
representation also shows the evolution of the complication in the Barber
structure. In the Barber and Impredicable paradox the relation involved is
quite simple. In the heterological paradox, the relation gets involved; we
say, e.g., the word "polysyllabic" is applied to the word "polysyllabic"
because the word "polysyllabic" is polysyllabic, since the word ha3 the
property designated by it. The element of designation comes in and makes the
relation more involved. In the case of the Richardian paradox, the relation
of serial number having certain property becomes more complicated because it
is conjoined with the relation of correlation. A similar situation arises
in the case of the Cantor general argument where the relation of membership
of positive integers to the set is conjoined with the relation of correlation
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with the set. We can make our relation in a paradox still more complicated,
though the basic structure which is exhibited by the Barber paradox remains
intact. There may be paradoxical structure other than that of the Barber
but interlaced with the latter, thus making the structure still more complex.
§3. Nature of the solution of paradox
In solving the paradoxes we have not only to look at the structure
which leads us into contradiction. We have also to examine the logical
behaviour of the terms involved in the paradox. In solving the paradoxes we
should keep the following three things distinct even though they may be
closely linked with another and may be fully understood in context with
the others: (a) particular concepts involved in the paradox (b) the para¬
doxical structure, and (c) solution of the paradox. Identical paradoxical
structure does not necessarily imply identical solutions. For an adequate
resolution of a paradox, we have to consider the logical behaviour of the
concepts involved and thus rectify our beliefs concerning these concepts.
In our examples of various paradoxes above, the basic paradoxical structure
is the same but there are various ways to avoid or change the paradoxical
structure. In the Barber paradox, we cannot sensibly deny that the barher
is a person or the relation of shaving to oneself or to others. And it also
seems that there is no essential difference between the relation of shaving
as it exists with oneself or with somebody else. The relation of shaving
seems quite unambiguous and we need no recourse^to the hierarchy of this
relation. Here both Russell's and Ramsey's solutions are unsound; their
answers to 3uch paradoxes fail to achieve satisfactory solutions. But we
may reasonably argue that the extension (or application) of the relation of
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shaving by a barber such that the barber shaves all and only those who do not
shave themselves, is objectionable and responsible for contradiction. In the
extension we must either deny that this relation of shaving applies to all
persons who do not shave themselves or that this relation applies to only
those persons who do not shave themselves. The terms involved in the Barber
paradox are quite clear and need no clarification. But in the case of the
Impredicable paradox the situation is different and we may reasonably deny
that we can by universal instantiation put the property of impredicability I
"W
in place of the variable a; (any property) because the sense in which impredic-
ability or predicability is a property is different from that of other
properties like coloured, red, abstract, etc. We may by our own definition
even deny the status of property to impredicability or predicability. The
same remarks apply to the property of heterologicality and of autologicality.
This is so because in order that any property should have the characteristic
of impredicability or of predicability, it must be other than the property
of impredicability or of predicability. For as we argued above, the property
of impredicability or of predicability is a dependent property, like the
property of heterologicality. Just as we cannot call a thing admirable or
good unless it has some other characteristic like beauty or honesty, we cannot
characterise a property as impredicable unless it has some other property.
There seems to be no ambiguity in the relation of predication or in the
characteristic of being impredicable or predicable, as Russell and Ramsey
would suggest. In the heterological paradox we have the word "heterological"
which means heterological but we cannot conjoin this fact with the legitimacy
of raising the question whether "heterological" is heterological or not,
because as said earlier, in order that any word be heterological or autological
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it must designate some property other than that of heterologicality or
autologicality.
It is clear from the above examples that even if their paradoxical
structure i3 the same, the solutions may be diverse. Of course, any proposed
solution must eliminate the paradoxical structure. But essentially ar^y
solution of the paradox must also clarify and bring to light the logical
behaviour of the basic notions involved in the paradox. Russell seems to
have committed the fallacy of presuming that if all paradoxes involve the
vicious circle fallacy, their solutions must be similar. He overlooked the
peculiarities of different paradoxes (or different sorts of paradoxes); -
peculiarities which may accompany the paradoxical structure or the vicious
,0 '
circle fallacy. Russell says:
In all of them (i.e. paradoxes), the appearance of contra¬
diction i3 produced by the presence of some word which has
systematic ambiguity of type, such as truth, falsehood,
function, property, class, relation, cardinal, ordinal,
name, definition. Any such word; if its typical ambiguity is
overlooked,.... will thus give rise to vicious circle fallacies.*
And thus he says that once ambiguity is removed by his theory of types, the
vicious circle is removed and thus paradoxes are eliminated. Hi3 whole
attention wa3 directed to eliminate the vicious circle instead of studying
the logical behaviour of concepts involved in the paradoxes.
§A- Classification of paradoxes
As already mentioned there seems to be no common characteristic shared
by all paradoxes. We may classify paradoxes according to the sort of solutions
they offer or according to their common paradoxical structure. There seems to
be no particular advantage in making a strict classification. One paradox
* P.M.. p.6l+. Bracketed expression is our own.
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insofar as it involves a particular sort of concept, may have different
formulations and hence may involve different paradoxical structures. Even
the notion of paradoxical structure is not absolute, because in complicated
cases it may be difficult to decide whether to put a certain formulation of
paradox dnder this or that paradoxical structure. We may appreciate such a
situation in complicated cases like that of Richardian and the Cantor general
diagonal argument, as shown in our graphic representation of the Barber
structure. Again, one may find similarities amongst any things, such as
between stones and men. But one should select similarities which serve some
useful purpose. There is some convenience of arranging and tackling paradoxes
according to their common paradoxical structure. Along these lines, we shall
try to arrange various paradoxes primarily in accord with their common para¬
doxical structure. We call all those paradoxes "Barber paradoxes" which are
structurally similar to the Barber paradox. To the Barber paradoxes belong,
for example, all the paradoxes mentioned in our previous diagram. The moral
we drew from that discussion is that it i3 logically impossible for there to
exist a man (barber) who shaves every man that does not shave himself. Taking
any entity instead of man and any relation instead of shaving, but keeping
otherwise the same structure, we get antinomical results as in the case of
the specific Barber paradox. The Barber structure or pattern makes us realise
that it is logically impossible that in any specific class of things, whether
this class or group be of persons, ideas, relations, or of any sort of entities,
there could not be one member of this class which bears some specific relation
to all and only those members of the group or class in question which do not
have the said relation to themselves. In the next chapter we chall discuss
the Liar paradox as a further example of a "Barber" paradox.
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Finally, in Chapter V, we shall discuss paradoxes which occur in logico-
mathematical systems. It is profitable and convenient to group together such
paradoxes as that of Russell, Burali-Forti, and of Cantor because for each of
them we can trace their origin to defective axioms. Two or more paradoxes
occurring in an axiomatic system will certainly help us in understanding the
nature of all sorts of paradoxes occurring in the system. We may, for the
sake of better understanding, make a distinction between semantic and syn¬
tactic paradoxes, meaning by the latter those paradoxes which occur in logico-
mathematical systems and by the former those which do not occur in such systems.
Even if we separate "syntactic paradoxes" as outlined above, it would still be
useful to keep in view other paradoxes which have an identical or similar
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A. Introduction j
§1. The Barber structure of the Liar paradox
The Liar paradox may be formulated in several ways. One version of it
has already been discussed in the last chapter. The Barber structure which
underlies most of the common versions of the Liar paradox becomes apparent
when we keep in view that a true sentence is that which truly asserts the
state of affairs asserted by the sentence and similarly a false sentence is
that which falsely asserts the state of affairs asserted by the sentence.
That is to say, suppose sentence x asserts state of affairs y, then a: is true
if and only if x asserts y and y obtains or holds; and sentence x is false
only if y does not obtain or hold. The entity in the Liar paradox which
corresponds to the man in the Barber paradox is a proposition, statement or
l
sentence (we make no distinction of these terms unless specifically mentioned),
and the relation analogous to the relation of shaving and not shaving is that
of truly or falsely asserting the state of affairs asserted by the sentence.
We choose one statement among all the statements in question, of which we say
that it truly asserts the states of affairs asserted by all and only those




themselves; and. then, by raising the question whether that statement truly
asserts the state of affairs asserted by itself, we are led to contradiction.
To elucidate the comparison between the Liar paradox and the Barber paradox,
let us take the following two sentences: (a) "This statement is false", and
(b) "This page is green". Let us suppose that sentence (a) says something
J .
about the statement made by sentence (b). Then sentence (a) says that it is
false that this page is green. In short, sentence (a) says that it is not
the case that this page is green; i.e. that this page is not green. And this
is true.. Hence sentence (a) truly asserts the state of affairs asserted by
sentence (b). Y/hereas sentence (b) taken by itself does not truly assert
the state of affairs asserted by itself, because sentence (b) states or
asserts that this page is green, which it is not. Now, suppose there are
only two sentences, namely (a) and (b), and we arise the question whether
sentence (a), taken by itself and without reference to (b), truly asserts
the state of affairs asserted by itself. In short, we ask whether sentence
(a) is itself true or not. By raising this question we arrive at the Barber
structure. This is 30, because we ask whether or not sentence (a) truly
asserts the state of affairs asserted by itself, which truly asserts the
i
states of affairs asserted by all and only those sentences which do not truly
assert the states of affairs asserted by themselves. More explicitly but
concisely:
The Barber paradox: A man b shaves all and only those men who do not
shave themselves. (x)(Sbx = ~Saxc), where Sxy sym¬
bolises "cc shaves y". Does the man b shave himself
or not?
The Liar paradox: A sentence (i.e. the Liar sentence) truly asserts the
states of affairs asserted by all and only those sentences
which do not truly assert the states of affairs asserted
by themselves. (x)(Tsx s~Tasc), where Tccy symbolises "cc
truly asserts the state of affairs asserted by y". Does






§2. A version of the Liar paradox
Let us consider the following version of the Liar paradox:
Whatever is written in this
rectangle is not true
The sentence written in the rectangle concerns the truth-value of all sentences
written in the rectangle. But this very sentence, namely "whatever is written
in this rectangle is not true", is itself written in the rectangle. Hence,
if we take this sentence to be true, then by its own very assertion, it is
not true. And likewise if taken to be false then it is true. The same
pattern is exemplified by another version of the paradox, namely: "I am
lying".
It might be argued that in these two versions of the Liar paradox, the
paradoxical situation or contradiction may be averted by including some
other statements in the rectangle in question in the one case, and in the
other by the person uttering some other statements beside "I am lying". But
I
this is not a correct assessment of the situation. Even if there were other
sentences in the rectangle or uttered by the person, the paradox would remain
unaltered, provided we could maintain the Barber structure involved in the
Liar paradox. If we write in the above rectangle the following sentences:
(a) "A square is a three-sided figure", (b) "A polygon is a four-sided figure",
(c) "This page is green", the paradoxical result would ensue by raising the
question whether sentence (l),
namely "whatever is written in this
rectangle i3 not true" is; true or
not. This is so because it fulfils
©
(l) Whatever is written in this
rectangle is not true
(a) A square is a 3-sided figure
(b) A polygon is a 4-sided figure
(c) This page is green
1
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the requirements for the Barber structure. The sentence (l) in the new
rectangle says of all sentences in the rectangle that they are not true, that
is they do not truly assert the states of affairs which they assert. Sentences
(a), (b), (c) are in fact false (not true). Hence it is clear that sentence
(l) truly asserts the states of affairs asserted by sentences (a), (b), (c)
although they themselves do not truly assert the states of affairs asserted
by themselves. It is the very nature of the sentence (l) that it can truly
assert the states of affairs of only those sentences in the rectangle which
do not truly assert the states of affairs asserted by themselves. The
sentence (l), being itself in the rectangle, the requirements for the Barber
structure are satisfied and thus the question whether sentence (l) truly
asserts the state of affairs asserted by itself, in other words whether
sentence (l) is true or not, leads to a contradiction. If in this rectangle
in question we add the sentence (d) "Snow is white" or "Anequilateral
triangle is equiangular", even then the paradox would ensue. But the paradox
i
may not seem to ensue just because for psychological reasons we may tend to
cling to the reference provided by (d) and the trick of self-reference of the
Liar statement does not enter as such. (This point also relates to the
problem of shifting reference in the Liar paradox, which will be discussed
at a later stage.) For then the sentence (l) does exclude the application
to itself as such and so the requirement (b) desci-ibed below for the genesis
of the Barber structure is lacking. The requirements for the genesis of the
Barber structure are (a) that there should be one entity (here: the Liar state¬
ment) which claims to bear a certain relation to all entities which do notr to
bear this relation to themselves, and (b) that this unique entity belongs to
the group of entities under discussion.
V • I
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§3* Resolution and struoture of the paradox ^
It is clear that the above versions of the Liar paradox have basically
the Barber structure. But the main point of the Liar paradox concerns the
concepts of truth and falsity. We are not simply interested in averting the
contradiction involved in the Liar paradox, i.e., in just removing the Barber
structure. Our primary object is to clarify the logic or the proper usage of
the concepts involved in the paradox and the logical status of sentences like
> •
"I am telling a lie". Even if by some clever device we manage to eliminate
the Barber structure, such a resolution of the paradox may not illuminate
and clarify the notions of "true", "false" and the proper usage of sentences
like "I am telling a lie", and hence should not be regarded as an adequate
resolution of the paradox. It is possible that we may arrange to prevent the
Barber structure from occurring in our usage of words like "true" or "false"
but contradiction may still arise through the emergence of some other paradox¬
ical structure. The Liar paradox is not necessarily connected with the Barber
structure. The Liar paradox in general concerns the notion of truth and
falsity insofar as the incorrect and illegitimate usages of "true" and "false"
lead to contradictory results. And the resolution of the Liar paradox lies
in removing the incorrect usage of these words and thus clarifying their
proper usage. The incorrect or inappropriate usage of these terms may lead
to a paradoxical structure, and this paradoxical structure may be the Barber
structure or some other. The reason why we have treated the Liar paradox as
one of the Barber paradoxes is that the usual versions of the Liar paradox
fit the Barber structure, and we seem to be able to appreciate the Liar




Of course we may present other versions of the Liar paradox which do not
involve the Barber structure. For example, if on one side of a blackboard is
written: "whatever is written on the other side is true" and nothing else, but
on the other side of the blackboard is written: "whatever is written on the
other side is false" and nothing else, then raising the question of the truth
s ' ■
or falsity of either of the sentences leads to contradiction. Or, to take a
still simpler example, consider the following sentences:
( 1 '
The next sentence is true. The previous sentence is false.
Here we do not have the Barber structure. We simply meet a straightforward
contradiction because what is asserted by one sentence is denied by the other,
'/e may in fact combine the above two sentences in one:
This sentence is (both) true and false
which, as one can easily see, violates the principle of contradiction; namely,
a sentence cannot be both true and false together. As formulated in this way,
Lt is just a circuitous way of violating the principle of contradiction. One
nay easily make the situation more complicated, so that it becomes all the
nore difficult to notice the violation of the principle of contradiction at
me glance. For example:
(The second sentence in the bracketed space is true. The
third sentence in the bracketed space is false. The first
sentence in the bracketed space is true.)
5y raising the question of truth or falsity about any sentence in the above
iracketed space, we are led to contradiction. The proper resolution of this
:ontradiction should make us realise where or why the principle of contra-
Liction has been broken.
d
From the above discussion it is clear what is needed for a proper
■esolution of the paradox, i.e., one which does not simply avert the paradoxical
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structure. An adequate resolution of the paradox must clarify the concepts
Involved in the paradox, and should tell U3 how they should be properly used,
i. solution of the Liar paradox should throw light on any version of the Liar
saradox and should enable U3 to understand the flaws involved in the Liar




i. Tarski's resolution of the -paradox
.1. Importance of the Liar paradox
Tarski discusses the Liar paradox and comes to the conclusion that
iatural languages, say English or French, are essentially inconsistent.*1 The
nherent inconsistency of natural language is concealed by the fact that it
as no specific structure. The Liar paradox and other 'semantic' paradoxes
re just reminders that we have inconsistency in our language. So, Tarski's
onclusion is that because of this inherent inconsistency of our language,
e come across such 'semantic' paradoxes. Once we reform our language and
emove the inconsistency in it, the paradoxes naturally disappear. If what
arski says is true, his resolution of the Liar and other 'semantic' paradoxes
aula satisfy the test for a proper resolution of paradox; that is, it would
Larify the concepts involved in the paradoxes. Indeed, should Tarski's
slution prove acceptable, it would amount to a revolutionary advance in
smantics. Thus he impresses upon us the importance of the Liar paradox in
iese words:
Tarski, 'The Semantic Conception of Truth', (Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research, 1944)J repr. in Readings in Philosophical Analysis, ed. H. Feigl
& W. Sellars, pp.52-84«
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And just &3 ciass-theoreticai antinomies, and in particular
Russell's antinomy (of the class of all classes that are not
members of themselves), were the starting point for the
successful attempts at a consistent formalization of logic
and mathematics, so the antinomy of the Liar and other
semantic antinomies give rise to the construction of
theoretical semantics.'"
[ence, for Tarski the proper resolution of the Liar paradox would lead to the
■emoval of imprecision and inconsistency in our common language and thus the
onstruction of a self-consistent language for scientific purposes.
Tarski's comparison of the Liar paradox with Russell's paradox is
nfortunate. he overlooks the fact that in logic and mathematics a few basic
otions are involved which can be rendered precise in a deductive system. But
n the case of ordinary language we have many notions, call them "semantic" or
therwise, which extend to various paradoxes. Neither Tarski nor any other
emanticist has shown that these concepts can be systematized in a form like
bat of a geometrical system, and thus has not exhibited a closely inter-
annected and interwoven system. Showing some connections between a few
smantic concepts together is a different sort of thing from the close con-
sction of concepts involved in a formal system. And unless this is shown,
be proper resolution of the Liar paradox may remain restricted to the
secific Liar paradox or to a few other semantic paradoxes, and may not throw
iy light on the notions involved in all the 'semantic' paradoxes. To say
lat the solution of Russell's paradox has bearing upon or resolves other
iraaoxes occurring in a logical or mathematical system has a sound rational
isis because such a solution involves the rectification and clarification
1 basic concepts and axioms responsible for the construction of the whole
a deductive system. But there seems to be no sound rationale or justifi-
ttion for the assertion that the solution of the Liar paradox has bearing
Ibid., p.59.
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apon or would resolve other 'semantic' paradoxes. Tarski offers only an
indirect argument, through his theory of language-levels. But Tarski's
theory may be adequate to resolve the Liar paradox but not to resolve other
'semantic' paradoxes. So Tarski must provide some reason for the assertion
that resolving the Liar paradox would also result in the resolution of other
paradoxes. His argument as such is circular and has a metaphysical flavour:
le argues for the inconsistency of ordinary language through the inconsistency
>f the Liar paradox and then he brings forth his comprehensive view of the
.nconsistency of ordinary language to resolve the Liar and other 'semantic'
0
jaradoxes. He does not offer any independent proof for the inconsistency of
irdinary language. Let us now turn to his actual presentation and solution
if the Liar paradox.
2. Tarski's presentation ana resolution of the paradox
Tarski considers the following version of the Liar paradox. Given the
entence
The sentence written on page 78, line 16 is not true,
hich we abbreviate by the symbol S, according to Tarski's semantic theory of
ruth (i.e., a sentence is true if it asserts an existing state of affairs),
e assert:
1) 'S' is true if and only if, the sentence written on page 78 line 16 is
not true.
v o •
at, keeping in view the meaning of the symbol S, we establish empirically,
s Tarski says, the following fact in accordance with the theory of identity
Leibniz's law):
2) 'S' is identical with the sentence written on page 78 line 16.




3) 'S' is true if and only if 'S* is not true.
After presenting the paradox, Tarski embarks on an analysis of the
.ssumptions which lead to the antinomy. He says that we have assumed that
he language, in which the above antinomy is constructed obeys the ordinary
aws of logic ana moreover that (in this language) we can formulate and assert
n empirical premiss such as (2) in the above argument. Tarski thinks that
he second assumption is not necessary since some paradoxes may be constructed
ithout any empirical premiss but that the first assumption is time and must
e accepted. There is also a third assumption underlying the above con¬
traction of antinomy, namely - as expressed in Tarski's words:
We have implicitly assumed that the language in which the
antinomy is constructed contains, in addition to its
expressions, also the names of these expressions, as well
as semantic terms such as the term "true" referring to
sentences of this language; we have also assumed that all
sentences which determine the adequate usage of this term
can be asserted in the language. A language with these
properties will be called "semantically closed".*
t is true that Tarski expresses the Liar paradox in a 'semantically closed'
anguage as defined above. Tarski blames the 'semantically closed' language
ar the paradox. Hence, according to Tarski, if we decide not to use any
inguage which is semantically closed, we get no paradox. Tarski then goe3
1 to say:
Since we have agreed not to employ semantically closed
languages, we have to use two different languages in dis¬
cussing the problem of the definition of truth, and, more
generally,any problems in the field of semantics. The
first of these languages is the language which is "talked
about" and which is the subject-matter of the whole dis¬
cussion; the definition of truth which we are seeking
applies to the sentences of this language. The second is
the language in which we "talk about" the first language, and
in terms of which we wish, in particular, to construct the
definition of truth for the first language. We shall refer to
the first language as "the object language" and to the second
as "the meta-language".*♦
Ibid.. p.59 Ibid., p.60
rarski reminds us that the terms "object language" and "metalanguage" have
Dnly relative meaning. If we want to apply the notion of truth to the
sentences belonging to the metalanguage of the original object-language, we
lave to create a new metalanguage to talk about truth in this metalanguage,
vhich now may be regarded as an object-language. And in order to define or
talk about the truth of statements expressed in this new metalanguage, we
"equire yet another metalanguage of a higher level. So Tarski introduces
;he idea of an unending hierarchy of languages.
In fact'Tarski's solution of the paradox is analogous to Russell's
;heory of types. As Russell arrived at his theory of types in order to avoid
i 'vicious circle', so Tarski arrives at his hierarchy of languages in order
;o avoid 'semantically closed' language. Again, as Russell discovers the
irinciple of the vicious circle by generalizing the fact that all paradoxes
.uffer from self-inclusiveness (reflexivity) and from the general observation
if propositions involving the vicious circle, so Tarski arrives at the idea
f metalanguages simply by examining the conditions of the Liar paradox and
oncluaing that the paradox arises because it is expressed in a 'semantically
losed' language. With regard to Tarski's solution, we can raise general
"ejections which may be raised against any solution in terms of a levels of
anguage theory. We have already mentioned these objections and more will
e said later.
The concept of levels of truth seems very odd. That is, it is odd to
uppose there is no concept of truth in general but there can be truth of the
irst order, truth of the second order and so on ad infinitum. We employ the
ord "true" without taking it to stand for an infinite series of| levels of
ruth, for we believe that there is a general concept qf truth as such. But
t may be said that the proponents of the levels of language theory have found
lis belief to be false. Sometimes truth is stranger than fiction. Simplicity
5 a virtue, but contradiction is worse than complication. The proponents
jsert that the construction of levels of language is the only proper way to
rert the contradiction in semantic paradoxes and so Occam's Razor fails to
>rk here. But the theory of levels of language remains implausible unless
;s proponents can give us a clear-cut indication as to how to construct a
.stinctly-demarcated series of levels, so as to overcome the following
ijection. The general idea of levels of language is that, given any language,
.y LI, a language about certain existing objects, then the language in which
talk about the language LI would be of higher level, say L2; and the language
i which we talk about language L2 would be of still higher level, say L3, and
on. And we must not confuse the levels or orders of languages with each
her. That is, if we are talking about sentences of language LI in terms of
, then we cannot talk of the sentences of language L2 in terms of LI, and
]
so we must not talk about sentences in one language in the language of the
me level. We have already argued in the first chapter that in many cases
lf-reference is quite legitimate and consistent, e.g. "This sentence is in
glish". Admission of such self-referential expressions goes against the
vels of language theory. To regard such expressions as illegitimate in any
?
nsistent language seems remote from the truth and we find no plausible
ound for such conviction. Tarski may retort that in such expressions as
ose quoted above no semantical concepts are involved and hence self-reference
harmless. But in the first place, neither Tarski nor any other semanticist
3 offered us any criterion to decide whether or not a certain concept is to
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be regarded as a semantical concept. Although the semanticists do give some
examples of semantic concepts like "truth", "designation", "satisfaction",
they do not provide any general criterion to distinguish them from non-
semantic concepts. In the second place, Tarski does not seem to restrict
himself to semantic concepts only, and he does seem to make a wider claim that
we should not talk about any language in the language itself, whatsoever
concepts are involved. In the third place, in the specific case of the
concept "truth", which every semanticist has acknowledged to be a semantical
concept, the following statement-form is valid but according to the leyels
of language theory it should be dismissed as illegitimate:
If x says that whatever y says is false and y says that
something which x says is true, then something which x
says is false and something which y says is true.
Obviously, the levels of language theory should not regard such a statement-
form as legitimate. If two statements attach truth-value to each other, then
there is no reason for regarding one as of higher level than the other. In
our daily discourse we often employ sentences attributing truth-value to
each other. In the case of the Liar paradox we have already presented some
versions of it where two sentences attribute truth-value to each other - for
instance
The next sentence is true. The previous sentence is false.
If there is no objection based on the levels of language theory against the
valid'statement-form presented above, then why should these versions of the
Liar paradox, or the self-reference of the Liar paradox in general, be
attacked on that ground?
The other point which Tarski wants to emphasize is that we must not
employ names of expressions in which the antinomy is contructed in the very
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e language (-/names or designating expressions being semantic;concepts),,
ause then we would be employing a "semantically closed" language. But
s point is nullified by the fact that we can present the Liar paradox in
h a way that the problem of the name and designation belonging to the same
guage may not arise. W. Rozeboom formulates the Liar paradox in this way
making a distinction between sentence-token and statement.* His formulation
the paradox is as follows. Let us call S the expression inside the Figure 1.
In Figure 1 there is a sentence-
token which conveys a false statement Figure 1.
us assume that it designates a statement, call it 2. So we have:
S is a sentence-token and, moreover, the only sentence-token in Fig. 1.
If 2 is a statement, S conveys 2.
S conveys no statement other than 2. ^
2 is a statement.
O
2 is true only if it is the case that in Figure 1 there is a sentence-
token which conveys a false statement.
2 is false only if it is not the case that in Figure 1 there is a
sentence-token which conveys a false statement.
No statement is both false and true.
All statements are either true or false.
, suppose (Hi): 2 is true. Then from (Hi), (2), (4)} it follows S conveys
rue statement. From (Hi), (5), (l), it follows that S conveys a false
tement; hence from (3), £ is false. Hence by (Hi), (l) - (5), (7) we are
to contradiction. Now suppose (H2): 2 is false. Then (H2), (2), (a)
Ly that S conveys a false statement. From (H2), (l), (6), it follows that
I. Rozeboom, 'Is Epimenides still lying?', Analysis 195"£ > pp.105-113-
k-. '- U-Jt- \
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Loes not convey a false statement, (l), (2), (4), (6) entail that 2 is not
_se. But since (l)-(7) imply 2 is a statement which' is neither true nor
.se, are logically inconsistent.
It follows from the above discussion that the levels of language theory
;er the lines of Tarski is not justified. Thus we have to look for some
ler solution of the Liar paradox.
O
Significance of the Liar paradox
Meaninglessness and the Liar statement
We mentioned in our first chapter that according to Russell self-
erring Expressions are to be regarded as meaningless or insignificant.
O--.
the usual versions of the Liar paradox are straightforwardly self-
erential, expressions in these versions may be regarded as meaningless,
enko has attempted to show that Russell's solution - that the expression of
Liar paradox is meaningless - itself leads to contradiction.* Let us
sider the following version of the Liar paradox which is discussed by Toms:**
No true sentence is written within 0Figure 2.
the rectangle of Figure 2.
if the sentence or statement within Figure 2 asserts no statement to be
a or false, it follows that no true statement is written within Figure 2.
s, the sentence "No true sentence is written within Figure 2." is true, and
refore meaningful, and so contradicts Russell's hypothesis. Symbolically
ressed:
U P. Ushenko, Problems of Logic, pp.78-81. Another argument to refute
lussell on this point has already been dealt with in the first chapter p.25.




Let fx mean "a: is written in the rectangle of Figure 2."
Ta; mean "a; belongs to the class of true sentences."
Mas mean "a: belongs to the class of meaningful sentences."
s be a variable for which the name of a sentence may be substituted.
a name the sentence "No true sentence is written within the rectangle
of Figure 2."
e have : (l) fa - (i.e., a is written in Figure 2.)
(2) (s)(/s => s=a) - (i.e., only a is written in Figure 2.)
o, Figure 2 is:
(s)(fs D ~Ts) Figure 2.
l) Suppose Ta, then:
(3) (s)(/s D ~Ts) - i.e. assertion of the sentence supposed true.
(4) fa D ~Ta - from (3) for value (2) of s.
(5) -To - (1), (4).
3, this alternative leads to contradiction.
i) Suppose ~To, then:
(6) ~(s)(fs D ~Ts) - i.e., assertion of the(sentence. supposed false.
(7) (3a)(fa . Ts) - from (6) by logical transformation
(8) fy . Ty - by EI
(9) fy D y=a - by UI from (2)
(10) y=a - by MP and simplification from (8), (9)
(11) fa . To - by replacement ana principle of extentionality:
( (<px . x=y) D cpy) .
(12) To - from (ll) by simplification.
», this alternative also leads to contradiction.
^
0 Suppose ~Mo, then Ushenko and Toms argue:
(13) ~Ta, and then by argument (b) we get
(14) To, and hence
(15) Ma.
Section (c) above needs explanation. The sentence, "No true sentence
written within the rectangle of Figure 2.", is as true as the sentence, "No
.Ise sentence is written within the rectangle of Figure 2."; if there is no
sentence written within the Figure 2, or if the sentence written in Figure 2
cannot be regarded as true or false, i.e., it cannot be regarded as conveying
a proper statement, - in that case it is not right to-conclude merely that no
true statement is written within the rectangle of Figure 2, or that no false
statement is written within the rectangle of Figure 2: one should draw both
these conclusions. Hence Ushenko and Toms' argument of part (C) is misleading
jymbolisation does not necessarily bring out the clarity and validity in our
thinking; sometimes it rather leads us astray from correct and valid arguments
Symbolisation follows rigid patterns to which we may doggedly try to fit argu-
lents which do not follow those patterns. From "~Ma" we get the "combined"
issertion, namely: "No true sentence is written within the rectangle of Figure
! and no false sentence is written within the rectangle of Figure 2.". This
C
:ombined assertion or sentence cannot be treated as the combination of two
entences in truth-functional logic. So the symbolisation of truth-functional
.ogic cannot hold here. In truth-functional logic a combined assertion, say
A . 8', can be broken up into two sentences "h" and "B" which can be treated
eparately and independently from each other. But this cannot be done with
he above combined assertion while remaining within the framework of truth-
-vo
unctional logic. This is so because by the application of law of excluded
ladle we are soon led to contradiction. Hence, unless we construct another
ystem in which the law of excluded middle does not apply, we cannot express
orrectly the logic behind the present combined entailment. So the argument
n part (C) is not a valid one, although the conclusion that "(s)(^s D~Ts)"
s meaningful can be justified by other considerations. We may reasonably
rgue that since ~Ta is a part of the meaningful "combined" sentence in an
nportant sense, hence "(s)(,fs D~Ts)" may also be reasonably regarded as
ianingful. We shall further consider the problem of meaningfulness at the
id of this chapter.
I. Dichotomy of either-or attacked
By regarding the sentence "No true sentence is written within the
sctangle of Figure 2." as meaningful but neither true nor false, we have in
ict shown that there is a third possibility; that is, we can reasonably say
*
a sentence or statement that it is neither true nor false. In certain
ises we can deny both these alternatives. In all the formulations of the
iradoxes considered above, the law of excluded middle (of traditional logic)
.s been assumed to hold. Tarski explicitly admitted that traditional laws
'
logic underlie the formulation of the Liar paradox. He could easily have
oided constructing his cumbersome hierarchy of languages by attacking the
aditional law of. excluded middle. It is not the law of contradiction but
e law of excluded middle that we regard as questionable. We can say both
o true sentence is written on the blackboard" and "No false sentence is
itten on the blackboard" in case the blackboard is either clean or there is
~v>
imperative sentence, etc. written on it. If on the blackboard the words
s written "The blackboard is black (or white)", then we can determine the
.ith-value of the sentence "No true sentence is written on the blackboard",
t it has a truth-value because its truth-value has become dependent on the
uth-value of the sentence "The blackboard is black (or white)". If it
inds on its own, we cannot 3ay whether it is true or not true. We have
r-eady touched on this point, especially in chapter II. Now, let us explore
?e closely the logical status of expressions contained in the Liar paradox
:e "This sentence is false" or "I am lying".
/
88
The logical- behaviour of "true" and "false"
As said above, we can avoid contradiction in the Liar paradox if we
gard the sentence involved as neither true nor false, though meaningful,
sre are several sorts of sentences which cannot be regarded as true or
Lse. For instance, imperative sentences are of such a nature. But the
itences involved in the Liar paradox are neutral (i.e., neither true nor
Lse) for some other reason than e.g. imperative sentences. Sentences like
am lying", "Thi3 sentence is false" taken by themselves are incomplete
Its of thought because they lack reference. We raise the question "What
C
i am I telling?", "Which sentence is false?" or "Why is this sentence
.se?" 'i'here is no possible or actual state of affairs about which judg-
I
its are passed in the above sentences when taken by themselves. We must
>w what we are referring to, or wnat statement i3 to be assessed as true
false before we can say that it is true or false. R.C. Skinner has ably
;ued that to describe a statement (sentence or assertion) as true or false
to say something about the statement.* He says:
what is properly describable as being true or false is
always a sentence (or statement), or group of words that
could stand alone as a sentence (or could be used to make
a statement), which does not itself contain the words
"true" or "false";
argues that if A says "It is false that the conservatives are out of
our at present", and B replies "It is true", then B would be taken as
erting that the conservatives are out of favour at present. This is so,
suss in fact, the sentence to which B refers is: "The conservatives are
of favour at present", - a sentence not containing the word "false" -
t.C. Skinner, 'The paradox of the Liar', Mind 1959, p.326.
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id not "It is false that the conservatives are out of favour at present".
Ct is true that it is false that " means "It is false that and
it is false that it is false that " means "It is true that ".
.timately in order to say that a certain sentence is true or false, there
ist be some reference, sone possible state of affairs asserted by the sentence
id if this reference is missing, there is nothing to be assessed as true or
tlse. The single sentence written on a blackboard "The sentence written on
ds blackboard is in English" though self-referring is true; the single /
>ntence written on a blackboard "The sentence written on this blackboard is
i French" is self-referring but false. But to ask whether the single
ntence on a blackboard "The sentence written on this blackboard is false"
true or false (as in one of the versions of the Liar paradox) is to misuse
e words "true" or "false"; that is, it is to ignore the proper usage of the
rds. Inthe first two cases "true" and "false" refer to the question
ether or not the sentence written on the blackboard is in English and French
spectively. Here we find a reference, so we can reasonably raise the
estion whether it is the case or it is not the case; that is, whether a
rtain state of affairs exists or not - the state of affairs being whether
e sentence written on the blackboard is in English (or in French). But in
e last case we do not find any reference to any state of affairs of which
could decide whether or not it exists. When I say "This sentence is false",
must refer to something expressing a certain state of affairs. When
imenides the Cretan utters only the sentence "Nothing true is ever asserted
a Cretan", the sentence lacks reference to something that is the case or
not the case. There may be other sentences uttered by Epimenides himself
by some other Cretan to which this sentence is supposed to apply, but this
onot change the oddity unless the sentences concerned express states of
"airs and so can be assessed as true or false. Another Cretan might say:
latever Epimenides says is true"; but even then we are led to contradiction,
seems obviously odd to ask whether the sentence "This sentence is false"
true or false if there is no sentence to be judged true or false, just as
is odd to tell a man to go and shut the door when there is no door to shut
open. Telling somebody to shut the door implies that there exists a door;
lerwise it seems absurd to tell him. Similarly, to say that a certain
itence is true or false implies that there is a sentence which can be
isonably said to be true or false; i.e., the sentence in question must
mess a certain state of affairs. If this precondition is not satisfied,
i oddity is apparent and it becomes nonsensical to ask whether or not the
itence "This sentence is true" is true.
Skinner elaborates his point of view, which we fully endorse, on the
esis of contradiction in the Liar paradox by citing the following example,
aider whether the sentence "'Socrates is still alive' is false" i3 true
false. He say3 we can play a trick with this sentence by remarking that
it is true then it is false and vice versa; but if we look for its refer-
e and keep our eyes on it, no paradox arises. We may paraphrase the above
tence by: "Is it in fact ti*ue that Socrates is still alive?". We must
w what we are referring to. Do the predicates "true" and "false" apply
"Socrates is still alive" or to "'Socrates is still alive' is false"?
nner ably argues that a paradox arises because the argument switches from
to another. The first part of the paradox runs: If it is false (assumption)
n, since this is what it is declared to be, it i3 true. The first and
ond "it" in the argument refer to "Socrates is still alive", but the third
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t" refers to "'Socrates is still alive' is false". Similarly with the
cond part of the argument. Skinner argues that a similar sort of malady
facts the statement of the Liar paradox. The situation here "becomes more
mplicated "because the expression "The sentence written on this blackboard"
not a sentence. But if we regard it aa having a sentence or statement as
ference, a similar situation arises. It is the shifting of reference which
ids to contradiction and it occurs owing to our oversight in not clinging
one fixed reference. If we accept the convention that "It is true that it
false" means "It is false", and "It is false that it is false" means "It
> true", but keep the same reference then we get no contradiction. For
The sentence written on this blackboard is false' is true" just means "The
itence written on this blackboard is false" and "'The sentence written on
Ls blackboard is false* is false" means "The sentence written on this
ickboard is true". Skinner further argues that if we do not accept the
>ve convention and do not change the reference, but clearly fix our atten-
>n on the expression taken into account, then also no paradox ari3e3.
ipose that the sentence written on this blackboard is true, - then the
Lclusion "'The sentence written on this blackboard is false' is false"
is follow, but it is not paradoxical because what is asserted to be false
the conclusion is "The sentence written on this blackboard is false",
ice, truth or falsity has not been assigned to the same reference and hance
contradiction arises. In the example considered above, namely "'Soorates
still alive' is false", if we fix the reference and take care not to shift
reference, no contradiction ensues. To say that this sentence is false
s not lead to the conclusion that this (whole) sentence, namely "'Socrates
still alive' is false" is true. Only by confusing the two references,
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lamely "Socrates is still alive" and "'Socrates is still alive' is false",
Lo we get the contradiction. Similarly with the case "This is a false
sentence". The reference shifts here from "This" to "This is a false sentence".
:f we suppose the above sentence to be false then, for reasons given previously,
re cannot say "This is a false sentence" is true. As in statements of the
liar paradox there is in fact no reference: we imperceptibly shift the refer-
mce, e.g., from "This" to "This is a false sentence", and fall into a trap,
'he absence of the real reference or mention of state of affairs in the
.ssertions judged to be true or false prevents us from detecting the change
f reference.
It is clear that the proper resolution of the Liar paradox should safe-
uard against this change of reference and also it should provide a definite
nd legitimate reference for the Liar assertion. Once we have ultimately a
ixed and definite reference, which may or may not contain the word3 "true"
r "false" (e.g., in the case "All sentences on this page are true" the
eference or statement describing a certain state of affairs contains the word
true"), we can use the rules governing the correct usages of the words "true"
r "false" - these rules being e.g. that it is false that it is true means it
s false and that it is false that it is false means it is true.
Misleading aspects of the Liar paradox
L. Grammar and the Liar paradox
The conclusion from the above discussion is that we must have some fixed
sference in order to speak of truth or falsity. For proper usage of the terms
true" and "false" there should be determinate reference to a certain state of
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iffairs. Compare the following two sentences: (a) "I am writing" (b) "I am
Lying". Their grammatical structure seems to be the same, but the logical
>ehaviour of the words "writing" and "lying" is different. "Writing" is
mrely a factual or descriptive word, but "lying" is essentially an assessment
if the assertions of certain man: it is used to pass a certain judgment. The
rords "time" and "false" are likewise "assessments" used in passing judgment
pon whether such-nnd-3uch is the case or not. And hence to use them signi-
'icantly there must be something to assess or to be judged true or false,
his something to be judged as true or false is an assertion expressing some
eference or state of affairs. When I utter the sentence "I am uttering a
entence" then it is true that I am uttering a sentence. The sentence "I am
ttering a sentence" asserts a state of affairs which actually exists. But
n the case of "This sentence is false" or "I am lying", the relevant refer-
C
nee is lacking and unless this vacuum is filled by asserting a certain state
f affairs, we cannot say of these sentences whether they are true or false,
n the first case, there is an answer to the question "What is it that I am
ttering?"; but in the second case, there is no answer to the question "What
tate of affairs is being falsely asserted?", or "What lie is it that I am
elling?".
The adverse encroachment of grammar on thought is as old as the origin
f thought. Many wrong philosophical arguments and speculations have their
aots in grammar. Two or more sentences may have similar grammatical structure
it widely different logical forms. "This man has four pounds" and "This chair
as four legs" have similar grammatical structures which may beguile us into
linking that their logical behaviour is of the same kind. But in fact, the
art of relation which pounds have to the man is of a quite different nature
from the relation which legs bear to the chair. The distinction of substance
(substratum) and property in philosophical literature seems to derive from
the misleading effect of grammar. The sentence "The sentence written on the
blackboard is an English sentence" and the sentence "The sentence written on
the blackboard is false" have grammatical similarities, but it is misleading
to assume that their logical behaviour is also the same. The problem involved
in the Liar paradox is to get at the logical behaviour of the words "true"
and "false" and to get rid of mistakes created or suggested by grammar. Our
JX
account of the Liar paradox in terms of the Barber structure assists us in
bringing out the defect with which the paradox is infected. To recapitulate,
we argued that we have a certain statement (call it the Liar statement) which
truly asserts the state of affairs asserted by all and only those statements
which do not truly assert the states of affairs asserted by themselves. Now,
we cannot raise the question whether or not the Liar statement truly asserts
the state of affairs asserted by itself. The question is illegitimate because
no state of affairs is asserted by the Liar statement itself. This also brings
out our point that we can legitimately raise the question of the truth or
falsity of the Liar statement (e.g., "This sentence is false") only when it
refers to some other statement which ultimately desoribes a certain state of
affairs.
j2. The problem of reference and significance
The problem of reference in the Liar paradox can perhaps be better
appreciated if we compare it with other sentences like "The present king of
?rance is bald". This sentence, as pointed out by Strawson, cannot reasonably
se regarded as either true or false.* For there exists no present king of
* See P.F. Strawson, Introduction to Logical Theory, pp.184-192.
95
ranee, and hence the question of the sentence's truth or falsity does not
rise. But there are stronger grounds for denying that the expression of
he Liar paradox, for instance, "I am lying", can be regarded as true or
alse. The sentence "The present king of France is bald" expresses a certain
ossible state of affairs, even though there is no present king of France -
he state of affairs that someone referred to by "the present king of France"
ci -
s bald. But in the case of "I am lying" there is no expression of any state
P affairs. In order to judge any sentence to be true or false, the first and
sremost requirement is that the sentence must express a certain state of
Pfairs. This condition is necessary though not sufficient. The second
jquirement for such a sentence to be judged true or false is that if it
mtains referring expressions then there must exist a subject about which
C
>mething is asserted by the sentence. In the case of "The present king of
•ance is bald" there exists no person corresponding to the present king of
•ance about whom it is said that he is bald. The question of truthfulness
•ises only when granted the supposition that there exists one and only one
•esent king of France. Both the sentences above are significant and intel-
.gible. But when we raise the question of their being true or false, Con-
.dering these sentences as they are and without reference to other relevant
mtences, the Liar sentence becomes insignificant. It is then devoid of
■oper significance because it lacks the proper background or expressions to
scribe any state of affairs. A3 regards the second sentence, if we know
ere is no present king of France, we cannot then significantly raise the
estion of its being true or false. We understand the expressions in certain
ntexts and the expressions gain significance and relevance with the provision
relevant contexts. Unless these contextual requirements are satisfied,
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i whole expression may become insignificant though we may understand the
lividual words involved in it.
The significance of a sentence depends on the context. Russell ably
Lngs home this point in connection with his theory of descriptions, although
did not pursue our line of argument, lie says:
The central point of the theory of descriptions was that
a phrase may contribute to the meaning of a sentence with¬
out having any meaning at all in isolation. Of this, in
the case of descriptions there is precise proof: If 'the
author of Waverley* meant anything other than 'Scott',
'Scott is the author of Waverley' would be false, which
it is not. If 'the author of Waverley* meant 'Scott',
'Scott is the author of Waverley' would be a tautology}
which it is not. Therefore, 'the author of Waverley'
means neither 'Scott' nor anything else - i.e. 'the
author of Waverley' means nothing, Q.E.D.*
above quotation is given just to illustrate how the phrase "the author of
erley" attains proper significance only in the context of the whole sentence.
ay utter any sort of noise or scribble down any sort of dots, say "* "; they
nify nothing. But when I say that they are examples of such-and-such a 30rt
noise or dot, they attain significance. Similarly, to take the extreme
mples, "The law of excluded middle is green" or "The square root of an
phant is a cow" would be regarded as absurd, but in certain contexts, for
mple where the speaker is ignorant about what is the law of excluded middle,
may have significance and then we may tell him that he is mistaken about
law of excluded middle so that his utterance cannot be regarded as true or
n significant when viewed in a different context. A similar situation may
se with the assertion that prime numbers are heavier than natural numbers.
tences sometimes gain significance when viewed in a metaphorical or poetic
text. With an appropriate background or context the sentences gain or lose
J. Russell, My Philosophical Development, p.85-
aningfulness or significance. If a speaker is aware that x has no children,
en the speaker's assertion that x's children are asleep is absurd. But if
e speaker does not know whether x has or does not have children, then we can
asonably say that his assertion is false.
There can be no hard and fast rules for determining whether a sentence
meaningful. Significance depends on contextual matters, and as the number
possible contexts is uncountable and extensible we cannot make strict rules
significance. In our everyday language we U3e many words to express the
aninglessness of expressions - like "absurd", "insignificant", "nonsensical",
snseless", etc. They exhibit different shades, different nuances or degrees
meaninglessness with respect to our contextual requirements. It i3 also
portant to note that the logic behind all contextual situations (and hence
our language) cannot be formalised. A formal system has its own limitations,
is delimited with rigid, inflexible rules which do not apply to every
tuation. As contextual situations are numerous and can spring up unexpec-
LLy, the logical or deductive rules applying to them are equally innumerable
L indeterminate. Our common natural language is able to express newly
>rgent situations. It follows that there oannot be a formal system to
rern all the deductive rules of ordinary natural language. Of course, we
i for our own limited purposes demarcate sentences having a certain degree
significance. We may concentrate our attention only on those sentences
>ut which we could significantly talk of their truth or falsity - the realm
ire true and false are contradictory and hence where the law of excluded
.die does apply. This limitation, in fact, we have imposed upon ourselves
.le discussing the Liar paradox. We may consider sentences where true and
se are not contradictory and the concept of "false" extends far wider than
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that of truth - where the negation of negation (i.e., falsity of falsity) does
not imply the truth. It is quite useful and interesting to investigate for
these purposes the problem of negation. In certain other cases a sentence
can be significant without implying that it has any truth-value (ie., truth
or falsity as we generally understand these terms), like some interrogative,
imperative, and even indicative sentences. Modal logio and deontic logic are
attempts to understand the logic behind concepts and sentences to which we
io not ordinarily apply the terms "true" or "false".
In some cases phrases signify like demonstrative pronouns. "It is
false", "It is true", "It is condemnable", "It is commendable", "It is
provable", "It is unprovable", etc. are intelligible sentences. But their
significance lies in that they prepare U3 for something whose truth-value
sr provability, etc. is in question. But if we try to understand the above
phrases in another sense, where they do not act demonstratively and refer
solely to themselves, they would appear absurd, insignificant anddevoid of
sontent. They are significant when they are appreciated and understood in
•*
;heir proper role and function.
We have not explained what sort of sentence is supposed to be assessed
is true or false; i.e., what 3ort of reference is lacking in the Liar expres¬
sions like "This sentence i3 false". The sentence to be assessed must express
lither that certain thing, say that a round golden table exists or does not
ixist or that a certain law, relation, connection, or claim holds good or not.
iven a hypothetical or conditional statement can be judged true or false. It
say assert that a certain causal nexus holds good or not. There is a limit
;o our ability to explain a thing and perhaps we cannot do more than use the
bove phrases to explain our point. To explain further we might be simply
33
asing circuitous and unnecessary phrases.
Concluding remarks
Our resolution of the paradox by first providing a proper reference
and then raising the question of truth or falsity is adequate to remove the
Jarber structure and hence the contradiction involved in it. This is 30
>ecause the Liar sentence, which attributes a truth-value to itself, is
levoid of a proper reference and unless a proper reference is provided we
;annot raise the question of its truth or falsity. Hence we cannot legiti-
lately ask whether or not the Liar sentence is true. Our solution not only
*emove3 the contradiction but also explains and clarifies the notions of
;ruth and falsity involved in the Liar paradox. Hence our solution satisfies
;he requirements for the proper resolution of a paradox. It may be objected
;hat in the version cited earlier there was a reference, but still we got the
ontradiction. The example was that sentence (1) in the rectangle leads to
(l) Whatever is written in this
rectangle is not true
(a) A square is a 3-sided figure
(b) A polygon is a A-sided figure
(c) This page is green
ontradiction if one is asked whether it is true or false, although ample
eference is provided by the sentences (a), (b), (c). But the contradiction
rises here because the conditions of the Barber structure are satisfied. If
e write sentence (l) outside the rectangle and thus do not regard this sen-
ence as falling into the domain of sentences inside the rectangle, we get
o contradiction. Then we can reasonably say that sentence (l) is true
ecause all the sentences inside the rectangle, namely (a), (b), (c), are,
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Ln fact, false. The sentence (1) has indirect reference not provided by (l)
Itself. If there had been another sentence, call it (la) instead of (l),
vhich has direct reference, that i3 reference provided by (la) itself, i.e.
;he states of affairs asserted by (la) jitself, even then there would have
arisen no contradiction because in that case we could not have the Barber
itructure. Because then we could not have the sentence (la) which would
;ruly assert the state of affairs provided by all the statements (i.e. in the
•ectangle) which do not truly assert the state's of affairs provided by themselves,
'his is so, because then (la) would have no direct reference. It may be noted
hat the Barber structure as such has nothing to do with the lack of reference
s such. It just happens that in the Liar paradox, if we provide the refer-
nce, we eliminate the Barber structure as well, for the reason just mentioned
n the case of (la).
In conclusion, we cannot 3peak of statements of the Liar paradox as
rue or false because they lack reference, that is they do not express or assert
ny states of affairs, and as soon as we provide the reference for the Liar
tatement, the paradox disappears. Considered independently from external
eference we may simply regard the Liar statement a3 neither true nor false,
ut as a sentence which can be used to asse33 as true or false any statement
aving proper reference, i.e. assertion of certain states of affairs. We have
rovided an adequate solution because it not only helps us to eliminate the
elf-contradictory Barber structure but also helps us to understand the logical
ehaviour of the words "true" and "false" and the Liar statement, and thereby
eads us to a better understanding and appreciation of the concepts "true",
false", "reference", etc. It teaches us that in order to apply significantly
tie words "true" and "false", there must be some reference - a sentence
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describing a certain state of affairs, and that we should be careful not to
shift our reference in the argument.
Chapter IV
DIAGONAL PARADOXES
In this chapter we shall discuss the Richard paradox along with
ntor's diagonal argument. As the main theme of this chapter is to
ahorate the Richard paradox, which in its formal structure follows
e Cantor diagonal, we have called the chapter "Diagonal Paradoxes",
shall also discuss Cantor's general argument, Cantor's argument
nested intervals to prove the indenumerability of the real numbers
d the "Richardian" paradox (our name given to a paradox in order to
stinguish it from the Richard paradox). For they have some essential
atures in common with the Cantor diagonal and the Richard paradox,
though Cantor's general argument and the Richardian paradox manifest
2 Barber structure and not the diagonal structure.
Introduction to Richard's paradox
, Richard's paradox and its importance
For the sake of clear exposition we present the paradox in
shard's own words :
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I am going to define a certain set of (ensemble) numbers which
I shall call the set E, by means of the following considerations:
Let us write all the arrangements of the tr/enty-six letters of
the French alphabet (taken) two by two, arranging these arrange¬
ments in alphabetical order; then all the arrangements three by
three, ranged in alphabetical order; then those four by four, etc.
These arrangements may contain the same letter repeated several
times; they are arrangements with repetition.
Whatever whole number p may be, every arrangement of the twenty-
six letters p by p will be found in this table, and as every¬
thing that can be written with a finite number of words is an
arrangement of letters, everything that can be written will be
found in the table of which we have just shown the manner of
construction.
As numbers are defined by means of words, and the latter by
means of letters, some of these arrangements will be defini¬
tions of numbers. Let us cancel from our arrangements all
those which are not definitions of numbers.
Let itl be the first number defined by an arrangement,
the second, u^ the third, etc.
There have thus been arranged in a determinate order all
the numbers defined by means of a finite number of words.
Therefore: all the numbers that can be defined by means
of a finite number of words form a denumerable set.
This now is where the contradiction lies. We can form a
number which does not belong to this set.
'Let p be the n-th decimal of the n-th number of the set E;
let us form a number having zero for its integral part,
p+1 for its n-th decimal if p is equal neither to eight nor
to nine, and otherwise unity.'
This number N does not belong to the set E. If it was
the n-th number of the set E, its nth figure would be the
nth decimal figure of that number, which it is not.
I call G the group of letters in inverted commas.
The number N is defined by the words of the group G, i.e.
by a finite number of words; it ought therefore to belong
to the set E. But we have seen that it does not belong.
That is the contradiction.1*
* J. Richard, 'Les Principes des Mathematiques et Le Probleme des
ensembles', Revue generale des Sciences, (1905), p.541
(as translated by Ivo Thomas in I.M. Boch^nski,
A History of Formal Logic, p.390).
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After presenting the above paradox, Richard goes on to discuss its
resolution. He says:
Let us show that this contradiction is only apparent.
Let us return to our arrangements. The group of letters
G is one of these arrangements. It will exist in my
table but at the place which it occupies, it has no
meaning. There it is a question of the set E and this set
is not yet defined. Therefore I ought to cancel it. The
group G has meaning only if the set E is totally defined
and this can come about only by an infinite number of
words. Hence there is no contradiction.
It seems clear from above that Richard seems to resolve the
contradiction by denying the existence and constructibility of the
'diagonal' number; i.e., the number which was proposed to be constructed
by the instructions embodied in the group of letters G. If we accept
Richard's solution we have to reject Cantor's diagonal proof of the
indenumerability of the set of real numbers.* In fact, before presen¬
ting the actual paradox, Richard claims that contradictions arise from
the supposition of an indenumerable set:
It is not necessary to go to the theoiy of ordinal numbers in
order to find such contradictions. Here is one which presents
itself in the study of continuum.
This important aspect of the Richard paradox may be summed up by
saying that it concerns the definability of real numbers. We suppose,
ir think that we have some reason to believe, that the set of real
lumbers is indenumerable. But the real numbers are definable in words
ir sentences which constitute a denumerable set. Hence we conclude
shat the set of all real numbers is denumerable, thus contradicting
1 Subsequently Richard regarded the 'diagonal' number as valid. We
shall discuss this point at a later stage.
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the previous assumption about the indenumerability of real numbers. This
is the general argument which may be put forward. For his particular
or definite argument, he exploited Cantor's diagonal argument. He formu¬
lated the paradox following Cantor's diagonal argument and tried to
disentangle the riddle by rejecting the diagonal derivative real number.
Let us therefore turn to Cantor's diagonal argument in order to elucidate
Richard's presentation and resolution of the paradox.
§2. Cantor's diagonal and the Richard paradox
Cantor's diagonal to prove the indenumerability of real numbers
may be stated as follows: Let us consider the real numbers between
0 and 1 (excluding 0, including l) taking each number expressed as
an infinite non-terminating decimal. For instance, a real number
0.5 (i.e. 1/2) may be expressed as 0.4-9999 Let us start
enumerating these real numbers according to some enumerating method.
Let the first few numbers run as follows:
Now, according to our supposition of the denumerability of the set of
all the real numbers, every number in the interval 0<ic^L must have a
place at some stage in this list of numbers. But we can construct a
number which cannot occur in this list. We construct the new real
number by inserting in the first decimal place a digit 3 (or in fact
any digit different from 2 - the digit 2 occurring at the first decimal
place of the first number of the list in our example), in the second
decimal place 2 (or again in fact any digit different from 3 - the digit
3 occurring at the second decimal place of the second number of the list),
in the third decimal place again 3 (or in fact any digit - different from 5
the digit 5 occurring at the third decimal place of the third number of the
list in the above example), in the nth decimal place again 3 unless there
is a digit 3 at the nth decimal place of the nth number in the list and in
that case 2 (or in fact any digit - different from the digit occurring at
the nth decimal place of the nth number in the list). Nov/, this newly-
constructed diagonal-derivative number cannot occur in our proposed enumer¬
ation or list because it must differ from every number in the list. The
list was arranged under the assumption that we have a rule or rules
whereby to enumerate all the real numbers between CKa^L. But this
so-called diagonal derivative number, though lying between 0 and 1,
cannot occur in the list. Thus we conclude that the proposed rules
were insufficient or incapable of enumerating all the real numbers in
question because the diagonal derivative number cannot occur in the
List. We may then start with some different rules so as to include
bhis newly-constructed diagonal derivative real number in the list.
3ut once again we may construct another diagonal derivative number which
:annot occur in the new list. Hence no procedure can serve to enumerate
ill the real numbers in the interval 0<ic^L, and so we have demonstrated
the indenumerability of the set of all real numbers between 0 and 1.
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By this method we get a diagonal derivative number which cannot occur in
the supposed denumerable list. If our denumerable list contains all
the rational numbers, though expressed in decimals, then our diagonal
derivative must be an irrational number. As the diagonal number purports
to be a real number, no denumerable list can be claimed to exhaust all
the real numbers.
Now, here comes Richard's onslaught I Consider a list of all possible
arrangements formed of letters from the French alphabet. This alphabet is
made up of 26 letters and we arrange them in a certain alphabetical order.
Sentences and words consist of letters and hence must occur among these
arrangements. Now every real number can be expressed in words: let every
such number be expressed or defined by some sentence. And hence all
verbal definitions of real numbers are included in our list of arrange¬
ments of French letters. Hence the set of all verbal definitions of all
real numbers is denumerable. Thus the set of all real numbers is denumer¬
able. This contradicts the conclusion of Cantor's diagonal argument.
Before examining the underlying assumption about the denumerability of
the set of all possible arrangements of the French letters, which is
central to Richard's argument, we shall first look at Richard's paradox -*
more closely. That is, we shall assess and examine the validity of the
diagonal argument and see whether we can actually define a definite
diagonal derivative number or not.
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B. Validity of Cantor's diagonal argument
In general there are two main arguments against the Cantor diagonal,
namely: (a) that the diagonal number is not a proper number; and (b)
that even if we regard it as a proper number, its nature must be regarded
as different from that of the listed numbers and thus the argument as
such does not work. We do not discuss these two arguments completely
at one place because they involve for their elucidation and explanation
other arguments and considerations.
The first objection (a) can equally be levelled against Cantor's
other argument by nested intervals, discussed in subsection 1+ below. The
second objection (b) also holds good for Cantor's general argument,
discussed in the next section, to prove the Cantor theorem. These
objections therefore will also be discussed along with the respective
arguments. In the present section, the second objection is discussed
in the next sub-section and the first objection in sub-sections 2, 3
and 4.
§1. Assessment of the argument
.
The diagonal argument has an air of plausibility but it is in fact
unsatisfactory. The given diagonal rule to produce a diagonal number
can define a definite number - a definite number in the proper sense -
only under certain conditions. The diagonal procedure obviously defines
a. definite number in the case where the list consists of a finite number
of members (i.e. decimal numbers). The rule, call it a "diagonal rule",
\ ■ • I
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justifiably applicable if the list is finite, but the applicability of
is rule to an infinite list is open to question. In one sense there
erges a diagonal number even if the list is infinite; namely, in the
nse that we can tell what digit there would be at the nth decimal place
r any n. We just have to look at the nth digit of the nth decimal number
the list and determine the required digit. This feature may be regarded
one of the essential requirements for determining any decimal number. We
st have some definite method or formula to find out what digit is to
placed at the nth decimal place. We may construct a decimal number
throwing a die; if at the nth throw we get the digit h, we put the
git h at the nth decimal place of the designed number. But in this
simal number the digit at the nth decimal place depends upon chance-
:tors or factors not completely comprehensible by us. What is required
r a definite number is that the digits at any nth decimal place be
;ermined by some rule, as e.g. are the digits at the nth decimal
tee of say ir or 1/3• Our diagonal number does satisfy this particular
idition because we have a list determined by definite rules of enumera-
m to determine the digits at the nth decimal place for any n of the
igonal number. But we shall show in the next subsection that this
iracteristic, though necessary, is not sufficient in order to have a
iper number. v ^
For the sake of argument we may agree for the time being that we
■e the diagonal number. Y/e can show, however, that the number charac-
•ized and determined by the diagonal procedure does not demonstrate what
tor wanted to demonstrate. We would like to argue that the diagonal





ber must be regarded as a different sort of number from the numbers
the list. The diagonal number has some special features which are
ferent from those of the real numbers in the initially planned list.
j
existence of a diagonal number is dependent upon the existence of a
tain infinite list; it cannot be constructed independent of this list.*
the case where the given list is finite, the diagonal derivative can
constructed independent of the list which initially generated it.
the Cantor diagonal number is inextricably bound up with an infinite
t. The infinite list is responsible for the emergence and existence
.
the diagonal number - no list, no number. That is, we cannot describe
determine the decimal digits except through the infinite list. The
iamental specification of this connection between the Cantor diagonal
Der and the infinite list is that the digit at any nth decimal place
the diagonal number must be different from the digit at the nth decimal
'
:e of the. nth number of the list. This specification is the defining
■
_
perty of the Cantor diagonal and not just an accidental feature adjoined
if,
i definite and independent number. Hence Cantor's diagonal number cannot
IIIplaced in the designed list. But from these facts it also follows that
.
;he very nature of such a number it can only be constructed in terms of
the numbers in the list. The numbers in the list are to be in the
.
it place "independent" numbers; that is, they do not depend for their
itence upon any list of numbers, and their decimal digits are determined
fixed by rules independent of the infinite list. We must start to
.
lerate in the list only such numbers, for we cannot put dependent numbers
re have already talked about dependence and independence in connection
rith the heterological paradox in Chapter II.
"J
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(e.g. the diagonal number which depends for its very construction upon the
infinite list) in the list unless we first have a list of independent numbers.
To specify a dependent number, like the diagonal number, we have to resort
to a certain infinite list. So, we start to enumerate in the list only
independent numbers. That is, those which do not depend for their existence
upon any infinite list. Later on we are asked to include in the list the
diagonal number which is of a different nature and status.
The situation may be compared with the following example. If we list
numbers by a formula which permits only rational square numbers to occur
in the list, it is unjustifiable to complain that there are no rational
prime numbers in the list. So, when we create a diagonal number which is
bound to be different in nature from the listed numbers, it is illegitimate
to insist that it should occur in the list. This by no means follows from
the argument that the list of all real numbers is indenumerable because the
real numbers which we had initially in view were of a different kind from
that of Cantor's diagonal numbers. If we insist that genuine real numbers
be independent numbers and not dependent numbers, the answer is very simple:
the diagonal number is not a real number and hence its non-occurrence in the
list by no means proves the indenumerability of the real numbers. Suppose
no?/ that diagonal (or dependent) numbers are also real numbers; then we
must formulate our question unambiguously. We must say (a) whether indepen¬
dent real numbers are denumerable; (b) whether the diagonal numbers (con¬
structed from the list of independent real numbers, i.e. of type (a)) are
denumerable; (c) whether the diagonal numbers (constructed out of the diagonal
numbers of type (b)) are denumerable, and so on. Ultimately the question
arises whether the independent numbers are denumerable or not. We may say:
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ive us an infinite list of independent numbers and we shall let you know
he rule whereby to enumerate all the diagonal numbers constructed out of
hat list. It is only through not making the distinction between dependent
nd independent numbers that Cantor's diagonal argument can carry any
eight. Further discussion of this point is resumed in Section C on the
eneral diagonal method.
2. The nature of real numbers
The question naturally emerges from our distinction between the diagonal
imber and real numbers, as to what is the nature of a real number and what
5rt of definition is needed for it. A real number may be regarded as a non-
srminating decimal such that, as mentioned earlier, there is a certain rule
lereby to determine the digit at the nth decimal place. There is another
:quirement which we explain by the following analogy. Let the points on
straight line AB (—— —) represent all real numbers, say be-
reen 0 and 1. To every point there is then a definite corresponding real
imber. Suppose the point at C represents the real number l/3« Accordingly,
ds number may be expressed by an infinite decimal 0.33333 Now,
3 (or 0.333..•) is another way of saying 3/10 + 3/100 + 3/1000 + 3/10000 +
... Similarly, if we go on adding indefinitely we cannot get any number
dch is less than or greater than 1/3* We say that the series 3/10 +
'100 + 3/1000 + converges to a limit 1/3• We may also express
.e series as the sequence 3/10, 33/100, 333/1000, and so on, and
y that this ascending sequence has a limit 1/3. Since there is an infinite
mber of points (or real numbers) between any two points (or real numbers)
locate any definite point (and so, real number) it is sufficient to
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Indicate that such-and-such a series or sequence has a limit - the limit being
the point (or number). The symbols 1/2 and 0.5 and 0.49999 represent
the same number - i.e., that which corresponds to the point which lies in
;he middle of line AB. Given the above series, we cannot have any lesser
3r greater number than the limit. For if we choose the greater, then our
series cannot reach the point (number). In other words there is a lesser
lumber or nearer point which the series cannot exceed. This indicates that
>ur chosen point or number cannot be represented by the series. Whereas, if
re choose the lesser, then sooner or later by developing further the series
>r sequence, we shall reach a number greater than the chosen one, indicating
.gain that our chosen number cannot be represented by the series. This shows
hat in order to have a definite point (number), we must have a convergent
eries (or sequence) with a limit. For instance, a series 3/10 + 3/100 +
/1000 (i.e. 0.3) is a convergent series, because however many
erms vie add in this series, the total number will never grow beyond a
ertain fixed number or point. Here we may say roughly that this series
annot grow beyond say 1/2. At the same time, this series has a limit in
he sense that this series cannot represent a number lesser or greater than
/3: it cannot grow beyond 1/3 and it tends towards reaching 1/3.
But it/is important to note that it may also happen that we have
bounded series which may not converge to any limit. This situation may
rise in the following case. Let there be a straight line AB consisting
f an infinite number of points (representing real numbers). We may choose
ny two points (numbers), say a'b', lying inside the points A and Bf And
gain we choose two points (numbers) ai'b" inside a'b', Yie go on repeating
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this process. We thereby create an infinite number of nested intervals,
each including the earlier ones. Obviously the sequences a', a"1, ...
and b'f b"} b»».,... are bounded, for evidently the sequence
a' a" a'" b"1 b" b'
A } 1 ' 1 1 5 1 1 B
a', a", a"1, cannot go beyond say B (taking the extreme point, or
in fact any determinate bn), and the sequence b', b", b"'}
n.
cannot go beyond say A or any determinate a, y say a'". It is also
obvious that if they converge to a limit then they both can have only
one limit, for if they have two limiting points, then we could always
create a shorter interval a. b , which would lie between these two
points. But it is also conceivable that they (both sequences) may
not have any limiting point. As there is always an infinite distance
irrrCT
in the sense of an infinite number of points between any a and
b * *
, it may happen that our consideration of a sequence at a certain
stage would give us the impression that it is converging to the limiting
point c. But at a later stage, it may give the impression that it con¬
verges to another point say c', and at some further stage to c" and so on.
This situation may arise where there is no definite and fixed rule by
which we choose the sequences a', a", a"', ...., and b', b", b,rt,
But it would of course be impossible where we have such a rule, i.e.,
where we know the rate at which the sequences seem to converge. In the
case of a sequence like 3/10, 3/100, 3/1000, .... we have a certain rule
of convergence, and so we know the rate at which the number is increasing
so as to approach a definite point or number. We know that in this number
\
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(0.3) a digit 3 must necessarily occur at every decimal place: it betrays
the rate of convergence, or boundedness too. This rule is indissolubly
linked with the number concerned. What rational number is to occur say at
the ^th member of the convergent sequence is determined by a rule which
is also applicable to ascertain the numbers which occur earlier in the
sequence. The rule in question for getting a particular nth member of
the sequence is applied with the aid of previous members of the sequence.
A limiting convergent series 1/2 + 1/4 + 1/8 + l/l6 + represents
the number 1. To obtain the nth member of the series we have simply to
multiply by 2 the denuraerator of the n-lth member of the series. But if
such a rule of boundedness is lacking we have no guarantee that a bounded
convergent series or sequence has a limit.
For further elucidation we resort to the following example. Take
as an example, the number it, which equals half the circumference of a
circle of a radius 1. How do we determine such a length? Let us draw
a figure. 7le have a circle ABCD. CA and BD are diagonals at right
angles meeting at the centre 0. Obviously the length (circumference)
of the circle lies between the total length of
the sides of the bigger square K-jK^K^K^ and the
total length of the sides of the smaller square
ABCD. The total length of the sides of the
square ABCD is obviously less than the circumference of the circle. Let
us divide the arcs (AB, BC, CD, DA) at E, F, &, H and make an 8-sided
polygon. The total length of the sides of this polygon is nearer to
the length of the circle than the total length of the sides of the
- 116 -
quare ABCD. Again, let us divide the smaller arcs (AE, EB, BE, )
nd construct a 16-sided polygon. The total length of the sides of this
olygon is even still nearer to the circumference of the circle than is
hat of an 8-sided polygon. We go on constructing polygons of more and
ore sides (of 32, 64,... etc.) and we notice the total length of the sides
ets closer and closer, though it never becomes equal to the circumference
f the circle. The total length of the sides of any such polygon cannot
xceed the circumference of the circle; hence the sequence consisting of
he total lengths of the sides of the successive polygons forms a conver-
ent sequence. But this sequence must also have a limit and that limit is
ae circumference of the circle because we can always make a polygon of a
reater number of sides approaching though never exceeding the circumference
r the circle. Of course we may have a rule how this convergent sequence
rows, for we can easily observe the sides of the polygon growing in a
jgular fashion, naiely 4, 8, 16, 32, 64, showing thereby that we
ive a limit which approaches at most to 2rr. But even if we have increased
le number of sides arbitrarily, sometimes trebling, sometimes adding say
)0 sides to the previous polygon, we shall have a limit because we have
.ready a limit of the circumference of a circle. Suppose we have a line
S of one unit length consisting of points representing all real numbers
itween 0 and 1. If we want to create a convergent series representing
le point B (i.e. number l), we may simply divide the line AB at the middle
dnt c (thus representing - - pi -
.mber 1/2), again dividing cB at c' and again sub-dividing at c" and so on.
is series (1/2 + 1/4 + 1/8 + 1/16 ) must converge to the point
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B, thus representing the number 1. In this case we already have a limiting
point at B, and thus any infinite convergent series which cannot limit any
point before B is sufficient to determine the number. In short, the bounded
series or sequence denotes a definite number only when it indicates that
it has a certain definite limit.
§3. Cantor's diagonal number
Now, reverting to the Cantor diagonal number, we notice that it
is associated with a bounded sequence. But a simple bounded sequence
may be generated by just throwing a die and putting the digit that appears
on the die at a decimal place corresponding to the number of the throw.
In fact any decimal number is_ a bounded or convergent sequence of rational
numbers. For example the decimal number 0.3 is the convergent sequence
of 3/10, 33/100, 333/1000, But it may happen that an infinite bounded
sequence or series has no limit. And in this respect we find little dif¬
ference between the diagonal number and the number generated by throwing
a die. We find a definite diagonal number only if we have a limit. That
is, Cantor should have proved that by his diagonal method we always get a
limit. We shall construct an example in order to emphasize our point.
We know that the set of all rational numbers is denumerable. We
show that a rational number of the same nature as the diagonal one may
be generated which cannot occur in the list of rational numbers. Let us
enumerate the positive rational numbers between 0 and 1. Let us construct
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or define a number which lies, say
between l/5 and l/l. We start construc¬
ting the new number by the following
instructions or rules:
(a) Change the denominator of
the first number of our list so as to
make it the next prime number. In
our example it would turn out to be 1/2. Obviously this resultant number
1/2 would be different from the one upon which it is constructed, i.e.,
here from l/l.
(b) Add the numerator and the denominator of the resultant number and
the next number of the list A. In our example it would be 1+1/2+2 = 2/4.
rhen put the next prime number as denominator. Here it becomes 2/5.
(c) See whether the resultant number is less than 1/5; if it is, then
idd to the numerator some number to make it greater than 1/5. Ensure
also that each resultant number is less than the previous one. If it is
lot, then by selecting the next prime number as denominator and adding
ir subtracting some digits from numerator, make it so. In our example
re have done this, making the resultant numbers 9/41 and 12/59* We have
shown the resultant numbers in list B.
So, we have an infinite bounded sequence of resultant rational numbers,
just as in Cantor's diagonal we have a bounded sequence of, in the example
sited, 5/10, 32/100, 323/100, But in fact we have a series of
























procedure we have a series of real numbers (in fact rationals) differing
from the numbers occurring previously in the proposed list, and not one
definite real number. One purpose of this illustration is to make our¬
selves immune from any sort of deception with regard to the decimal
notation. We may in fact translate our example into decimal notation.
In order to show that there is a definite number, we have to prove that
by such procedure the bounded series does tend to a limit. Unless we
have a limit, how can we possibly assert the existence of a definite
number? We may take a decimal whose initial few decimal-places are
determined by the following digits: 0.2387*...... We may create nested
intervals from it as follows: The first interval lies between 1/10 and
3/10, the second between 22/100 and 24/100, the third between 237/1000
and 239/1000 and so on. But this sequence does not give any clue as to
the limit. In the case of our example of the number ir the sequence had a
limit. In fact in that example we already had a limit and we were only
trying to express this limit by the lengths of the sides of successive
polygons. But in the present case, though the intervals get closer
and closer we do not know whether we have a definite limit. Because there
are an infinite number of numbers in any interval it can be any one of
the infinite numbers represented by the bounded sequence, and hence we
have no definite number. Exactly the same is true in the case of the
diagonal number.
§4. Cantor's proof by nested intervals
There is another proof of the indenumerability of real numbers, due
also to Cantor, which involves nested intervals and commits the error
1
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mentioned above.* The proof is as follows: Suppose we have an infinite
series I of real numbers given according to a certain rule. Cantor tries
to prove that in every interval of the series there is a number which
cannot occur in the series. We choose an arbitrary interval [ct,(3].
from the series I and let csC]3. -We then choose another interval [ct,p],
such that it lies within the previous interval [a,pj . The numbers
being chosen as the first a; and y to occur in 1", such that cc^r and
> r f( Jf r ftf *V-|Likewise we create other intervals La>PJ, La,pj, ,
occurring within the previous intervals, where a'****' and (3*' • • • •
71- I
are similarly the first x and y to occur in I such that a'' • • • • ' ^cc
71-1
and y<C(3'•••*' T Now either the number of intervals is infinite or
finite. If finite, then we can obviously choose a number which lies
within the last interval but does not occur in the list, otherwise it
would make a further interval contrary to our supposition. If the
number of intervals is infinite then Cantor says:
the numbers a,a,Z. have a certain limit
a, because they are always increasing in value with¬
out becoming infinite; the same holds for the numbers
|3,p,j3, , because they are constantly decreasing,
let their limit be p.*
oO
Now either the two limits are the same, i.e. a. = (3 ; or they are
different, and so they cannot occur in the list I. For the limit is
* G. Cantor 'fiber eineEigenschaft des Inbegriffes aller reellen
algebraischen Zahlen' in Journal ftlr die reine und angewandte
Mathematik, vol. 77, pp.260-1 (or in Gesammelte Abhandlungen,
edited by E. Zermelo, pp.115-8).
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supposedly the last component of the sequence and yet cannot be one of
the components of the sequence.
Our objection is that the infinite sequence a,a,a, and
{3,13,(3, .. may not converge to any limit unless we are given a
definite rule of convergence, and hence the derivation of any definite
number from the above sequences is illegitimate. It is evident in the
above proof that it is assumed that every bounded monotone increasing
or decreasing sequence has a limit. No proof is provided: it is just
assumed. We tried to show in the last subsection that it might not always
be the case. If we take it as a hypothesis for the foundations of mathe¬
matics, then we have to forego the claim to base mathematics on logic
or 011 intuition, because this assumption is not intuitively obvious,
neither is it derivable from any logical or intuitive principles. On
the other hand our analysis given above runs counter to such an assump¬
tion because, as we remarked, we cannot locate any definite point on
a line simply by a bounded sequence or series: we need a certain de¬
finite rule to measure the rate of boundedness or convergence to locate
a definite number or point.
C. The diagonal fallacy
§1. General diagonal method
Let us examine now the general diagonal procedure, which is also
supposed to offer us a proof for the indenumerability of real numbers.
The general diagonal procedure is applied when we have a set or sets of
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ertain things, say of sets or of numbers, and we construct a new thing -
new set or number as the case may be - which cannot occur in the original
et, or cannot be correlated with a member of another set with which it
as assumed that it could be correlated. We exhibit this method by
onsidering Cantor's assertion that the setl/S of all subsets of set S
as a higher cardinality than its set. This assertion is called by
ae name Cantor's theorem. To prove the indenumerability of real numbers,
t is sufficient to prove that the.setl/"S of all sets of positive integers
5 not denumerable. Hence from the Cantor theorem, indenumerability of
le set of all real numbers follows.
The theorem is proved in the following way. Suppose S and IfS
:e equinumerous. That is, we suppose there exists a scheme for mapping
imbers of "ifS with the members of S in one-one correlation. Now as the
jmbers of \fS are all subsets of S, we can raise the question whether
* not any members of S is a member of its correlate - its correlate being
le correlated member of 1/S. Let us construct a set, say M, that would
>ntain only and all those members of S which are not members of their
irrelates. Now this set M should be correlated with some particular
imber, say m, of S, because of our supposition of correlation between
andl/S. Now, as m is supposed to be correlated with M, we raise the
lestion whether m is a member of M or not. If it is a member of M,
ten according to the definition of M, m cannot be correlated with M,
dch in fact it is by our supposition. If on the other hand, m is not
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. member of M, then according to the definition of M, m should be a member
if M because m is not a member of its correlate. So we arrive at a contra¬
ction. Hence our supposition that S andl/S are equinumerous is false,
f we try to correlate1/S with S by some other scheme, we can always like-
ise construct a set M, and the equivalence in cardinality between 1/S and S
s bound to break down. From this the conclusion follows that, since the
ardinality of1/S cannot be less than S and is proved non-equal to S,
herefore the cardinality of 1/S must be greater than S.
*
Let us examine the above general diagonal argument. We shall try
o demonstrate that it embodies an illegitimate inference. The nature
f the constructed set M is quite different in kind from the members of
S, initially laid down for correlation. The members of 1/S to be cor-
elated with the members of S can be defined independently of any member
f S, that is independently of any consideration of correlation between
3 and S. So, once we get a member of US, it could be described or
efined independently of any consideration of S. But the constructed
st M cannot be described or defined on its own: it depends upon those
smbers of S, which are not members of their own correlates - for in
rder to determine M we have to determine how the members of S are
^rrelated. In case S is a finite set, the situation is very simple,
len we can always determine M and can then express it independently as
1y other member off/S. Suppose S=|l,2| and let the correlation with
le set 1/S be: 1 [l^j 2 [l,2j; we have then the null set,
lich is a subset of S but which does not contain any member of S, which
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can be a member of their correlate, and we can easily conclude that l/S
must have greater cardinality than S. But if S is infinite, we can
determine M as independently describable only if at some stage of our
correlation we get a certain rule by which we can then tell which members
of S are the members of M without resorting to further examination of
the correlation. If this is not obtained then our raising the question
whether or not m can be correlated with M is illegitimate.*
The impossibility of a correlation follows simply from the process
of defining the set M. To simplify this point we resort to the following
analogy: Let us suppose we have two entities a and 4, a being a particular
positive integer and 4 being a subset of the set of all positive integers.
We further suppose, as is obvious in this particular case, that it is
justified to raise the question whether a is a member of A or not. Now,
given any two entities we can obviously correlate them one to one. Now,
if we define the set A such that its correlation with a becomes impossible,
the legitimate conclusion would be that such a definition of A is itself
illegitimate. Let us suppose that the defining characteristic of the
subset A is that it contains only and all those positive integers which
are not members of their correlated sets. If we now correlate one to
one a to Af and raise the question whether or not a is a member of A} we
meet a contradiction. This shows that something has gone wrong with cur
* Actually we are repeating the same sort of argument as advanced v/hen dea¬
ling with the Cantor diagonal number earlier.
definition of the set A} because it seems quite legitimate to correlate
a to A and to raise the question whether or not a. is a member of A,
The definition of the set A reminds us of the description of the barber
in the Barber paradox. We then said that there cannot be a barber who
could shave all and only those men who do not shave themselves. Once
we grant the barber to be a man, our definition of the barber is self-
contradictory and so illegitimate for defining a barber. As no self-
contradictory thing can exist, the barber described cannot exist. A
similar situation appears in the case of the set A and the set M
above. We tried to define the set A (and also the set M and in fact
the diagonal number too) so that its correlation (and in the case of
Cantor's diagonal argument, the occurrence of the diagonal number in the
enumerating list) becomes impossible. If we insist on the legitimacy of
the set (and the diagonal numbers) we should also add that they must
differ from other correlated sets (and numbers) just as the above barber
must be regarded a different person from every man, if the definition of
the barber is to be accepted. The moral we draw from this argument is
that in order to have a correlation between any two things or sets, their
definitions should be independent of the correlation. So the definition
of the set M should not make it impossible that it could be correlated
with any member of S. Hence Cantor's argument to prove the higher cardin¬
ality of the set of all subsets of S than S is not valid - the set M cannot
be regarded as a member of |/S as other subsets of S would be, for the set
M is not the sort of set, as others are, of which we could sensibly raise
the question of correlation with any member of S. Our argument is in fact
I
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the same as it was in the case of Cantor's diagonal number. So, the set
M should not be regarded as a properly defined set because of its dependent
character. But even if we regard it as a set, the question of its correlation
with a member of the set S is illegitimate, because by our very definition
.ve make it impossible. Y.le may call this way of defining an entity a diagonal
fallacy. It occurs in defining Cantor's diagonal number and the Cantor
diagonal- set M, and in the Barber paradox as well.
32. The Richardian paradox
Our point may perhaps be better appreciated if one considers the
following paradox. This paradox is given by Nagel and NewmarS*, who
.naccurately call it the Richard paradox. For the sake of clarity we shall
;all it the Richardian paradox - this name suggesting that there is some
iharacteristic common to it and the Richard paradox.
Let us start by defining the numerical properties of cardinal numbers,
j.g. a prime number may be defined as "not divisible by any integer other
;han 1 and itself". Each of these definitions contains a finite number of
;ords. Let us place the definitions in serial order, using some definite
*ule like the rule that definitions containing fewer words should come first
ind definitions containing the same number of words are arranged in alpha-
letical order. On this basis a unique serial number will correspond to
:ach definition. It may in certain cases happen tint a serial number possesses
he very property designated by the definition with which the integer is cor-
■elated. For example, if the defining expression of "prime number" happens
E. Nagel & J. R. Newman, GOdel's Proof, pp.60-2.
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to be correlated with the serial number 17, then 17 itself has the designated
property. If the defining expression "product of some integer by itself"





Property of being square
i










were to be correlated with serial number 15, 15 does not have the property
designated. We shall say, then, 15 has the property of being Richardian,
while 17 does not have the property of being Richardian. Now, let us
consider the property of being Richardian. The defining expression
for the property of being Richardian describes a certain sort of numerical
property of integers. We take the expression itself as one of the series
of definitions proposed. Suppose this expression is correlated with the
serial number n. Now the paradoxical situation emerges when the question
is raised whether or not n is Richardian. For n is Richardian if and
only if n does not have the designated property, that is, if and only if
it is not Richardian. And if it is not Richardian, then it must have
the designated property, i.e., it must be Richardian. Hence, a
contradiction results.
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The heterological (or the Barber) structure of the Richardian paradox
discussed above - that is, the structural pattern exhibited by the hetero¬
logical paradox - has been mentioned in chapter II. First we have the
statement: "The serial number n is correlated with the property of being
a serial number which does not have the property correlated with it", and
then we raise the question whether or not n has its correlated property.
The resolution of the paradox is now clear. We can sensibly ask whether
n has the correlated Richardian property only if n has some correlated
property other than the Richardian property. The semantical extrication of
the paradoxical question "Does N have the correlated property or not?" is
the same as in the heterological question "Is 'heterological' heterological
or not?", or "Is Impredicable impredicable or not?". V/e observed while
discussing the heterological paradox that in order for a certain word to be
heterological or not, it must have some property other than that of being
heterological. The property of being heterological is in fact a property
of certain other properties of the word and indeed it is dependent on other
such properties, and hence unless there is some other such property by
virtue of which the word can be regarded as heterological, we cannot
sensibly talk of the word as heterological or not. In the same way the
Richardian property is dependent on some other properties and unless we
know that other property it is not legitimate to ask whether or not n
is Richardian.
The general diagonal method also exemplifies the heterological or
Barber pattern. It has the same structure as the Richardian paradox.
Instead of a list of serial numbers, v/e have the members of the set S
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>f positive integers and instead of a list of properties of numbers we
ave the members of the power set IfS of the set of positive integers,
nstead of the constructed Richardian property and its correlated serial
umber n, we have the constructed set M and its correlated member
f S. In both cases an attempt to correlate n with the Richardian property
nd m with M leads to contradiction. Not only do these paradoxes have
he same structure, they seem to suffer from the same malady. The set
and the Richardian property are both constructed by an already planned
orrelation - the fact of correlation constitutes the core of the defini-
ion of the set M and the Richardian property. The Richardian property
eems to be different from other properties insofar as it depends on the
orrelation; similarly the set M is different from other sets since it
spends on the correlation. If it is illegitimate to raise the question
f correlation in one case, why not in the other case? If we turn, in parti-
alar, to Cantor's diagonal to prove the indenumerability of real numbers,
3 notice that although in structure it seems to be different from the
sneral diagonal argument or from the heterological, it suffers also from
le same defect. The construction of a diagonal number is similar in
iture to the construction of the set M. The diagonal number depends on
very real decimal in the infinite list for its very existence (insofar
5 it must differ from each of them by at least one digit), and then it
3 asked whether it occurs in the list or not. It is as illegitimate to
sk whether or not the diagonal number occurs in the list as it is to
ik for a correlation of the set M. In both cases we did not follow
le original plan (in the sense specified in our discussion of Cantor's
diagonal number), but instead of' producing an independent set or number,
we constructed a dependent number or set. We made them by their very
definition unable to occur in the list in one case and to be correlated
in the other case. Hence the Richardian property, the diagonal number and
the set M are all illegitimately constructed concepts in their respective
contexts. If we are to say that n possesses the Richardian property or
not, that the diagonal number occurs in the list or not, that the set M
is correlated with m or not, we should first establish their independent
status, i.e. they must be shown to be describable independent of their
correlated serial number, of the infinite list of numbers, and of the
correlated members of S, respectively. If this is a valid objection,
namely that by definition we render impossible what we want to establish,
then the Richardian paradox, Barber paradox and Cantor's diagonal procedure
O
all suffer from the defect of the general diagonal method, i.e. from the
diagonal fallacy. Indeed the structure of the argument in each case may
be dissimilar in some ways, and each paradox or argument may have some
special features peculiar to itself. For example, -Cantor's diagonal
argument does not exhibit the heterological or the Barber pattern, as
explained diagrammatically earlier, and the notion of convergence,
boundedness and limit is peculiarly relevant to it. None the less, despite
these differences, these paradoxes involve the same basic fallacy.
Hence, we come to the conclusion that the Cantor diagonal method,
Cantor's proof by nested intervals and the general diagonal method fail
to demonstrated the indenumerability of the set of real numbers. Of course
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; does not follow that the real numbers are denumerable. We now
;tempt to show the indenumerability of real numbers, thus showing the
mdequacy of any attempt to resolve the Richard paradox by denying
ie legitimacy of the diagonal number or the indenumerability of real
imbers in general.
A proof of the indenumerabilit.y of real numbers
The real numbers may be divided into two groups, namely algebraic
mbers and non-algebraic (transcendental) numbers. For the definition
algebraic numbers only algebraic symbols and operations are needed,
gebraic operations are addition, subtraction, multiplication, division,
tracting roots and raising to powers. In order to express an algebraic
mber we need not use an infinite process, i.e. the notion of limit.
, an algebraic number may be expressed as a positive or negative rational
mber or as the root of an integer. Algebraic operations on algebraic
mbers can yield only algebraic numbers in turn. Hence, algebraic
mbers form a closed system, that is, the manipulation of algebraic num-
rs by algebraic operations always results in algebraic numbers, which
a be studied without resorting to the notion of limit or some such
finite process. Every algebraic number can be represented as the
71 TV— I
lution of an algebraic equation aQx + O|0; - 0,
ere aQ a are rational coefficients.
n
Now, from the very description of algebraic numbers, it follows
it they can be co-ordinated with natural numbers or integers. Both
jitive and negative integers are, crudely speaking, only twice as
p
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"numerous" as natural numbers: we have only to put negative and positive
signs before numerals representing natural numbers to represent integers.
Hence, if we can enumerate natural numbers we can enumerate integers too.
In fact, it can easily be shown that the union of two or more denumerably
infinite sets has the cardinality of a denumerable set. Again, any
rational number construed as a fraction whose denominator is greater
than 1, may be correlated with an integer equivalent to the product of
numerator and denominator of the rational number concerned. So all
ohe rational numbers having denominators greater than 1 can be correlated
Vvxch integers. The class of rational numbers having 1 as denominator is
obviously equinumerous with (or even may be regarded as the same as) the
class of integers. Now, insofar as addition of any denumerably infinite
number of integers to the infinite class of integers make3 no difference
to ohe cardinality of the class of integers, the rational numbers have
the same cardinality as that of integers. Similarly, any algebraic number
expressed in the form of a root "Vir, when multiplied by itself n times,
gives rise to an integer. Other algebraic numbers involving complicated
symbols of roots and square can be correlated likewise with integers,
hence every algebraic number can be correlated with an integer. So, we
have been able to show that the class of algebraic numbers has the same
cardinality as that of a denumerably infinite class, say of natural numbers,
thbugh we have not provided any systematic rule for enumerating the algebraic
numbers. The denumerability of the set of algebraic numbers results from
the fact that each algebraic number can be derived within a closed system:
we get the natural numbers out of a few axioms (Peano's axioms, or by
»
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recursive function theory) and with a finite number of operations performed
on natural numbers we get the algebraic numbers. We have showed only
the possibility that algebraic numbers can be enumerated. However,
Cantor showed how to enumerate the algebraic numbers.
It is about transcendental numbers that we are told that they
constitute an indenumerably infinite set. What we require, however,
is a proof to show that by the very nature of transcendental numbers,
it is impossible for them to form a denumerable set. Transcendental
numbers are negatively defined as non-algebraic numbers. It is obvious,
however, that the cardinality of the set of transcendental numbers cannot
be less than that of the set of algebraic numbers, and in a vulgar and
unscientific sense they must be "more numerous" than algebraic numbers -
just as rational numbers or integers may be said unscientifically to
be "more numerous" than square integers. For once we have one trans¬
cendental number, say tt or e, its multiplication, division, addition,
subtraction, etc. with any algebraic number would always yield a trans¬
cendental number; otherwise it could not be a transcendental number. A
transcendental number when multiplied or divided by, subtracted from
or added to another transcendental number may yield an algebraic or
non-algebraic number. Now the problem of denumerability of any given
kind of numbers, rational or irrational, real or prime etc., is whether
it is possible to give an effective method for enumerating them in a list,
such that any number of the kind under examination may be shown to occur
sooner or later somewhere in the enumerating list. If, for instance, the
transcendental (or real) numbers form a denumerable set and we have some
rule according to which we start enumerating them, then any transcendental
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(or real) number, say ir, should occur in the list at some stage. If it
is impossible for there to be such a finite number of methods for
enumerating the given numbers, then we conclude that the set of those
numbers is not denumerable, i.e. that its cardinality is greater than
that of a denumerably infinite set.
Let us examine the question whether it is possible to give such
rules for enumerating real or transcendental numbers. If a set is
denumerable, its members can be effectively enumerated; and if the
members of the set can be enumerated, it is denumerable. Also a set
is not denumerable, if its members cannot be enumerated and vice versa.
In order to have a clear view of the situation, let us consider the
position in the case of algebraic numbers. As we said earlier, we may
construct the natural numbers by Peano's finite number of axioms. Again,
by a finite number of effective operations we construct the series of all
algebraic numbers. (For the sake of simplicity we shall avoid any refer-
r
ence to complex numbers.) No infinite process is needed. In short,
algebraic numbers can be generated from a few axioms and operations which
constitute a formal system. The completeness of the algebraic number
system (i.e. its capacity to generate every algebraic number) may be
achieved through these instructions. We have primitive recursive notions
like zero, successor, variable and we recursively define operations
like +, ~, T-, V by number theoretic functions .with the help of initial
%
functions like the zero function (Zx = 0), identity function (ix = x)
and successor function (Sx = x+l). We can generate the natural numbers
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by the rule that every variable has a successor. We can construct other
1
complicated functions for V, etc. from the earlier ones. The class
of all formulae in such a system has to be denumerable just as the
class of formulae, say in the prepositional calculus. We have an effec¬
tive means of deriving formulae from the finite number of primitive
notions, definitions, axioms or functions.
But in the case of real numbers (i.e. including transcendental
numbers) we do not have such a generating system. Indeed our proof for
the indenumerability of the set of real numbers lies in showing that we
cannot have such a system. We have amply discussed the nature of a real
number. To define a real number is to specify the rate of convergence in
a series or sequence. We may think of each such number as a non-terminating
decimal with a plan or pattern which specifies the digit that occupies the
nth decimal place. Thus such-and-such a sort of number examplifies such-and-
such a definite pattern at its decimal places. We can show that any rational
number is necessarily represented c-nly by repeating decimals and vice versa.
• * •
For example, 1/3 as 0.3, 1/7 as 0.142857 - i.e. the whole series 142857 is
infinitely repeatable. Mathematicians have not yet succeeded in mapping
out a differentiating pattern in the non-terminating decimal system cor¬
responding to irrational algebraic numbers as they have for the case of
rational numbers. For our purpose, it is enough to remark that such a
*
mapping of the class of irrational algebraic numbers expressed in terms
of of only algebraic operations and expressed in decimal-terms must exist,
though the pattern or patterns of decimal digits on decimal places would
certainly be much more complicated than that of rational numbers.
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Let us take the transcendental number e. It may be defined by:
1 + 1/1! + 1/2! + 1/3! + This expresses a limiting series which
tends towards the limit e. In fact every real number, whether algebraic
or non-algebraic, can be expressed in a limiting sequence or series,
e.g. 1 may be represented by the sequence 9/10, 99/100, 999/1000,
(=0.9°). There must exist ultimate patterns or types in decimal digits
corresponding to certain types of numbers. Rational numbers as stated have
a certain type or pattern in decimal digits: the pattern is exhibited by
the very nature of rational numbers. A definite number, say -J has a
definite unique pattern exhibited in decimal digits, here recurrence of
digit 3. But it has also a common or generic pattern which is shared by
all rational numbers as described earlier. Similarly irrational algebraic
numbers must have corresponding patterns. In like manner the numbers which
arise out of operating with a transcendental number, say ir with algebraic
numbers must have certain patterns. Let us ask whether it is possible to
have only a finite number of ultimate types of limiting series or sequences
which express all the real numbers. Our proof for the indenumerability
of real numbers lies in showing that the number of such ultimate types
cannot be finite. Hence there cannot be an effective enumeration of all
the real numbers; hence they are indenumerable.
By the term "types of limiting series or sequences" we mean the common
features or patterns according to which the limiting series or sequences
can be grouped. This idea of grouping further clarifies the notion of
the general pattern exhibited by the digits on the decimal places. For
example, the group of rational numbers are mapped by repeating decimals
as already mentioned. For the sake of precision, let us talk about all
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eal numbers between 1 and 2. By a few types of limiting series (and con-
equently of patterns exhibited by the digits in our non-terminating
ecimal system), say A-^, we can start enumerating the rational numbers.
Lth some other types, say type to Bm we start enumerating irrational
Lgebraic numbers. By some other types, say (h to C^, we start enumer-
ting the transcendental numbers which result from performing operations
Lke +, ~, ■J-, V" with algebraic numbers by, say ir. But the types C-^ to
^ will not exhaust all the transcendental numbers. There will still be
ial transcendental numbers which cannot occur in our enumerating lists,
Imply because they belong to different patterns. This results from the
)llowing considerations: We may have other patterns which express the
jsult of performing algebraic operations with another transcendental
imber, say e, with algebraic numbers. But still there will be real
■anscendental numbers which cannot occur in the lists for the above
sason, because the possible types or patterns in which the symbols from
to 9 can be arranged are infinite in number. For instance in one kind
'
arrangement we have the rule that at every 125th decimal place we
.ve the digit 5> then in the other pattern we stipulate that at eveiy
:6th place there shall be a digit 5, or even two or more 5's, the other
nditions remaining the same. In short, we can change the pattern by
bitrary legislation. These possible types of patterns cannot be enumer-
ed. For if they could be enumerated it would mean that we could subsume
ese possible patterns under still more general patterns or under a
ngle pattern. The possibility of such a suggestion is ruled out for
e reason that we can arbitrarily change even the most general pattern
an arbitrary way and there is no rule how this alteration of pattern is
/
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effected. We can generate a real number by formulating a rule as to how
different digits should occur in a decimal expansion, e.g. we generate
a real number by the rule that in the proposed real number only two
digits, namely 1 and 2, occur, such that first the digits 1 and 2 occur
only once in their natural order (i.e., 0.12 ), then these digits
further occur two times each in the same order (thus becoming 0.121122...)
and then three times each, and so on. The possibility of such rules or
patterns for forming real numbers is unlimited and cannot be subsumed
under any general principle, rule or most general patterns. We can
always alter any fixed pattern for generating real numbers at will.
We thus reach the crucial conclusion that there can only be a non-
enumerably infinite number of patterns or arrangements of digits from 0
to 9. Hence we cannot have a finite number of principles, axioms or rules
for defining the transcendental numbers such that by applying these rules
we arrive at any transcendental number at some stage. About algebraic numbers
we know how they can be generated by a few operations and primitive symbols,
and hence a finite number of types exhaust all sorts of algebraic numbers.
This is so because algebraic numbers are characterized by a few common
algebraic operations and hence they must correspondingly exhibit certain
i
common patterns in decimal digits. The same cannot be said of transcen¬
dental numbers. For this reason we cannot enumerate them like algebraic
or rational numbers. Hence the set of, all transcendental numbers is inde-
numerable. Denumerability in the case of infinite sets implies that we
can have some finite number of principles according to which the numbers
in question can be arranged so that we can construct or enumerate any given
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lumber sooner or later. Now this is impossible in the case of non-algebraic
lumbers. A finite number of principles to generate numbers implies that
ve have a finite number of general types or patterns in our decimal system,
bid if we have an infinite number of general patterns to describe numbers,
;his implies correspondingly that we cannot have a finite number of princi-
)les for generating numbers. In order to have an infinite number of
general patterns, we need an infinite number of principles to enumerate
ill the numbers. So, no matter how many principles or ways of enumera-
;ing real numbers we use, there will always be an infinite number of real
transcendental) numbers which cannot occur in the enumerated lists, simply
lecause they can have no place in the given principles or methods of enumer¬
ations: they would belong to different patterns in the decimal system. It
s just as if we started enumerating natural numbers divisible by two; then
>dd numbers would naturally be excluded from the list or enumeration.
. Resolution of the Richard paradox
1. The Richard paradox and the indenumerability of real numbers
We have been able to show that the set of all real numbers is
ndenumerable. Richard himself at a later stage changed his mind and
dmitted the meaningfulness of the diagonal.* Hence his solution, des-
ribed earlier on page 104 can no longer hold. Now, as the set of all
eal numbers is indenumerable, there cannot be any finite number of rules
o enumerate them such that sooner or later any arbitrarily chosen number
ccurs in the list. But there is one list in which any such number could
ccur. That list is the one in which numbers are defined or described in
J. Richard, 'Considerations sur la Logique et les Ensembles',
Revue des Metaphysiques et Morales, 1920, pp.356-69.
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finite number of words, which are arranged in a certain lexicographical
rder as Richard describes in presenting the paradox. Now, as every
umber can be expressed in a finite number of words, it must occur in
he list. For Richard there would be a clear contradiction because he
as already assumed that such a list is denumerable. Therefore he
includes in his presentation of the paradox:
all the numbers that can be defined by means of
finite number of words form a denumerable set.
at us investigate this supposition. This takes us back again to
ae question: What is a denumerable set?
If the number of things under review is finite, obviously they
institute a denumerable set*: we can count them so that none is left
rev. If the set of things under consideration is infinite, the problem
i how to count them, such that every member of the set has a place in
le enumeration. The set of valid formulae, or even of well-formed
irmulae in the propositional calculus is an example of a denumerably
ifinite set. Here we have a few basic signs, and rules are given for
imbining these signs in a certain order. Even the ill-formed formulae
institute a denumerable set because we can always make rigid rules of
teir various ways of combining in the denumerably infinite number of
rmbols. In fact, given any denumerably infinite number of symbols, the
it of finite formulae arising out of the combinations of the initially
ven symbols is always denumerable. We give a simple proof of this
sertion. Yfe know that the set of natural numbers is denumerable. We
Sometimes the word "denumerable" is used only for infinite sets.
We need not make here any such distinction between "countable"
and "denumerable" sets.
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have a finite number of original symbols 0, 1, , 9- Any finite
formula originating by the combination of these symbols in fact represents
a number, hence the infinite set of these formulae is denumerable. In the
duodecimal system we have twelve original symbols. In another system we
may choose some other number of initial symbols to construct natural
numbers. In a natural language we have also a finite number of initial
symbols and therefore the set of sentences (or in fact any combinations
of letters making finite formulae) must be denumerable.
But a natural language is not simply a combination of symbols. In the
case of symbols representing numbers, they are unambiguous and have a
definite and fixed place in our thought; similarly in the case of an
axiomatic system. But the symbols in a natural language (say, words
here) do not stand for definite, unambiguous and immutable objects.
Not only are they ambiguously used but also the symbols or combination
of symbols attain a different meaning or significance depending on the
particular contexts. We cannot count the contexts or the situations on
which the meaning or significance of the symbols depends. The contexts
or situations cannot be enumerated: they emerge and no formulae can
predict their evolution or emergence. Our language serves to deal with
all occasions, contexts and situations; hence the symbols have to be
flexible to attain new meanings. This means that although the set of
phrases of a natural language, considered only as combinations of symbols,
is denumerable, considered with respect to their significance it is
indenumerable.
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Let us return to the Richard paradox. From the above discussion we
see that there cannot be a finite number of formulae to enumerate each
and every phrase of a natural language as intelligible units. Now,
insofar as each member of the indenumerable set of real numbers is
expressible or definable correspondingly by members of the indenumerable
set of a given language, there is no contradiction - both being indenum¬
erable sets. The trouble arises if we suppose that the set of phrases
of the language is only denumerably infinite. Of course if the set of
all sentences were denumerable, the set of all real numbers would also
have to be denumerable.
In this connection there may arise some confusion about the notion
of denumerable set. Suppose we have a diagonal number which does not
occur in our enumeration, then we can always make another enumeration
in which this particular number occurs along with others. Once numbers
are known, i.e. once they are properly defined or we come to know some
definite method for defining them, then they always form a denumerable
set. No definite, defined or known number can be said to be indenumerable
it is the set consisting of numbers which is properly called indenumerable
A set is thus indenumerable when we cannot by any enumeration exhaust all
the members; that is, sooner or later every member must appear in the
enumerating list.
§2. Concluding remarks
While discussing the Richard paradox, J. Tucker remarks:
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The source of the confusion is two-fold. It arises in part
from the usual failure to distinguish between the diagonal
and heterological patterns, in part from the superstition
that there has to be a one-one correlation between the things
talked about and the words used in talking about them. There
are accordingly two stages of clarification. The Richard as
a diagonal has to be distinguished from the heterological
contradictions. Then the grammatical confusion peculiar to
the Richard has to be cleared up.*
have already sufficiently discussed in what respects the diagonal
d the heterological patterns are similar and in what respects dis-
milar, and hence we need not comment on this point. On Tucker's
cond remark we would like to quote him:
The grammar of the Richard is the grammar of 'talking about'
and the trouble peculiar to the Richard is peculiar to
•talking about'.**
then indicates the nature of this trouble in the following words:
How, it is asked (at various levels of sophistication)
we can talk about the indenumerable if the number of words
in any possible language is merely denumerable? How, in
the case of one particular way of talking about, namely
defining, can we define each indenumerable number if the
supply of definitions is only denumerable while the things
to be defined exceed that supply?***
have underlined "each indenumerable number" in quoting Tucker above.
is difficult to'understand what Tucker means by these words. Are
rj transcendental numbers? His formulation of the Richard paradox
likewise difficult to understand. He states:




The Richard consists of two 'conflicting' statements:
(i) Only a denumerable number of numbers can be finitely
defined;
(ii) Indenumerable numbers can be finitely defined by
means of the diagonal.*
We have already pointed out that the so-called diagonal number can occur
in an enumeration other than the already planned one. So this diagonal
number is only indenumerable relative to the previous enumeration but
denumerable according to a new enumeration. We pointed out that in
fact no known particular number can be properly called indenumerable;
it is only a set which may be properly called indenumerable.
In a way Cantor seems to commit this error too. He tries to
prove that a particular number, i.e., the diagonal derivative number,
cannot occur in the denumerable list. What he should have tried to
show was that a particular set or class of numbers cannot occur in
the list, and not one particular number. Perhaps Tucker wants to em¬
phasise that there is no need of an infinite number of words to represent
or define the diagonal number as Richard in his first presentation of
the paradox suggested. Tucker is eager to emphasise the incorrectness
of the assumption that 'talking about' involves a 1-1 correspondence
between the things talked about and the words used in talking about them.
Even so, this does not seem to resolve the paradox. It soon appears
that Tucker wants to criticise those who think it impossible to talk
properly about an indenumerable set like the set of all real numbers
because the supply of definitions (in this formal system) can only be
denumerable. We quote Tucker once again:
* Ibid, p.54.
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Dixon assumed that 'talking about' involves a one-one
correlation between the things talked about and the
words used in talking about them; and Church makes no
advance on Dixon. Dixon took the argument as a sign
of what would now be called incompleteness: since the
set of finite definitions is denumerable, whereas the
real numbers are indenumerable there must be real
numbers about which we cannot talk adequately and
unambiguously. Church argues that since there is no
one-one correlation between any possible formal system
(denumerable) and number theory (indenumerable) we
cannot adequately talk about number theory by means
of formal systems.*
He further comments on Church:
.... He has not noticed that a simple extension of his
argument demolishes it. for the denumerability which
he attributes only to formal systems applies, if it
applies to them, to all possible languages, formal or
informal. But number theory must be in some language
and this language too must be denumerable. It follows
that there is no difference in size between the informal
language in which number theory is expressed and any
formal system and, on Church's own premiss, no such
thing as the Richard paradox. If it v/ere true that
the number of words in any possible language is denum-
erably infinite, and if it were also true that we could
talk about indenumerable sets adequately and unambi¬
guously only if we had an indenumerable number of words
available, then there would be no Richard paradox be¬
cause it could not be adequately and unambiguously stated.
But both premisses are false.*
Pucker seems to be confused about the nature of formal systems and
natural language. It is not the words as such that are important, but
their arrangements in phrases as intelligible units. We have already
remarked that the set of all phrases as intelligible units in natural
Language is not denumerable. In a strict formal system like proposi-
;ional or functional calculus, where every symbol has a fixed signifi-
* J. Tucker, 'Constructivity and grammar' pp.57-8.
See A. C. Dixon, 'On well-ordered Aggregates', Proceedings of the London
Mathematical Society, 1907, pp. 18-20.
See A. Church, 'The Richard Paradox', American Mathematical Monthly (1934),
pp.356-61.
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cance and where we can deal with symbols irrespective of their inter-
i
pretation, the formulae are bound to be denumerable. Hence there is a
marked difference between a formal system and a natural language. It
follows that in a strict formal system we cannot talk about every real
number because in such a system we can only produce a denumerable set
of formulae. And this denumerable set must exclude some real numbers. .
But as natural languages can be used in forming phrases constituting an
indenumerable set, we can talk in these languages about each real number
in sentences (definitions). Hence, Dixon is right in asserting that
'In any other aggregate whose cardinal number exceeds N0 it is similarly
impossible to give a finite description of each individual number'. This
follows from his assertion that 'by defining, describing or specifying an
object is meant stating such properties of it as distinguish it from all
other objects of mental activity'. Obviously there must be a one-one
correlation between numbers and their descriptions, and therefore not
all real numbers can be individually defined. But the inability to define
each individual member of the set of all real numbers does not mean we
cannot talk about the indenumerable set taken as a whole. Tucker seems
to be unclear about this distinction, too.
In conclusion we may remark summarily once again that the Richard
paradox arises from the incorrect supposition that the set of all sen¬
tences (definitions) in natural language is denumerable. It makes us





In this chapter we discuss the antinomies which we come across in
attempting to construct a consistent axiomatic set theory. We have intention¬
ally labelled these antinomies "set-theoretical" paradoxes and not "logical"
paradoxes in order to avoid any suggestion as to the status of set theory -
that is, whether or not axiomatic set theory should be counted as logic.
We now outline three such paradoxes: (l) Russell's paradox of the class
of all non-self-membered classes; (2) Cantor's paradox of the class of all
cardinal numbers; and (3) the Burali-Forti paradox of the class of all ordinal
numbers. We have already touched upon these paradoxes in the first chapter.
We assume certain basic axioms in our set theory from which we construct the
above-mentioned classes, which in turn lead to inconsistent derived formulae.
We start with the Russell paradox.
A. The Russell and related paradoxes
Cantor, the pioneer of set theory, in his earlier developments of set
theory did not explicitly lay down his basic axioms in order to serve as a
basis for deriving theorems. But it seems clear that he required the following
three axioms:*
* See P. Suppes, Axiomatic set theory, p.5«
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t
l) The axiom of extensionality: Two sets are identical if they have the
same members: (:c)(cc £ A s x £ ±s) D A = B
l) The axiom of abstraction: Given any property or description $, there
exists a set whose members are just those entities having that property
(3y)(x)(x £ y = <j> (x))', and
l) The axiom of choice.
Russell's paradox
Russell's antinomy is derived by uncritically applying the axiom of
faction. The axiom states that for every property or description there
i corresponding set. But let us consider a description of the class of
classes which are not members of themselves. V/e observe that this des-
ition results in a contradiction. V/e may briefly state the antinomy
irmally as follows:
(i) A class Y contains as members just those classes which are not
ers of themselves.
(II) Suppose I is a member of itself; but by definition Y contains only
e classes which are not members of themselves - hence Y is not a member
tself.
(Ill) Suppose now Y is not a member of itself; but by definition Y
ains all those classes which are not membex-s of themselves - hence Y is
mber of itself.
(IV) Hence Y can neither be or not be a member of itself. But by our
osition Y must either be or not be a member of itself. These statements
contradictory - (P v Q) is contradictory to (~»P . ~§). pr we may express
contradiction by remarking that as Y is a member of itself (J £ if) and J
ot a member of itself (Y fL Y) are contradictory, either alternative lead-
to its contradictory, i.e., ((P D~p) . (~P Dp)) s (p . ~p).
149
The emergence of this antinomy is not a trivial matter. When Russell
'ormed Frege of the antinomy in a letter, Frege was deeply shocked, for it
> as though the entire foundation of his edifice which he took such pains
construct was shaken.* In an axiomatic system of set theory the antinomy
■ be derived as follows
(1) (3y)(J0(X £ I" * j>{X)) Axiom of Abstraction
To obtain Russell's antinomy we take 0(X) to assert that X is
not a member of itself, i.e. X jt X- We have then an instance
of the above axiom-schema of abstraction:
(ii) (erXxHx er* x e x)
(III) Y £ Y *■" Y £ Y by instantiation in (II). (ill) is
logically equivalent to (T £ T . Y £ Y) ....
contradiction.
In order to avoid the antinomy there are several alternatives. One is
uphold the axiom of abstraction but den;/ that there could be such a class
Y on the ground that the description of this class is meaningless. For
defining characteristic of membership in ^ .... Xfi X .... is meaningless
so cannot be an instance in the axiom of abstraction, and hence cannot
lace <p(X). Russell takes up this line of argument. Accepting the basic
umption (axiom-schema of abstraction), he declared that there are meaning-
s phrases which nevertheless appear to be meaningful, tie offered a touch-
ne in the vicious circle principle whereby meaningless phrases like "member
itself" or "not a member of itself" are excluded. We have already sufficient-
iiscussed this principle. We pointed out that the principle is not semanti-
Ly unimpeachable and that there are several cases where the so-called
se: Frege, G-rundgesetze der Arithmetik, vol.ii, Appendix, pp.253-265 (transl.
i Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege, eds. Geach & Black, pp.234-244)•
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"vicious circle" is quite harmless. It may of course be offered as a pragmatic
justification or as an ad hoc arrangement to avoid certain paradoxes. But this
in no way proves the logical or intuitive certainty of the principle. As far
as Russell's solution in terms of hi3 theory of types is concerned it does
avoid the paradox because we cannot then meaningfully use X £ X and X jL X
But his theory of types as a basis for set theory is not only semantically
objectionable but also technically cumbersome, in addition to needing some
sxtra-logical assumptions. We have already on several occasions criticized
the theory of types. W. V. Quine also has aptly criticized the theory of
types in the following words:
But the theory of types has unnatural and inconvenient
consequences. Because the theory allows a class to have
members only of uniform type, the universal class V gives
way to an infinite series of quasi-universal classes, one
for each type, 'i'he negation ceases to comprise all
non-members of x, and comes to comprise only those non-
members of x, which are next lower in type than x. Even
the null class A gives way to an infinite series of null
classes. The Boolean class algebra no longer applies to
classes in general, but is reproduced rather within each
type. The same is true of the calculus of relations.
Even arithmetic, when introduced by definitions on the .
basis of logic, proves to be subject to the same re¬
duplication. Thus the members cease to be unique; a new
0 appears for each type, likewise a new 1, and so on,
just as in the case ofV andA . Not only are all these
cleavages and reduplication intuitively repugnant, but
they call continually for more or less technical manoeuvres
by way of restoring severed connections.*
"t is to be noted that the vicious circle principle does not necessarily lead
;o type theory. It is quite possible and consistent to uphold the principle
is far as set theory is concerned, not accepting a type-theory, but adopting
ome other methods to avoid the vicious circle. Let us now attempt to
iscover the real ground for the genesis of this paradox.
' W. V. Quine, 'New foundations for mathematical logic', American Mathematical
Monthly, Feb. 1937, P»7B, vol.XLIV. Reprinted in From a Logical Point of
View, pp.91-2.
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j2. The Curry paradox and others
The structure of the Russell paradox a3 such is obviously that of the
Jarber paradox. Our aim is not merely to legislate so as to prevent the
>ccurrence of 3uch a structure in our axiomatic system, but to determine the
•eal cause behind the paradoxical pattern of the Russell paradox. It may be
;hat we shall be able to adopt measures so as to prevent Russell'3 paradox,
>ut that other paradoxes having different structures arise because of the
lame underlying fault. For example, no direct derivation of the Russell
laradox is possible in Quine's system ML, but J. B. Rosser showed that this
;ystem embodies the Burali-Forti paradox.** It may be that the real cause
ehind the two paradoxes is the same. An axiomatic set theory constitutes
.n inter-related whole and in order to find the real cause of any set-
heoretical antinomy we have to find some fault in its basic axioms. And
n order to discover the faults in the basic axioms and rectify them, it is
seful to study various sorts of antinomies arising in the system. With thi3
im in mind, let us consider a few more antinomies originating out of the
xiom of abstraction. This will also throw light on the concepts of set and
et-membership.
As already remarked, the Russell paradox emerges by instantiation in
he axiom of abstraction. It may be surmised that one way of avoiding this
ontradiction would be to construot a set theory based on mapy-valued logic
nd not on classical or two-valued logic. In this way the meaning of negation
ould be changed and thus a set ma}' both be a member of itself and not be a
ember of itself. But the Curry paradox may be cited against such a
* See P. Suppes, Axiomatic Set theory. p.9»
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suggestion, for this paradox arises even when we do not employ any negation
sign. This paradox may be symbolically expressed as follows:
(1) (3r)(X)(AT £ Y m <f>(X)) Axiom of abstraction
(2) (3r)(x)U £ Y ■ {X £ X D (P . ~P)) <p(X) interpreted as
(X £ X D (P . ~P)) in (1).
(5) Y £ r ■= (r £ Y D (P . ~P)) by instantiation of (2)
(4) Y £ Y D (P . ~P) from (3) because [(P D (P D Q)) D {P D Q)]
holds in any finitely-valued logic.
(5) r £ T by (3) & (4), Modus Ponens.
(6) P . ~P .... by (4) & (5), Modus Ponens.
hence ary statement, e.g. (P . ~P) above, may be deduced.
The above discussion brings out the fact that the assumption that there
is a set corresponding to every predicate is untenable. Zermelo took thi3
line. The problem remains, however, as to which sort of predicate gives rise
to sets. For Russell, those predicates which do not give rise to set3 may be
regarded simply as meaningless. Zermelo's approacn is positive as compared
with Russell's, he tries to choose "good" predicates, i.e. those which serve
genuinely to describe sets. But Russell tries to eliminate "bad" predicates,
ie. those which do not describe sets. Let us examine a few more predicates
which purport to describe sets through the axiom of abstraction, thereby to
determine what sorts of predicates lead to paradoxical results. The paradoxes
arising from the following predicates may be regarded as belonging to the same
family as the Russell paradox. Let <f>{X) be interpreted as (Z) ~ (Z £ X . X £ Z)
or (Z)(W) ~ (Z £ X . X £ N . W £ Z) or (z)(X = Z D X £ Z) or (Z)(W)((X = Z . Z a
X jt W) etc. In each case the axiom of abstraction leads to contradictory
results. What is at the root of these contradictions?
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B. Description and existence of sets and the paradoxes
§1. Set-membership and the existence of sets
We shall argue that the above predicates run counter to the very nature
of set and set-membership. The identification of a set requires solely the
determination of its members. The axiom of extensionality states that two
sets are in fact identical if they have the same members; hence we may have
two or more different definitions of the same set. Two or more predicates
may seem to characterize different sets, but in fact these sets may contain
the same members, just a3 "evening star" and "morning star" denote the same
star. Now, the problem is what sort of definition is permissible to identify
the members of a set. To identify the members of a group is, in a way, to
define a set. The point to be noticed is that in trying to define a set, we
already presuppose the possibility of its "existence". Hence the defining
expression of a set should satisfy conditions for existence, among which is
that the defining characteristics are not self-contradictory. For example,
*
by defining a figure as a square-circle we rule out even the possibility of
its existence.. There simply cannot be such a figure. Existence implies
possibility and impossibility rules out even the possibility of existence.
A figure being a square-circle is impossible because it is impossible for a
square figure to be circular and vice versa, so that a square-circle cannot
exist. Similarly we cannot define a set by a contradictory description.
Construction of a set is tantamount to its existence, and the theory of sets
involves the construction of sets. Hence the defining description of a set
within axiomatic set theory must not involve a contradiction. For instance,
the null set may be defined as a set having no members or as a set which is
included in every other set; but not as a set whose members are those objects
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which are not equal to themselves, i.e. zfia\. Just as we cannot assert
the ideal existence of, say, a geometrical line defined as straight-crooked,
similarly we cannot assert the existence of an empty set by giving a contra¬
dictory condition of its membership. This fact is concealed in the case of
the null set because it is suggested that, as there cannot be an object a
which would satisfy z^a, it follows that the set in question is an empty 3et.
But one may reasonably argue that insofar as we define the empty set as a set
having only those members which satisfy the required condition (a^a) and that
sort of object cannot exist, it follows that there is no such set and hence
no such thing as the null set.
§2. Self-membership
The antinomies may emerge by overlooking the above point in defining a
set; that is, the contradictory definition of a set may lead to contradictory
results, as we noticed in the case of the Russell set of all non-aelf-membered
sets. To show that this definition is in fact contradictory, let us consider
another example: the set of all sets. This set, being a set, must be a member
of itself. We can show, on the other hand, that this self-membership is a
contradiction in terms. By the axiom of extensionality given above two sets
are the same if they have the same members. This implies that if two sets
have different members or a different number of members (a special case of
having different members), they are different sets; although under the above
assertion of extensionality this does not strictly follow. Suppose two sets
be the same but with different members, and in particular some set a member
of itself. But this supposition conflicts with the very concept of set. A
set has been defined solely in terms of its membership, as we intuitively
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iderstand the meaning of "set" or "class". Cantor defined a set (Menge)as
my collection into a whole M of definite and separate objects m of our
ituition or thought, which are called the "elements" of M'.* Patrick Suppe3
ifines a set as 'something which has members or is the empty set', i.e.:
is a set =
^ [(3x) (icGy) v y = 0,].**The essential characteristic of a set,
lerefore, concerns the notion of membership. This is the characteristic of
ie concept in general. No other characteristic is given on the basis of
dch we could distinguish one set from another. If this has been assumed
e sole defining characteristic of a set, why should it not be regarded as
e sole differentiating characteristic of sets? That i3 by virtue of this
aracteristic we differentiate not only sets from non-sets, but also one set
om another. If some other characteristic is regarded as a differentiating
ature, this would imply that membership cannot be regarded as the sole
I
cessary and sufficient condition of sets. As a set has always been treated
defined solely in terms of its members, it follows not only that two sets
e the same if they have the same members, but also conversely. Accordingly,
me logicians, e.g. P.R. Halmos, have given as the axiom of extensionality
wo sets are equal if and only if they have the same elements."*** So, if
o sets have different elements or a different number of elements, then they
e necessarily different 3ets. From this it immediately follows that a set
nnot be a member of itself. For as soon a3 we suppose a set to be a member
itself, then it no longer remains thh same set; a new set emerges which
LI have one new different member, namely the set in question. Consider a
G. Cantor, Contributions to the Founding of the Theory of Transfinite
Numbers, translated by Philip E.B. Jourdain, p.85-
P. Suppes, Axiomatic Set Theory, p.19.
* Paul R. Halmos, Naive Set Theory, p.2. See also, P. Bernays, Axiomatic
Set Theory, pp.8-9, 51-53«
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set A, A cannot be conceived of as a member of itself, for what would be con¬
ceived would be not A, but rather the set A U which is different from A. •
Suppose a set consists of two members x and y, i.e. {x,yj. If we try to make
this set self-membered, a new set appears, namely [a;,y, |a;,yj}. If the set in
question is finite, the effort to make it self-membered will lead to the
addition of another member to the members of the original set. ka in the
case given, the new set would have an extra member and hence be a different
set. If the set in question is infinite, the new set will not have more
members, but it would have one member (i.e. the original set itself) which
would be different from the members of the original set. Let us take the set
of natural numbers, i.e. |l,2,3, 1, then the new set becomes [il,2,3,••••},
1,2,3, }. Hence there cannot be a self-membered set.
It does not follow that there cannot be arything which is self-membered,
or that there cannot be something to which the axiom of extensionality does
not apply. The axiom of extensionality, for instance, does not hold in the
case of attributes. For a self-membered entity, we can cite the example of a
limited company. A limited company is composed of share-holders and the share¬
holders may be regarded as members of the company. Further, a company may be
a share-holder (member) of smother company or even of itself. The point to be
noticed is that a company will remain the same even if some of the share¬
holders cease to be members of it or some new share-holders join it. This
shows that unlike sets, the full nature of a company cannot be determined
solely in terms of membership or extension. One may construct a theory in
which an entity can be a member of itself, but that would not be a theory of
sets. In the theory of sets, self-membership is a contradiction in terms.
Hence it is no wonder that where we have a set which is immediately or
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Ltimately self-membered we arrive at contradictory results. An obvious case
aid be the class of all classes. This class, being a class, must by definition
a member of itself. But then the resultant class would have one new member
amely, the class in question) and thus a new class would emerge, and so on.
follows that there cannot possibly exist a class of all classes. The Russell
radox may be regarded as a special case of the above fallacy. As we know
it no class can be self-membered, it follows that the class of all non-self-
Qbered classes falls into the same category as the class of all classes.
. Formulae to avoid self-contradictory descriptions of sets
Similarly, we may arrive at a paradoxical situation if we posit a set
>se members are all sets having more than three members. Clearly there are
'e than three such sets. Hence the posited set has more than three members;
is it should be, by definition, a member of itself. But this is what a set
mot be. Thus we have given a self-contradictory description. Now, the
iblem arises as to how to avoid such defining expressions which immediately
in a round-about way lead to self-membership. We may take as an axiom:
' A. But there are other expressions like "A f. B . B f. A" or "A fL B • B C
1 f A" and so on, which are self-contradictory for the same reason. To prevent
h cycles, we may introduce rules to prevent the construction of such cycles,
. assert that these cycles cannot occur in the system. That is, formulae such
"A f. A" or "~(A £ B . B £ a)m must be taken as valid. Von Neumann introduced
axiom of Fundierung for this purpose. The simplified version due to Zermelo,
axiom of regularity, is given here:
A/03 &X)[X £ A . (y)(y £ X D y t A) ]-
s says that for any non-empty set A, there is a member X of A such that the
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ntersection of A and X is empty. This axiom can be easily justified intuit-
vely in accordance with the conception of set outlined above. Think of any
on-empty set A, and choose one of its members, say X. Now if X does not
appen to have any member, then the above axiom necessarily holds. If.X has
member, say yj, which is also a member of A, thus contradicting yj fL A,
hen instead of choosing X as our member of A, we select yj - for the axiom
ontains existential quantifier. The same process may then be repeated with
he set yj. If it has a member, say y^, which is also a member of A, we
aoose \)2 the member of A instead of yj and so on, till we reach a point
lere the intersection of the set A and at least one of its members is empty,
ius satisfying the axiom. Cyclic formulae like "A £ B . B £ A!' go against
re axiom.*
»•
Returning to the main problem, viz. what sort of description is legiti¬
me for defining a set, the one thing that has become evident is that this
sfinition or description must not run contrary to the axiom of regularity,
it there may be descriptions like "set of all sets exceeding three members"
lich are deceptive and we may only come to know their illegitimacy when we
>et a contradiction. To meet this problem Zermelo invented the axiom-schema
*
separation (Aussonderungs Axiom), given below, by modifying the axiom-schema
' abstraction. We shall show how the paradoxes are avoided by this amendment,
le Russell paradox is avoided as follows:
(1) (3r)(x)(x £ Y «■ (x £ Z • <p(X))) .... Axiom of Separation
(2) (ay)(x)(x £ r (x e Z • ~(x ex))) ••• ~(x e X) as an instance
of ^(x) in (1).
(3) y e y (rex. r £ r) — taking x = r.
t the result (3) is not self-contradictory because both sides could be false.
Cf. P. Suppes, Axiomatic Set Theory. pp.53-55«
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i do not get a contradiction because in this axiom we have to be given the
it Z; only then are we permitted to assert the existence of the sub-set Y.
i the very name of the axiom suggests, it is used to separate off from a
ven set only those elements which sdtisfy a certain predicate, thus forming
set consisting of just those elements. For instance, given the set of all
man beings, we may construct another set, the set of all human females, by
parating off all the members of the given set who possess the property of
mininity. The acceptance of this axiom leads to the following interesting
nclusion. Let us replace by X £ X, thus arriving at (2) as above. We
n show that Y ft Z must hold. Suppose it does not, then we have Y £ Z. Now
have either Y £ Y or Y £ Jf. If Y £ Y, then with our assumption of Y £ Z,
get the contradiction: £ Y ■ (Y £ Z . Y & Y)), i.e. (True = (True . False)).
Y 0 Y, even then we have the contradiction, i.e. (False » (True . True)),
nee we must have Y Z. (Thus also showing that in our result (3) above both
des of ■ must be false, thus avoiding Russell's paradox.) It follows that
ere can exist a set Y that does not belong to Z. As the set Z is any
bitrary set, it follows that there cannot be a set which includes every set.
j
fact, the admission of the universal class would lead from the axiom of
paration to the axiom of abstraction and therefore to antinomies. Hence,
sording to Zermelo's system, there cannot be such a set as the set of all
ts.
The above discussion leads to the question as to what sort of condition,
property or predicate is to be represented by <f>{X). Not every property can
, for otherwise we could posit a set which is a member of the given set.
?melo insisted that this condition must be 'definite'. In plain words, this
idition consists in predicates having significance for the elements of the
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*iven set, where a "significant" predicate is a predicate P such that if x £ M,
bhen either x ha3 the property P or it does not. E.g., the predicates "prime"
md "square" are significant, relative to the set of natural numbers. Thus
iermelo'3 axiom may be informally stated as follows: If M is a given set and
' is a property having significance relative to M, then there exists a sub¬
let of M having those and only those elements that have the property P.
'raenkel replaced the notion of "significant property" by determined formulae
ind thus removed the vagueness.*
It is clear that the step from the axiom-schema of abstraction to that
if separation is immense. By the principle of abstraction we could have "over-
>ig" sets like the class of all classes - as big as we like. But according
;o the principle of separation we cannot construct a set bigger than that of
, given set - the given set being already well-established by other axioms,
e cannot obtain, for instance, the set of all sets; rather, its impossibility
iay be demonstrated. In brief, in the Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory we construct
ets out of given sets by certain axioms like that of sum (Vereinigung).
airing and sub-3et formation. We cannot have the set of all sets having more
han three members because we cannot just arbitrarily define a set. A defini-
ion of a set must be governed by the restrictions imposed by given sets and
he formulae to determine the "significant property" in the axiom-schema of
eparation. We can, in accordance with the axiom of separation, construct a
et of all sets having more than three members only by separating or choosing
uch sets among the members (sets) of a certain already given set. Moreover,
his constructed 3et cannot be the given set. Otherwise it would become a
See G-.T. Kneebone, Mathematical Logic, pp.288-290: W. & M. Kneale, The
Development of Logic, p.682.
I ■
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lelf-membered set which cannot be constructed according to the axiom of separ-
ition. For we have shown above that X f. Z must hold true.
>. The Cantor paradox and the Burali-Forti paradox
We quoted Cantor'3 definition of set to illustrate the view that the
ifferentiating and defining characteristics of a set lie simply in its member-
hip. Our conclusion wa3 that on this meaning of "set", a set could not be a
ember of itself. Further reflection on Cantor's definition of "set" shows,
owever, that if we strictly follow it, we are led to contradiction. That is,
he definition itself seems to embody a contradiction. He defined a set as
any comprehension into a whole (Zusammenfassung zu einem Ganzen) M of definite
nd separate objects m of our intuition or our thought'. We can avoid any
eference to "mind" here and concentrate our attention on "sets", as consis-
ing of objects which are definite and separate. If the objects are finite
n number, we can count them and we can individually specify them simply by
roper names. But if the number of objects is infinite, then we have to
esort to a descriptive or definitional method of specifying them. In this
ay we define the set of all natural numbers. As every set is definite and
eparate, we feel justified in talking of the set of all sets, but this leads
o contradiction, as observed earlier. Insofar as numbers may be identified
Lth sets, a similar situation arises in the case of the set of all cardinal
imbers and the 3et of all ordinal numbers. For we are led to talk of the
reatest cardinal and the greatest ordinal, whereas according to Cantor,
lere cannot be such greatest numbers. Thus we come to the Cantor and
irali-Forti paradoxes.
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§1. The Cantor paradox
Cantor defines the cardinal number of a set M as follows:
.... the general concept which, by means of our active
faculty of thought, arises from the aggregate M when we
make abstraction of the nature of its various elements
m and of the order in which they are given.
We denote the result of this double_act of abstraction,
the cardinal number or power of M, by M.*
If, for instance, we have two sets, namely: (A) [Napoleon, Caesar} and (B)
[l, 2\, and we think of these sets irrespective of the nature of the members
and their order, then we are thinking about the cardinal numbers or powers
of these sets. According to Cantor, each member then becomes a 'unit', so
that the cardinal number M is a definite set composed of units.* Thus Cantor
says:
Since every single element m, if we abstract from
its nature, becomes a "unit", the cardinal number H is
a definite aggregate composed of units, and this number
has existence in our mind as an intellectual image or
projection of the given aggregate M.**
It is quite clear that by this double abstraction the above sets (A) and (B)
become one and the same set; they both have two units and so they have the
same cardinal number. It is clear that if two sets are equivalent in the
sense of equinumerous, i.e. if it is possible to find a law whereby they are
put in relation to one another, so that to every element of one there corres¬
ponds one and only one element of the other - then the set3 have the same
number of units and hence have the same cardinal number. So we have: if
tl C/^N, then M = N, where Hi/^N symbolises " M and N are equinumerous". This
neans that to every set there i3 a corresponding cardinal number and every
;ardinal number is, furthermore, itself a set. Two different sets may have
' G. Cantor, Contributions to the Founding of the Theory of Transfinite




the same cardinal number. One set has a higher cardinal number than another
if it has a proper subset equivalent to the other. But the reverse is not
true. In addition to finite cardinal numbers, Cantor talked of transfinite
cardinal numbers, A set, consisting of all finite cardinals, has a trans-
finite cardinal number; it cannot have a finite cardinal number since then
Lt would be a member of itself and could not be the set of all finite cardinal
lumbers. Now, according to Cantor there are an infinite number of trans-
finite cardinal numbers, because by Cantor's theorem the set of all sub-sets
jf any given set has a greater cardinality than that of the given set. Thus
ve have the assertion that there is no greatest cardinal number. But let us
:onsider, on the other hand, the set of all cardinal numbers. This set,
leing a set, has a cardinal number. In fact, it should be the greatest
:ardinal, thus contradicting the previous assertion.
j2. The Burali-Forti paradox
This is also called the paradox of the greatest ordinal. An ordinal
lumber in Cantor's theory is constructed as follows:* A set is ordered if the
irrangement of its elements in the set is an essential feature of the set
onsidered. A set is simply ordered by the binary relation if for any
;wo distinct elements x and y of the set either x h y or y x holds, h
eing non-reflexive but transitive. We shall call this the relation of
recedence. Two simply ordered sets M and N may be called similar (MC/T.N)
f there exists a one-one correlation between them which preserves their
elation of precedence. From the concept of similarity we have the concept
Ibid., pp.110-118, 137-159. See also G.T. Kneebone, Mathematical Logic
and the Foundation of Mathematics, pp.l60-l6l.
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of ordinal-type. If two sets are similar they have the same ordinal-type,
otherwise not. Thus any simply ordered set M has a property, the ordinal-
type ST. If every non-empty sub-set of the simply ordered set M has a first
nember with respect to the relation of precedence (i.e. the set is well-
>
ordered by h), then the ordinal-type of this set is called an ordinal number.
Phe set = [ 3,2,1] is not well-ordered but the set co = [l,2,3, ]
Ls well-ordered. The set [l,3,5, 6,4,2] is not well-ordered though it has
i first element, because one of it3 sub-sets, the set of even numbers, has no
Mrst element. It is obvious that every sub-set of a well-ordered set is well-
ordered. If we obtain from a well-ordered set M a subset A which constitutes
ill the elements preceding a definite element m of M, this sub-set may be
sailed a segment of M - e.g. the segment determined by the first element of M
.s the null set. Ary two well-ordered set3 are either similar to each other
>r one of them is similar to a segment of the other. Hence well-ordered sets
;an always be compared with respect to their cardinal numbers. A well-ordered
et cannot be similar to any of its segments. It is because of this character-
.stic of comparability that ordinal-types of well-ordered sets are called
rdinal numbers. For instance, thd 3ets N = [3,4,5, ] and. N = [4,5,6,....1]
/
Lave ordinal numbers: the ordinal number of N is less than N because N is
imilar to the segment of N determined by the element 1.
We may now succinctly express the Burali-Forti paradox by two conflicting
tatements:
(l) The series of all ordinals up to and including any given
ordinal exceeds the given ordinal by one. For instance,
suppose we have an ordinal number (well-ordered set), say
3: [0,1,2], The series of all ordinals up to and including
3 would be: [0,1,2,3] = 4, thus giving rise to a higher
ordinal than the given one.
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(2) The series of all ordinals has an ordinal number, i.e.
the set of all ordinals is well-ordered.
(2) implies that there is a greatest ordinal number but (1) implies that
here cannot be a greatest ordinal because a still higher ordinal emerges out
f the given one. Hence the contradiction arises.
3. General remarks
Both paradoxes can be constructed in certain systems of set theory,
neir exact formulation depends upon what axioms we have in our set theory
nd how we define cardinal and ordinal numbers in terms of sets. The above
Drmulation of the Burali-Forti paradox, for instance, assumes the well-
~dering theorem that every set can be well-ordered, which i3 in fact equi-
ilent to the axiom of choice. If we reject this proposition, then we may say
lat the set of all ordinal numbers is not itself well-ordered. We can define
irdinal and ordinal numbers in terms of sets in several ways. The purpose of
set theory is fulfilled if it exhibits in 3ets the structural patterns and
iterrelations characteristic of numbers. The paradoxes therefore can be
cpressed in terms of sets. We may, for example, express the Burali-Forti
iradox in terms of Von Neumann's theory without reference to the axiom of
loice. We present below this paradox, following the definition of ordinal
imber due to R.M. Robinson:*
Definition of transitivity: T(°c) *-* (y)(z)((Y £ Z • z 6 ) D T £°c )
Definition of cormexivity: c(»c) (r)(z)((r £<x: . Z £oC ) d(Y£ZvZ£Y
v z a y))
Definition of foundation: F(°c) (r)T(r D°c . Y £ A) d (32)((z £ Y • z f> Y)
-A)]
Definition of ordinal: 0(°c) «-► (T(«) . C(°c) . F(°<))
See, R.M. Robinson, 'The Theory of Classes, A modification of Von Neumann's
System*, Journal of Symbolic Logic. 1937» PP»35~36. F.v. Kutschera, Die
Antinomien der Logik. pp.40-41.
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>o a set is an ordinal number if and only if it satisfies the predicates of
;ransitivity, connexivity and foundation. For example, the set [f\, [a|, |a, [a}}}
slearly satisfies all these conditions. Consider now the set of all ordinals,
fe can easily show that this set should satisfy all three conditions and herjce
.tself must be regarded as an ordinal number. Hence this set must be a member
if itself. But the definition of foundation goes against the self-membership
if a set. Thus the ordinal number in question satisfies the requirement of
'oundation, but being self-membered also goes against it. Hence the contra-
.iction.
. Resolution of the paradoxes
1. Zermelo-Fraenkel's and von Neumann's approaches
As the paradoxes are considered in a context of particular definitions,
heir avoidance is also dependent on these definitions. The common feature of
hese formulations is that ultimately we reach "biggest" sets, like the set of
11 cardinals or ordinals, which appear to satisfy the conditions of cardinality
r ordinality. These sets either ultimately have to be self-membered - as we
ave shown in the case of the Burali-Forti paradox, following Robinson's
efinition of ordinal - or go against Cantor's theorem. Once we exclude such
biggest" sets, we may consistently hold that there is no largest cardinal,
rdinal or set of all sets. Zermelo took this line of approach. We cannot
onstruct such "biggest" sets in Zermelo-Fraenkel's axiomatic set theory. The
icistence of self-membered sets and hence the self-membership of those "biggest"
Bts is denied by the axiom of regularity. The sets are constructed by axioms
ike that of Elementarmengen. Potenzmenge or Vereinigung. We cannot talk in
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this set theory about the set of all cardinals or ordinals as there i3 an
mending hierarchy of sets having ever-increasing cardinality or ordinality.
That we cannot talk in this set theory about such "biggest" sets may
seem an unsuitable restriction on mathematical predicates and entities. We
nay wish to talk about properties 3uch as self-identity which belong to all
mtities. Or we may likewise wish to talk about each and every cardinal or
>rdinal. Thus we may wish to define a set which contains all such entities.
ron Neumann's approach is to provide for these "biggest" sets like the set of
ill ordinals or cardinals. He regarded the limitations imposed by the Zerinelo-
'raenkel set theory as excessively severe. Accordingly, he divided classes
.nto sets and proper classes. All sets are classes as well, but not vice
•ersa. Those classes which are not sets are called proper classes. The
.instinguishing mark of proper classes is that they are not members of any
lass. So, von Neumann's sets are the same as Zermelo's, and hence his set
heory incorporates Zermelo's set theory. But his theory of proper classes is
.n additional feature. To draw an analogy, we may say that every event has a
ause and so construct a series of connected causes; but then we may decide to
osit an ultimate event, which is not caused by any other event. Similarly,
e may go on constructing classes, or ordinals and cardinals in terms of classes,
nd then decide that there are ultimate or proper classes which are not members
f other classes. These proper classes are typified by the class of all sets
r class of all ordinals or cardinals. As these proper classes cannot be
embers of any class, no self-membership is involved and hence no contra-
iction results, as long as we keep in view the definition of cardinality and
rdinality given above.
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Now the following difficulty arises: at what stage of our construction
3houid we say that we have now reached proper classes? For instance, when we
reach the ordinal numberiowW , would the next class only be a proper class?
Co say simply that we have a proper class of all sets or of all cardinals is
just an ad hoc stipulation made to avoid contradiction. Also it seems that the
fery concept of class as such implies that it can always be a member of another
;lass. Hence, we can always go on forming new classes ad infinitum. It seems
irtificial to put an end to this infinite process of forming new and different
classes.
j2. Intuitionistic approach
So far we have discussed solutions for the antinomies of axiomatic set
;heory (l) in terms of Russell's theory of types, through applying the vicious
:ircle principle to eliminate characteristics which do not make sense; (2) in
;erms of Zermelo-Fraenkel's limitation concerning the existence of sets; and
3) in terms of von Neumann's distinction between proper classes and sets,
lut there i3 another approach to the problem and that is to dissolve it, saying
;hat there is in reality no problem and no paradoxes insofar as the existence
if these i3 simply the result of our own misguided attempts to construct an
ixiomatic set theory. This i3 the intuitionistic approach. For intuitionists,
;he problem of set-theoretical antinomies does not exist; in their theory we
.o not have to deal with the paradoxes since the very question of paradox does
lot arise. Indeed, they take the paradoxes as a sign that the logicist's and
he formalist's approaches to set theory are incorrect. According to an
ntuitionist, we have an intuition of 'units' in succession and thus we have
atural numbers. Kronecker, a precursor of the intuitionists, remarked:
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"The natural numbers were made by God, all else is the work of man".* The
intuitionists thus try to build the edifice of mathematics by construction
from natural numbers. Indeed, for them mathematical existence lies in con-
structibility. "Construction" means the production of something else by
starting from simple objects in whose nature we have insight (i.e. natural
numbers) through a finite number of steps. For example, the well-ordering
theorem is not acceptable to the intuitionists because it asserts the exist¬
ence of a "well-ordering" without really showing how to construct it. For
the same reason, intuitionists do not wholly accept the law of excluded
middle. They accept tnis law only in a limited way, namely where it is
"intuitively" clear, as in the case of a finite set. For instance, if S
were a finite set of rational numbers, they would accept that S either con¬
tains a prime number or it does not. But if S were infinite they would not
accept that the falsity of the falsity of an assertion about S implies the
truth of the assertion. For example, we do not know yet whether the sequence
1234567 occurs in the decimal expansion of ir. If we show that rejection of
the hypothesis that this sequence occurs in ir leads to absurdity, this is no
proof that ir contains this sequence. Verifiability is truth. For this
reason the intuitionists do not accept Cantor's Theorem. Moreover, because
of the concept of constructibility, the intuitionists admit only denumerably
infinite sets. On their view, as we cannot construct ascending series of
transfinite ordinals and cardinals, we do not come across any paradoxical
situation.
* Cf. R. L. Wilder, Introduction to the Foundation of Mathematics, pp.192-195*
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§3. Our suggestion
The mathematics which intuitionism offers is no doubt soundly based, but
it puts excessively stringent limitations on our mathematical methods. Cantor's
theory of transfinite numbers is a bold attempt to construct a mathematical
edifice using only laws of logic and without resorting to introspective con¬
struction. We argued in the last chapter that Canto's theory of transfinite
numbers, involving the construction of an infinite number of transfinite
numbers, cannot, by his proof, be rationally constructed out of and linked
with the rational or real number system. Hence, unless some other proof is
provided, the Cantorian transfinite edifice tends to obscure the distinction
between universal and particular mathematics, which we shall explain now.
Our common-sense belief is that there is one and only one proper mathe¬
matics, just as there is one and only one logic (i.e. a system of rules of
deduction or entailment). From this common-sense point of view, just as the
laws of logic are universal and immutable, so are the theorems of proper
mathematics. We endorse the common-sense opinion that a mathematical propo¬
sition, say "2+2=4" holds true in any mathematical or numerical universe
just as an entailment rule or a valid logical formula, say "p D p", holds in
any argumentative universe. We may describe a mathematical system which has
such validity as universal mathematics. Hence, the theorems of universal
mathematics must be presupposed as valid in order to construct any mathematical
or numerical system. The theorems of universal mathematics do not tell us how
things in the universe actually or possibly are. Although "2 + 2" is valid,
i.e. holds universally, we may develop a different sort of mathematical or
numerical system in which "2+2=1" is derivable; and although a x b = b x a
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holds universally in the domain of real numbers, we may nevertheless develop
a non-commutative algebra which holds true for the behaviour of certain
actual objects, say in the domain of quantum physics. For the construction
of a mathematical system applicable to an actual or imaginary realm we have
to regard the theorems of universal mathematics as valid. We shall more¬
over describe such a mathematical system as an instance of particular mathe¬
matics. An instance of particular mathematics lacks the validity which
universal mathematics possesses. Just as particular rules concerning the
physico-mental universe (say Newton's system, many-valued logic or Hegelian
logic) presuppose the rules of entailment as such, similarly the instances
of particular mathematics do not affect the validity of universal mathe¬
matics. The theorems of particular mathematics are derivable within their
particular systems, and which, if regarded as universally true, may even
contradict each other'3 theorems or theorems of universal mathematics. We
may assert after Heraclitus that the whole universe is in flux and hence
make a rule p . ~p. But even in arguing for or with this principle in
rational arguments we have to presuppose the validity of entailment rules
or laws of logic where ~(p . ~p) holds. Laws of logic are not laws about
how things actually or possible behave. Likewise theorems of universal
mathematics are not formulae expressing how things in the universe actually
(or possibly) behave. The laws of logic are laws of valid reasoning which we
employ whatever arguments we are discussing. They are presupposed and implicitly
or explicitly exploited in any argument in everyday discourse or in discussing
laws or theorems about physical or mental phenomena. Similarly, whatever
instance of particular mathematics we construct, it must presuppose and exploit
universal mathematics. For example, let us construct a numerical system in
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which the multiplication of matrices is given as follows:




2 Vl ♦ °2bl °l°2 + °2b2
X
d, d 2 b. b2
It can be easily seen that this multiplication is non-commutative. But in
defining such a multiplication and thereby creating such a numerical system
etc. stand for other complicated concepts involving commutative algebra).
Non-commutative algebra is simply a particular numerical system with matrices.
Consistency is required both in systems of particular mathematics and in the
system of universal mathematics. But the construction of any possible parti¬
cular mathematics presupposes universal mathematics. And it is in this fact
that the validity of universal mathematics lies. In our sense of the term,
particular mathematics may or may not be applicable to any particular objects
in the universe and existence amounts simply to freedom from contradiction
within the particular system. There can be several sorts.of particular mathe¬
matics. But we hold that there is one and only one universal mathematics to
which validity is attached and which cannot be otherwise without foregoing
this validity.' The objective criterion for this validity of universal mathe¬
matics lies in the fact that any numerical or mathematical system must pre¬
suppose for its construction the validity of universal mathematics. The
subjective criterion for the validity of universal mathematics is provided
by our own subjective intuition of realizing that the theorems of universal
mathematics are immutably, universally and necessarily true - as, for example,
that "2+2=4" always holds.
Now, what are instances of universal mathematics? Number theory may be
cited as an instance of universal mathematics. Again construction of a system
we have to use commutative algebra when multiplying say OjCi| etc. (unless
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of rational or algebraic numbers is to be included in universal mathematics.
Now, how do we achieve the validity of universal mathematics? The intuitionists
answer that universal mathematics is to be founded on our intuition of 'units'
in succession and 'introspective constructions*.* The logicists would say that
insofar as mathematics is derivable from logic, it ha3 the validity of logical
principles. But it seems clear that mathematics cannot be derived from logic,
however sophisticated the logical manipulations we perform. We cannot show
that the axiom of infinity, for example, is derivable from logic as we commonly
understand the term "logic". On the other hand, if we accept the intuitionistic
thesis, we cannot have the full real number system. Nor would we be permitted
to employ the law of excluded middle where it seems intuitively legitimate.
For example in the case of the number If we seem to be justified in our assertion
that its decimal expansion either contains the series 1234567 or does not
contain it.
Our suggestion would be to build up mathematics step-by-step as the
intuitionists suggest, but furthermore to widen the concept of "constructibility"
and to eliminate the "subjectivity" involved in it. Let us quote Heyting to
illustrate the intuitionistic view of mathematical construction:
(Brouwer's programme) consisted in the investigation
of mental mathematical construction as such, without
reference to questions regarding the nature of the
constructed objects, such a3 whether these objects exist
independently of our knowledge of them. That this point
of view leads immediately to the rejection of the principle
of excluded middle, I can best demonstrate by an example.**
Then he gives as an example the definition of an integer l:'i d® dhe greatest
prime such that 1-2 is also a prime, or 1=1 if such a number does not exist'.
* See L.E.J. Brouwer, 'Intuitionism and Formalism' in Philosophy of Mathematics
edited by P. Benacerraf and H. Putnam.
** A. Heyting, Intuitionism, pp.1-2. Words in brackets are our own.
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Heyting argues that this definition must he rejected. The intuitionists
'consider an integer to be well-defined only if a method for calculating it
is given'. It may be argued that we may prove at 3ome later stage that such
an integer does exist and that our knowledge is not yet advanced enough to
say for certain. So in a conceivable case 1 may be defined though we cannot
actually calculate the number. In reply Heyting says simply:
In the study of mental mathematical constructions "to
exist" must be synonymous with "to be constructed."*
Hence if we cannot construct the integer 1,- we cannot say whether 1=1. or not.
Hence the law of excluded middle does not apply. It is clear that the
intuitionists identify the concept of "true" (in mathematics) with that of
"verifiable". If we cannot show the manner of verification or falsification
of a mathematical theorem, we cannot talk of its truth or falsity. We may
reasonably reject this thesis and assert that "true" i3 a wider concept than
verifiable and cannot be identified with it. Why can only our 'introspective
constructions' lead to the truth of validity of mathematics? Our extension
of the view of construetibility would obviously permit the law of excluded
middle as for instance in the case of the assertion that ir either has or has
not the sequence 12345&7 in decimal expansion. No doubt the intuitionists'
method of 'introspective construction' provides us with methods to prove and
construct mathematical theorems. But why should we limit ourselves to thi3
method? If we attach objective truth or validity to logical theorems, why
should we not do the same with mathematical truth? Thus the intuitionists
may be accused of having a myopic view of reality.
* Ibid.
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Furthermore our insiight or intuitive understanding guides us to a
decision as to which methods are to be used as we continue to develop mathe¬
matics. In our effort to build up mathematics we are aided by the notation
and the various concepts used in mathematics. They do help us in our under¬
standing and appreciation of mathematical lay-out and structure, and they Bhed
light on the reasoning involved in mathematics. The change from Roman numerals
to Arabic ones was a great step in the development of mathematics. The work
performed by algebraic numbers cannot be achieved by rational numbers alone.
The introduction of the concept of limit marked a step further forward in the
formation and expansion of mathematics. The things which we would like to
express in terms of limit cannot be expressed in terms of definite rational
numbers alone. Similarly, the introduction of the concept of set is another
step in the development of mathematics. At each stage of development we meet
several sorts of difficulties and we have to use methods of reasoning which we
were not accustomed to before. We simply cannot legistlate beforehand that
only such-and-such types of arguments are permitted in mathematics. At each
stage of development we have to assess and examine the validity of the argu¬
ments used. These considerations can be summed up in two conclusions:
(1) The whole of mathematics cannot be moulded and shaped in a strictly
formalized system. Godel's incompleteness theorem supports this thesis.
(2) We cannot legislate beforehand that certain types of arguments are
the only ones to be used in mathematics. I'hi3 assertion runs counter to the
formalists' programme as well as against the intuitionists who insist that
mathematical existence is only possible through 'constructions'.
lie noted in the last chapter that Cantor's argument, demonstrating that the
cardinality of a given set is less than that of the set of all sub-sets of the
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set, is not sound. Were Cantor's argument valid, we would be justified in
constructing a series of an infinite number of transfinite cardinals.
Our point of view is to eliminate the predominant note of subjectivity
in the thesis of the intuitionists. Intuitionists assert that we have an
intuition of 'units' in succession. From this we derive natural numbers and
thence by 'construction* we arrive at rational and algebraic numbers. In
short, mathematics is valid only so long as it is constructed from this basic
intuition. One may say: we accept that we have this intuition, but why should
the mathematical system based on this intuition have a superior status? It
used to be 3aid that we have 'intuition' of Euclidean space, but how can
Euclidean geometry be regarded as superior to non-Euclidean geometries? The
construction of a non-Euclidean geometry in no way logically presupposes the
theorems of Euclidean geometry. Again our perception of Euclidean space
cannot necessarily be regarded as a universal feature of the universe, as our
investigation into the universe has led us to believe. On similar lines one
may argue that mathematics based on the intuitionist's thesis of intuition of
'units' in succession and 'construction' may not be valid. It is no more than
i
a reflection of the intuitive powers of the human being. Another being, say
a superman, may have a different intuition of "units"; he may, for example,
always apprehend two units and two units as three unit3 in succession. Our
reply to this criticism and fantastic claim is that this sort of criticism
may be levelled against logic or entailment rules in general as well. Our
position against intuitionists is that we claim the objective validity of
mathematics. Our mark of validity for entailment or logical rules like p
implies p is that if our attempts to reason are out of harmony with logical
rules, then we soon find ourselves.in confusion. We cannot argue unless we
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recognise implicitly or explicitly the validity of entailment rules. Similarly,
a mark of validity for universal mathematics lies in the fact that we cannot
construct any mathematical or numerical system without the assumption that
the former is valid. From our point of view, our intuition of 'units' in
succession and the intuitionists' method of 'construction* are simply means
to discover universal mathematics. We may even furthermore assert that we
have an intuition of "duration", a "mental continuum" and further that we
have an innate intuition or capacity to break any duration or continuum into
parts. The analysis of such intuitions may be expressed in the real number
system. Again, one may assert that we derive natural numbers from our external
observation of distinct objects and the real number system is an effort to
express in a number system an objectively seen line. All these intuitions,
insights or observations are no more than means of discovering and constructing
universal mathematics and they help each other in the development and mapping
out of the structure of universal mathematics. And our assertion that there
is a universal mathematics is based on the fact that it has validity which
particular mathematical systems cannot help but acknowledge and exploit. Our
basis of universal mathematics seems to involve circularity: it rests on our
intuitions, clear perceptions and certain insights which are corrected and
justified by the objective criterion of validity and vice versa. But the
same thing holds true for logical truths, i.e. for entailment rules. Logical
principles are intuitively given and justified by their consistency and
validity and vice versa.
It follows from the above discussion that we should not have such a
narrow view of construction as that of intuitionists, but rather accept any
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argument or method which seems to our rationality sound. As suggested these
rational arguments cannot be specified once and for all, but are discovered
as we proceed with the construction of universal mathematics.
We are justified in positing only two transfinite cardinals, namely
that associated with a denumerably infinite set (e.g. the set of all natural
numbers) and that associated with an inderiumerably infinite 3et (e.g. the set
of all real numbers), as discussed in the last chapter. We are not justified
in constructing a series of ascending transfinite cardinals without any
rationally sound proof. Hence we are not presented with the paradox of the
greatest cardinal or ordinal. Our view is to maintain strictly the distinc¬
tion between universal and particular mathematics which we formulated earlier.
Hence to our mind, the status of the Cantor edifice of transfinite numbers in
the system, insofar as it admits more than two transfinite cardinals, is that
of particular mathematics, unless it is demonstrated to be otherwise. That
is, theorems relating to Cantor's system, which imply that we have an infinite
number of transfinite numbers, do not have universal validity like the theorems
of finite cardinal arithmetic, e.g. 2 + 2 = If this system serves some
useful purpose as particular mathematics, there is all the more reason to
develop it. And for this overgrowth on universal mathematics we need to have
consistency as a criterion for the development of transfinite set theory. One
proof that axiomatic set theory, involving infinite number of transfinite
cardinals, should not be regarded as a part of universal mathematics, i3 that
we notice that different sorts of axiomatic set theories, as for example that
of Zermelo-Fraenkel or that of von Neumann, have been constructed, and that the
theorems from these even contradict each other when given the status of universal
mathematics. As these set-theories are logically independent of each other,
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they do not show the sort of validity which universal mathematics is supposed
to possess.
It may be asserted that there exists no ultimate distinction between
universal and particular mathematics; that a sheer conceptual approach in
building a mathematical or numerical system may not presuppose the validity
of universal mathematics; that all the mathematical systems are just concep¬
tual games in which the respective systems of rules of each are essentially
logically independent of each other. But we have no proof for such an asser¬
tion and it runs counter to our intuitive belief and the arguments which we
have been pursuing. We see the impossibility of creating a particular mathe¬
matical system without presupposing the validity of universal mathematics.
Unless we have strong reason to repudiate this distinction we should uphold
it. Further research may throw helpful light on this point. In case there
is ultimately no such distinction, then there are in fact no such paradoxes
to be resolved, in the sense that their emergence does not lie in our
rationality and that they emerge because of our own resolution to construct
such a system. In short, then, there is no philosophical problem about these
paradoxes because philosophical speculation in general lies in the elucidation
and construction of rational thought.
Appendix
j
The paradox of the Unpredictable Examination
The paradox may "be stated as follows: A teacher announces in class that
there will be an unexpected examination on some day during the next week; i.e.
either on Monday, or on Tuesday, or on Wednesday, or on Thursday, or on Friday.
By an unexpected examination he means that the students will not he able to
know on which day there will be an examination before the day of the examina¬
tion. One student objects by saying that there cannot be such an examination
and that the teacher has contradicted himself. He argues, if the examination
is held on Friday, the students will come to know the day of the examination
on Thursday night because Friday will be the only possible day left for the
examination. Further, such an examination cannot be held on Thursday because
the students will come to know on Wednesday night that as the examination
cannot be held on Friday, the only day left for the examination is Thursday.
For similar reasons the examination cannot be held on any of the other days.
But the teacher retorts that if he holds the examination, say on Tuesday,
how could the students know it beforehand? So, such an examination can he
held. Hence the contradiction emerges that such an examination can be and
cannot be held. It arises from the fact that we permit the students to suppose
that they will be able to make more than one (here it would be five) prediction
in the course of the week; but the teacher's conclusion that the examination
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can be held, follows from forbidding more than one prediction. Hence the
two contradictory conclusions do not arise from the same premisses. The
paradox is resolved, once the nature and number of predictions (the nature of
prediction being interpreting prediction of logical deduction) permitted is
made unambiguous and definite.
The paradox of Protagoras and his pupil
It is stated that Protagoras tutored his pupil on the agreement that
the pupil would pay the fees in a lump sum only when he first won a case at
court. The pupil abandoned the idea of practising law after completing his
studies. Protagoras got worried and impatient about his fees. At last he
sued his pupil in court and argued that if he (Protagoras) won the case, then
by the decision of the court his pupil would have to pay the fees; but if he
lost the case, then by the agreement his pupil would have to pay the fees.
So whether he lost or won, he would get the payment. The pupil, in his defence,
argued that if he lost the case, then by the agreement he would not have to
pay the fees; and if he won, then by the decision of the court he did not
have to pay. The judge got confused and adjourned the case. Perhaps the
solution lies in simply dismissing the case and thus no question of losing
or winning the case on either side would arise, that is just maintaining the
status quo.
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